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The problem of this thesis is the discovery of 
scientific knowledge and the importanee of discovery for 
understanding the rationality of science. I will argue that 
an adequate account of the rationality of science must 
include an analysis of discovery, and that many of the 
problems that have arisen for philosophers of science are the 
result of their failure to examine discovery. 
Clearly, this position :runs counter to traditional 
wisdom in philosophy of science which holds that philosophy 
of science concerns itself only with the justification of 
scientific knowledge and that discovery is the province of 
the pyschology or, perhaps, the sociology of science. 
DISCOVERY AS A DIRECTION FOR PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 
I will argue that discovery is more than merely 
another problem that deserves its niche in philosophy of 
science. It represents, instead, a new direction for philos-
ophical research into scientific knowledge. I will argue 
that pursuing discovery will provide a b:roader framework for 
l 
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understanding science than the Justification alternative. In 
fact, the framework for the rationality of science developed 
through the discovery approach will be shown to be 
sufficiently broad to encompass justification. 
What is it about discovery that gives it philo-
sophical significance when so many have assumed that it was 
the realm of creativity and impenetrable to logic? The 
answer to this question lies in the movement of the discovery 
process. In dealing with a problem the scientist is seeking 
an explanation of it such that it will no longer be seen as a 
problem but will instead become paC't of' that which is 
expected. The explanation is a theoC',Y, of course, and 
discovery can thus be seen as' moving from observation to 
theory. However, it can also be seen as moving from a 
problematic observation to a non-problematic observation. In 
either case the discovery problem will involve the character 
of observation and the relation between observation and 
theory. To deny that the character' of observation and the 
relation between observation and theory are relevant to an 
empirical characterization of science would seem 
unreasonable. 
THE JUSTIFICATION APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 
How does this relate to the problem encountered by 
writers in philosophy of science 't I w111 argue, beginning 
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with Thomas Kuhn in Chapter II, that many of those problems 
stem from inadequate and self-defeating concepts of 
observation. Kuhn, as I will show, accepts the claim that 
observation is theory-laden, but he interprets that claim as 
essentially destroying the objectivity of science, insofar as 
it is based on observation. Observation for Kuhn becomes a 
matter of consensus of a community of scientists and this has 
powerful implications for his philosophy of science. One 
such implication is his assessment of the limits of philos-
ophy of science. Science, he says, is rational only during 
periods of stability because these are the only times when 
consensus on observation statements is achievable. Philos-
ophy of science, then, is limited in its characterization of 
the rationality of science to those stable periods when 
testing or justification relation is functional. I will 
argue that Kuhn's limits on philosophy of sciences are too 
narrow and that his abandonment of objectivity is 
unnecessary. 
In Chapter III I will examine a position taken by 
Ernest Nagel which attempts to include the theory-ladenness 
of observation without the limitations or loss of objectivity 
that Kuhn was willing to emb I:' ace. He accepts theory-
ladenness but argues that observation terms and statements 
are nonetheless relatively stable in comparison to theory 
terms and statements because, although theory-laden, they are 
laden with "common sense." He ful:'ther argues that while 
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theory-ladenness does create problems of circularity in the 
testing relation, those problems can be avoided simply by 
choosing evidence that is not laden with the ·theory being 
tested. I will argue that Nagel has not improved the 
situation left by Kuhn. Kuhn describes the theory component 
of observation as an "arbitrary element" and Nagel describes 
theory as a ''free creation" of the scientist. Consequently, 
they both treat observation as if it were at least partially 
determined to be what it is by the theory component. Nagel 
says, for instance that "significant observation involves 
more than noting what is immediately present to the organs of 
sense" ([1], p. 24). Kuhn reaches the more radical conclu-
sion that with the development of a new theory we observe a 
different world ([2], p. 111). 
Both Kuhn and Nagel assume that in embracing the 
theory-ladenness of observation they must admit that theory 
determines what the evidence of observation is in a genera-
tive sort of way, that is, that theory in theory-laden 
observation is responsible to some degree for fabricating the 
evidence obtained through observation. In this interpreta-
tion of theory-ladenness theory determines an observation in 
the senses of making it possible and in dictating in part the 
content of the knowledge gained through the observation. 
The result of this interpretation of theory-ladenness 
for Kuhn is that testing ·in science is circular since the 
observations that are offered as support for any theory are 
dependent on that theory for their meaning. 
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In fact, Kuhn 
holds that many observations that were once possible on the 
basis of particular theories that no one believes any longer 
are no longer possible. Further', he believes that during 
periods of major theory change, the testing process breaks 
down entirely and the scientist is reduced to conversion 
tactics in order to persuade his colleagues. 
Nagel attempts to avoid such a radically unempirical 
conclusion about science by arguing that while the knowledge 
gained through observation is determined to be what it is in 
part by theory, observation terms are relatively more stable 
than theory terms and that observation terms essential to 
describing situations that are Pelevant to testing a theory 
are often not laden with theory. I applaud the latter 
defense of the empirical character of science, but it is 
still a weak sense of "empirical~ since the knowledge gained 
through observation is treated as paPtially fabricated by 
theory. 
I will further show that Nagel continues to believe 
that circularity in the testing relation is a problem. The 
solution he offers is prudent choice of evidence. I will 
argue that a more reasonable and more empirical solution to 
this problem is an analysis of the relation between theory 
and observation. 
The same assumptions about the theory-ladenness of 
observation motivate others to argue for a theory-neutral 
interpretation of observation. 
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In Chapter IV I will argue 
that this interpretation leads to a characterization of 
observation that is too indeterminate to yield knowledge of 
the world. 
While Nagel and Kuhn accepted the claim that 
observation is theory-laden, they failed to analyze how 
theory arises in relation to observation. The theory-neutral 
approach, on the other hand, seeks to separate theory from 
observation entirely in order to avoid the rationality 
problems encountered by positions like that of Kuhn. Having 
separated theory from observation, there seems no way to get 
them back together. 
THE DISCOVERY ALTERNATIVE 
The problem for philosophy of science, as I will 
argue in Chapters V and VI, is not to keep theory and 
observation separate or even to limit their relationship, but 
rather it is to analyze that relationship in order to see 
what sort of characterization of scientiI'ic knowledge is 
justified. 
That analysis was begun by N. R. Hanson with his 
logic of discovery. The function of theory in theory-laden 
observation, Hanson found, was to provide a context within 
which problematic phenomena make sense or become non-
problematic. What I will do is extend Hanson's analysis of 
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theory-ladenness in order to draw out the implications of 
theory-ladenness for testing in science. This analysis has 
logical priority over the assumption that theory-ladenness 
implies that the theory determines what the world is like (in 
the strong sense of fabricating and making observation 
possible) since it proposes to examine the relation between 
theory and observation before reaching any conclusion about 
theory-function in the observation process. 
The analysis of the relation between theory and 
observation in the testing process will be supported by an 
analysis of that relation in the observation process itself. 
That analysis will be given in terms of the contributions 
from the world in the form of energy and from the observer in 
the form of theory. Energy, I will argue, is not alterable 
by theory. The function of theory, however, is describable 
in terms of its ability to select from the available energy 
data and to connect that data in appropriate ways. 
Among the conclusions that I will reach on the basis 
of the discovery approach are: 
1. A re-interpretation of the justification-
discovery distinction as a continuum. 
2. A new basis for the theory-observation 
distinction other than empirical content. 
3. A dissolution of the problem of the meaning-
dependency of observation terms on theory. 
8 
4. A solution to the problem of the non-rejection of 
theories in the face of counter-evidence. 
5. An interpretation of scientific truth with less 
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CHAPTER II 
THE IMPLICATIONS OF THEORY-LADENNESS 
FOR THE HISTORY AND RATIONALITY OF SCIENCE 
In The Structure of Scientific Revolutions Thomas 
Kuhn found himself in what appeared to be a dilemma. The 
history of science provided ample testimony for the fact that 
the growth of scientific knowledge was more complex than that 
for which the model of simple accumulation of data and theory 
could account. Scientific change, Kuhn saw, involved more 
than addition, it also involved subtraction. He had no 
difficulty marshalling theories and "facts" from the past 
that no one would consider good science today. The other 
side of the dilemma came from his belief that science was 
empirical. It seemed to Kuhn that science made genuine 
contact with the world and that it had done so even in its 
distant past using theories and data that are no longer 
accepted. 
Kuhn was faced with unattractive alternatives. He 
had either to treat the history of science as partly 
irrational or make adjustments in the concept of the 
rationality of science. The latter course might not have 
been unattractive except that the adjustments amounted to 
10 
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reductions. The rational! ty of science, as Kuhn described 
it, is limited to epochs. When major changes occur the 
rationality of science breaks down. He saw no way to develop 
a trans-revolutionary criterion of rationality in science. 
I will argue that Kuhn's philosophy of science is an 
elaboration of the implications of two principles. The first 
is the traditional empiricist assumption that the basis of 
objectivity in science lies in consensus on the content of 
observation statements. And the second is the theory-laden 
character of observation. Kuhn was faithful to both 
principles and I will show that the problems he encountered 
arise from incompatibility between them. 
Did Kuhn actually accomplish the replacement of 
traditional philosophy of science with historical insight as 
he promised? I will argue that he succeeded in shedding 
light on science in several ways, including a deeper 
understanding of discovery and the conditions necessary for 
change in science. But I will also argue that his 
understanding of the theory-ladenness of observation leads 
him to an anti-empirical position with regard to science 
which has inadequate philosophical content for the void left 
by confirmation and falsification. He does not succeed in 
providing an alternative account of the rationality of 
Science for two reasons. First, his concern for science 
remains with the charact~r of the testing relation; the 
normal science/revolutionary science distinction amounts to a 
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definition of the limits of that relation. And, second, his 
misunderstanding of the meaning of the theory-ladenness of 
observation leaves him stranded with little else to do but 
define the limits of a system of thought that he believes he 
has rejected. 
My argument will have three steps. First, I will 
provide a summary account of Kuhn's analysis of normal 
science and revolutionary science in order to see what it 
actually accomplishes as a replacement of earlier approaches 
to philosophy of science. Second, I will show how his 
emphasis on the history of science shaped his understanding 
of the theory-ladenness of observation. And, third, I will 
argue that with this understanding of the theory-ladenness of 
observation, he was limited in what he could accomplish as 
well as predisposed to the sorts of problems that arose with 
his theory. 
NORMAL SCIENCE 
Normal science begins for the first time with the 
victory of one of the pre-scientific schools over all the 
others. This usually happens with the solution to a problem 
that was recognized at least in some form by most of the 
pre-scientific investigators into this part of nature. That 
achievement usually has two essential characteristics: 1. 
It is sufficiently unprecedented to attract a group of 
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researchers away from other modes of scientific activity, and 
2. It is sufficiently open-ended to leave all sorts of 
problems for this group to work on ([l], p. 10). 
A number of consequences follow from the evolution of 
pre-science to science. First, it is no longer necessary for 
each researcher to elaborate and defend the fundamentals of 
his work. With the dominance of a particular arbitrary 
element there is consensus within the community on 
fundamentals such as the types of entities that populate the 
universe, how they interact with each other, and the 
appropriate methods for investigating them. This is what 
Kuhn describes as the emergence of the "paradigm." The 
paradigm includes the theoretical commitment which is the 
same thing as the arbitrary element for Kuhn, but it also 
includes such things as research techniques, instrumentation, 
"exemplars" (in the sense of finished pieces of research that 
serve as instances of successful application of the paradigm, 
often for the purpose of teaching the students of the 
science), and much more. 
Having achieved consensus on the arbitrary or theory 
element, science progresses with far more efficiency than it 
could have otherwise. This is due in part to agreement on 
fundamentals, but it is also due to the psychological 
assurance that the past success of the science offers. The 
researcher is encouraged by more than the promise of further 
success, however. The paradigm that grows up around the 
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science includes methods and tools which have also proven 
effective ([1], p. 38). Community adoption of a particular 
interpretation of nature has the effect of getting research 
off the ground and directing it toward problems of a sort 
that have proven solvable in the past. 
For Kuhn, science does not progress in spite of the 
theory-ladenness of observation as it did for Nagel, but 
because of it. It is only if we have a theory to augment 
observation and experience that we can assess the relevance 
of the available facts and develop methods and instruments to 
deal with them. Having achieved this level, researchers have 
a great deal to work with as well as a history of sucess to 
encourage them. 
Kuhn says that his new image of science will be one 
in which fact and theory are not categorically separable, 
"except perhaps within a single tradition of normal-
scientific practice" ( [1], p. 7). Why does he allow this 
exception? It would seem that the dependence of fact on 
theory would be as great in normal science as in situations 
where that dependence becomes problematic in that it leads to 
a revolution. What he seems to be saying is that during 
normal science theory input into observation is not a 
problem. Since consensus has been achieved on the theory to 
employ, facts can be treated as if they were independent of 
theory. This is similar to Nagel's attitude toward the 
problem of theory-ladenness. As long as there is a 
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foundation on which all normal observers can agree, the 
evidentiary status of observation is saved. 
Kuhn understands normal science as those periods when 
debate about fundamental assumptions is minimal or non-
existent. Research during these times proceeds in a fashion 
which is amenable to the cumulative model. Fact and theory 
in these periods seem separable because the facts serve their 
testing function in a non-problematic way. Normal science 
is, in this sense, philosophically non-problematic science. 
However, Kuhn's concept of normal science does more 
than merely tag it as that part of science which satisfies 
the conditions of testing in the "standard view" of science. 
It also tells us ..!!:!.l_ science is cumulative, why there is 
little debate over fundamentals, and why science in this 
situation proceeds with such efficiency. Having a theory to 
guide research and having that theory held in common have a 
powerful impact on science. 
It is interesting that Kuhn does not concern himself 
with the problem of circularity in the testing that occurs in 
normal science. Nagel will avoid this problem after admit-
ting the theory-ladenness of observation by placing the 
commonly held theory outside of science, but this option is 
clearly closed to Kuhn. It is the dominance of a particular 
theory that results in the emergence of science from pre-
science. The reason for his lack of concern is most likely 
that he remains committed at some level to science as an 
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empirical endeavor. "Observation and experience," he says, 
"can and must drastically restrict the range of admissible 
scientific belief, else there would be no science" ([l], p. 
4). Observation and experience are not sufficient, as we 
have seen, since the contribution of the perceiver is 
essential. But the arbitrary element or the theory 
contributed by the perceiver is not the whole story. The 
world which is experienced allows only a range within which 
such theory assisted observation can function. It continues 
to make itself felt, even though the way it is felt is 
determined in part by the perceiver. Is this a form of 
circularity? Perhaps, but not in the logical sense that that 
which needs to be proven is presupposed by the evidence. 
Part of what needs to be proven~presupposed, but not all. 
The evidence is shaped by the theory, Kuhn would allow, but 
not generated in its entirety by the theory. 
REVOLUTIONARY SCIENCE 
The arbitrariness of the theory element has an 
additional aspect to it. It facilitates progress in the 
conservative sense discussed so far, but it also leads to the 
major changes that Kuhn calls revolutions. This seems odd in 
light of the fact that the aim of research during normal 
science is not innovation- of either fact or theory, but is 
more of a "mopping up operation," an attempt to force nature 
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to fit the contours of the paradigm ( [ 1], p. 24). How does 
research with this sort of motivation lead to major innova-
tions and the ultimate rejection of the paradigm that guided 
it from the beginning? The answer to this lies in the very 
arbitrariness of the element contributed by the perceiver. 
11 So long as those commitments retain an element of the 
arbitrary," Kuhn says, "the very nature of normal research 
ensures that novelty shall not be repressed for very long" 
( [ 1], p. 5). In other words, an arbitrary characteriza,tion 
of nature is necessarily limited. It achieves dominance 
because of a spectacular solution of a problem. And it 
proceeds to solve problems in part because of the diligence 
of researchers who "force nature into its contours." But 
this cannot last indefinitely. Sooner or later, a problem 
will arise that cannot be forced into the "conceptual boxes" 
provided in this approach. When this occurs we have the 
beginning of a revolution. 
The failure of a paradigm is usually heralded by a 
discovery. To say "unexpected discovery" would be repeti-
tious for Kuhn since the aim of science, under "normal" 
conditions, is not to generate discoveries, but to make the 
phenomena that are already known fit into the paradigm. If 
something unexpected arises, an "anomaly," the first response 
is to try to show that it is compatible with the paradigm. 
If this attempt fails repeatedly then future attempts tend to 
incorporate assumptions that diverge further and further from 
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the paradigm. As this process goes on it becomes increas-
ingly difficult to achieve consensus on just what the 
paradigm really is ([1], p. 83). 
Kuhn offers this analysis as a replacement of older 
philosophical theories because, among other reasons, 
anomalies are almost never treated as counter-instances 
al though in the language of philosophy of science that is 
what they are. If scientific theories were rejected in the 
face of anomalies all scientiic theories would have to be 
rejected at any given time. To do this would be to reject 
science itself, for bringing anomalies into the fold of the 
paradigm is the major research activity of normal science. 
He argues that scientific revolutions are 
"necessary." What he means by this is that radical changes 
of the sort which involve the rejection of part of what was 
previously considered scientific knowledge are essential to 
the evolution of science. Science might not have been this 
way, he admits. The "logical structure" of science does not 
require it. Instead, new discoveries might involve only 
previously unknown phenomena and new theories might represent 
only higher level integrations of previously divergent fields 
([1], p. 95). 
This is just what the latter day logical positivists 
would have us believe, Kuhn says. They take development by 
accumulation as the ideal for science and treat instances 
Where this did not occur as the result of human idiosyncracy 
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( [ 1], p. 96). They claim, for instance, that Newton's laws 
of motion were not proven wrong by the theories developed by 
Einstein. Newton's laws provide good approximations when the 
velocities of the objects studied are small in comparison to 
that of light. Any wider claims made by the Newtonians, the 
positivists say, were not supported by the evidence and were, 
therefore, "unscientific" ( [ 1], p. 99). Kuhn counters that 
if scientific assertions were limited in scope and precision 
to phenomena clearly supported by the evidence, that most of 
scientific research would become illicit, "unscientific." 
Scientists would be limited to talking about those discover-
ies which are only part of the history of their science. 
The assumption that science grows through simple 
accumulation also ignores the disparity in fundamental 
assumptions which always accompanies revo1u tionary change. 
The convertibility of matter to energy, part of modern 
physics, was inadmissible in the Newtonian paradigm, for 
instance ([l], p. 102). 
In other words, the positivist notion of growth by 
accumulation fails on two fronts. First, it refuses to admit 
that the process of growth in science-pushing a paradigm 
until it fails is scientific and, second, it cannot account 
for fundamental disparity between competing systems. 
The cumulative acquisition of unanticipated novelty 
almost never occurs in science, he points out. While 
accumulation does occur, during periods of normal science, 
the discoveries are usually anticipated. 
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And when discov-
eries are not anticipated, as was the case with the discovery 
of X-rays, they are often not cumulative ([l], p. 96). 
This discussion helps to explain why it is often 
difficult to determine just when a discovery is made and who 
should be credited with the discovery. Discovery is 
accomplished in steps, the first of which is the gradual 
realization that that which is being discovered does not fit 
into the current paradigm. The second step is the develop-
ment of an alternative paradigm that is capable of explaining 
the discovered phenomenon as well as much that the old 
paradigm explained. These steps take time and they are 
frequently contributed to by many researchers. It is only in 
retrospect and for the sake of simplicity that particular 
discoverers and precise dates are designated. 
KUHN'S HISTORICAL METHOD 
Why did Kuhn characterize the contribution of the 
perceiver as "arbitrary"? The primary reason is that he was 
impressed by the deep differences that have existed between 
scientific descriptions of the world in various times in its 
history. He traces an interesting back and forth shift on 
the admissibility of innate forces which demonstrates this 
point: Aristotelian dynamics, he says, were rejected largely 
because it included the concept of innate forces. Aristotle 
21 
explained the falling of a stone, saying that its innate 
nature drove it toward the earth. The commitment to 
mechanico-corpuscularism in the Seventeenth Century excluded 
such qualities as "occult" and unscientific since they were 
not included in that paradigm ([l], p. 104). Newton's 
concept of gravity caused problems for the same reason. 
While the standards of corpuscularism remained in effect the 
search for mechanical explanation of gravity was one of the 
most important problems among those accepting the Principia, 
including Newton himself. Failing to find such an explana-
tion, and unable to proceed without Newtonian theory, gravity 
was gradually accepted as a force innate in particles of 
matter ([l], p. 105). This acceptance had impact in other 
fields such as electrical theory where it leg! t imized the 
concept of attraction at a distance, leading eventually to 
Franklin's interpretation of the Leyden jar experiments and 
to a Newtonian paradigm for electricity ([l], p. 106). And, 
finally, Einstein's theories represent a shift back to pre-
Newtonian science in that they explain gravity without 
reference to innate forces ([l], p. 108). 
Another reason is his commitment to the belief that 
science is empirical. It seemed to him that past scientic 
theories did a creditable job of making sense of the 
Phenomena with which they were confronted. They did not 
merely manufacture those phenomena. Their theories were 
concocted in response to the environment. 
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Kuhn was faced with making sense of two aspects of 
science. First, radical change was revealed in its history, 
and second, that history also revealed that out-of-date 
systems of belief were both empirical and often highly 
successful ways of explaining the natural environment. He 
tried to explain both of these facets of science by treating 
science (and perception itself) as an amalgam of (a) genuine 
impact from the environment and (b) a creative contribution 
by the scientist. By retaining the impact of the environment 
he could keep his conception of science in accord with a 
basic commitment to empiricism. And by adding an element to 
perception that was arbitrary in the sense of being 
contributed by the perceiver and not by the environment, he 
had a way of explaining change in science that could reach 
all the way to observation. Further, he could accommodate 
such change without designating all previous bodies of belief 
as unscientific, as myth, or as simply in error. 
THE SUCCESS OF KUHN'S REPLACEMENT 
It is clear that Kuhn's theory of science is success-
ful in some respects. He is able to explain the rapid 
progress of science under "normal" conditions by demonstrat-
ing the guiding aspect of the paradigm. He ls also able to 
explain major change in· science without adopting an anti-
historical interpretation of science. He has shed new light 
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on discovery, and he has explained why scientists are 
tolerant of apparent anomalies. 
But has he solved the problems which will cause Nagel 
and Thrane to try so diligently to avoid the theory-ladenness 
of observation as a part of their philosophies of science? 
Has he developed a theory of science which can replace the 
analysis of the testing relation as the model for the 
rationality of science? I believe that the answer to these 
questions must be "no." As Frederick Suppe points out, most 
of the criticisms of Kuhn have centered on the assertion that 
his concept of revolutionary change in science is fundamen-
tally irrational, and that he ultimately characterizes 
science as unempirical ([2], p. 150). Kuhn contributes to 
these criticisms with claims such as his "different worlds" 
thesis, saying that after a revolution the scientist responds 
to a different world ([l], p. 111). He seems to be saying 
that theory is not only constitutive of science, but that it 
is also constitutive of nature. He is uncomfortable with 
this claim, calling it a "strange locution" ([l], p. 118). 
However, he feels that we must somehow make sense of both 
attitudes, that even though the world has not changed with 
paradigm change, the scientist works in a different world. 
The reason is simple--what occurs in a r~volution is not 
merely the re-interpretation of old data, but it also 
involves the emergence of-new data ([l], 121). 
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Kuhn attempted to accomplish both these ends with one 
theory. By retaining the impact from the environment he 
hoped to keep his theory on firm empirical grounds. And, by 
introducing an arbitrary contribution by the perceiver he 
thought he could explain revolutionary change. He did 
explain many things about revolutionary change that previous 
theories had failed to explain, but he did not provide a 
rational structure for such change. In fact he denies that 
this sort of change is rational at all. It is a matter of 
conversion instead of proof, he says ([l], p. 148). 
He attributes to the dominant epistemological 
paradigm of recent time the attitude that experience is fixed 
and neutral while theory is the man-made interpretation of 
the neutral data provided by experience. This paradigm no 
longer functions effectively but in the absence of an 
alternative, he says, he cannot relinquish it entirely ([l], 
p. 126). 
The part of that paradigm that he did not relinquish 
is the genesis of theory. He sees theory as the free 
creation of the perceiver in the same way that Nagel and 
Thrane will see it. What does this mean for his philosophy 
of science? In combination with his belief that observation 
is theory-laden, it is a powerful assumption. Observation, 
given this pair of assumptions, is far more than merely 
theory-laden. It is at least partially theory-fabricated. 
This creates no problem as long as the theory is accepted by 
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the entire community of scientists, but it makes choosing 
between competing theories necessarily non-rational. The 
evidence is fabricated in different ways from the perspective 
of each theory. 
But Kuhn's attitude toward theory genesis is not the 
only reason why he comes to apparently non-rational conclu-
sions. His philosophy of science retains another component 
of the dominant epistemological paradigm, its emphasis on the 
testing relation. His work can be read without distortion as 
a definition of the limits of philosophy of science, or of 
the limits of rationality in science. Testing proceeds as 
Nagel's "familiar methodological principle" would have it 
during normal science, but it breaks down occasionally, and 
these occasions are called revolutions. 
His philosophy of science is constructed from incom-
patible components. He retained the "free creation" model of 
theories, but in the standard view of science this was but 
one of two principles that served in the analysis of the 
testing relation. The other was the belief that observation 
was theory-neutral or at least not laden with the theory 
being tested. His attempt to replace the positivist and 
falsificationist approaches to philosophy of science could 
not succeed. He retained the free creation model of theory 
and concern for the testing relation, but he gave away the 
second principle that se~ved in the analysis of the testing 
relation. Testing can make sense of science only if one of 
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the principles remains stable. Since neither of Kuhn's 
principles remained stable he was pre-disposed to non-
rational consequences. 
In summary, Kuhn proposes to replace the standard 
interpretation of the rationality of science with an analysis 
of its history. He is motivated to do this by the 
recognition that change in science has often involved more 
than mere re-interpretation of old and stable data, but may 
also involve change in the data as well. Ultimately, he sees 
this as the result of an arbitrary contribution on the part 
of the perceiver. 
The arbitrary element has much positive influence on 
science. It provides direction and tells the researcher the 
relevance of available facts. Without it science and 
perception itself would be impossible. Its arbitrariness, on 
the other hand, guarantees that its usefulness will not last 
forever. Its usefulness ends with a discovery it cannot 
accommodate and with the emergence of another such element 
that can account for the discovery. 
Kuhn has been able to explain many elements in 
science which are ignored or denied by other philosophical 
theories. I have argued, however, that he has not been able 
to achieve an alternative model for the rationality for 
science, and that the primary reason for this failure is his 
interpretation of theory as the "free creation" of the mind. 
Consequently, the theory-ladenness of observation is 
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interpreted as at least partial theory-fabrication of 
observation. 
Is there a way to retain Kuhn's insights into science 
and avoid his non-rational conclusions? I believe that there 
is, but a new model of theory and of the theory-ladenness of 
observation must be developed if this is to be done. The 
theory-ladenness of observation must be taken as a problem 
for careful examination in philosophy of science in order to 
see what it really means. One should not assume, as Nagel, 
Thrane and Kuhn have all done, that its meaning is clear and 
that its place as an assumption for philosophy of science is 
unproblematic. 
The theory-ladenness of observation as a problem for 
the philosophy of science will be my starting point in Part 
II. The general character of my approach to philosophy of 
science will change as a result. The examination of the 
testing relation, for instance, will not be the first order 
of business. Until the meaning of the theory-ladenness of 
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CHAPTER III 
THE IMPLICATIONS OF THEORY-LADENNESS FOR 
THE STABILITY OF EVIDENCE IN SCIENCE 
Many attempts have been made to solve the problems 
that dominate Kuhn's work. Few philosophers have been will-
ing to enbrace his conclusion that a significant part of 
science, its periods of major change, are non-rational. The 
concomitant conclusion that there is no trans-revolutionary 
cirterion of rationality has been found equally unpalatable 
by most philosophers. 
In "Theory and Observation" Ernest Nagel offers a 
solution to the problems brought by the theory-ladenness of 
observation. He grants that theory-ladenness destroys any 
inherent difference between theory and observation statements 
and terms, but he argues that differences in "use" of these 
statements and terms are sufficient to ground the distinc-
tion. He further argues that differences in stability 
between theory and observation statements and terms justifies 
the continued assumption of a viable testing relation between 
them. In an additional argument he tries to show that, while 
circularity can be a problem as a consequence of theory-
ladenness, the problem is manageable merely by choosing 
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evidence that is not laden with the theory being tested. In 
other words, Nagel argues that pholosophy of science can 
accommodate theory-ladenness with no major change in its 
characterization of the rationality of science. 
I will argue that the concept of the basis of ration-
ali tY has not changed with Nagel, but continues to be based 
on consensus on the content of observation reports. I will 
show that this continued assumption undercuts all his 
attempted solutions. 
Nagel's article is important for the added reason 
that it brings out a concept of theory that is as problematic 
as his concept of observation. The reason, I will argue, is 
the separation of theory and observation that results from 
the failure to examine discovery. 
Nagel has three arguments which are intended to show 
that the testing relation in science has not been compromised 
by the admission of the theory-ladenness of observation. One 
involves his concern for the relative stability of observa-
tion terms. and statements mentioned above. He argues for an 
identifiable class of observation terms which are not subject 
to the vicissitudes of theories in science. He locates this 
class, or sub-class, since it does not include scientific 
uses of observation terms, outside of science in what might 
be called "common sense" or normal, everyday uses of observa-
tion terms. He calls these uses of observation terms "core" 
Uses as distinguished from "peripheral" uses of the. same 
terms in science. 
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I will argue that the placement of the 
"core" of observation terms outside of science puts observa-
tion beyond the ken of philosophical analysis. 
A second argument defends the continuing viability of 
the theory/observation distinction, given that observation is 
theory-laden. In this argument Nagel first concedes that 
most if not all of the "inherent differences" that had been 
assumed to exist between theory and observation terms and 
statements are dissolved by the admission of the theory-
ladenness of observation. He goes on to argue that none of 
these supposed differences are essential to maintaining the 
distinction, and that their loss does not impair the function 
of the theory/observation distinction in the analysis of the 
testing relation in science. All that is needed, he says, is 
to identify different "uses" to which the two sets of terms 
are put in the actual conduct of scientif le inquiry. The 
uses he identifies are interesting, opening up the possibil-
ity of a broader investigation of scientific knowledge. I 
will argue that instead of investigating the possiblities 
implicit in the uses he identifies he actually abandons them 
as a source of insight into science and falls back on the 
different levels of stability mentioned above as a criterion 
of different uses. 
His third argument is his defense of testing as non-
circular. He admits that circularity is a problem. If an 
observation term that is laden with a particular theory is 
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used in an observation statement that purports to test that 
theory then the test is circular and not valid. But as he 
indicated at the outset, he believes that observation terms, 
though theory-laden, are not meaning-determined by the entire 
set of theories and laws that make up a science at a particu-
lar time. Such a term can be used to test any theory or law 
other than the particular one that determines its meaning. 
He adds a historical argument against the seriousness of the 
circularity problem. I will argue that his historical argu-
ment is well taken and that circularity in scientific testing 
is not a serious problem at all. I will show that the reason 
why Nagel took the problem seriously was due to his inade-
quate concept of scientific theory, and that given that 
concept of theory, circularity is indeed a serious problem. 
THE RELATIVE STABILITY OF OBSERVATION TERMS 
Nagel grants that changes in theories and laws 
!nevi tably affect the way in which terms laden with those 
theories and laws are used. This is true even for "basic 
terms" like "red." The redness of a star, for instance, may 
be regarded as the effect of its motion and not as its 
genuine color after certain theoretical advances are made. 
He cal ls this a "peripheral" use of the term 'red' and he 
says that there remain "c~re" uses of such terms such as the 
color of apples and traffic lights which remain unchanged 
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with theoretical changes of this sort. This is what he means 
by "relative stability." The relative stability of the 
"core" uses of observation terms is what, in part, makes the 
theory/observation distinction both warranted and useful, he 
says ([1], PP· 33-34). 
It has been pointed out, he goes on, that the world 
might have been different, that one can conceive of physi-
cally possible circumstances in which the core meanings of 
observation terms would not apply. The argument is not 
relevant, he says, since relative stability is significant to 
the understanding of scientific knowledge even if it cannot 
be demonstrated that it is "cosmically necessary and 
unalterable ([2], p. 34). 
In a later argument he makes a similar point, saying 
that when theoretical statements that report observations are 
threatened we must pull back to statements including predi-
cates of "normal perceptual experience" ( [ 2], p. 37). In 
this way ordinary non-scientific language provides a sort of 
foundation for science that is always available if theoret-
ical expansions of knowledge fail to pan out. 
It is interesting to note that both the "peripheral" 
and "core" uses of red are dbservation terms. The 
"~eripheral" uses are those found in science and "core" uses 
are "normal" or 'common sense" uses of observation terms. 
Relative stability has - been demonstrated not between 
theoretical terms and between 
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scientific and non-scientific uses of observation terms. 
This is the consequence of the theory-ladenness of observa-
tion, of course. Having accepted that observation is 
theory-laden, Nagel cannot deny that the observation terms of 
science are theory-laden and therefore subject to the 
vicissitudes of scientific theory. Non-scientific uses of 
observation terms are theory-laden in some sense as well, 
according to Nagel, for he has already granted that "signifi-
cant observation involves more than noting what is 
immediately present to the organs of sense" ( [ 2], p. 24). 
But the non-scientific uses of observation terms do not have 
their meaning determined by science. It is here that their 
relative stability and their value lies. 
This is not the problem of circularity because it is 
not a particular testing relation that Nagel is worried 
about. Rather it is the general character of the ground of 
testing that concerns him. 
terizes science then a 
If testing is that which charac-
stable ground of test must be 
isolated. It is not, apparently, to be found within science 
since changes in science would af feet its stability. Nagel 
has chosen to place the ground of test outside of science 
Where it is beyond the theory-ladenness of observation, at 
least insofar as theories are generated by science or 
scientists. 
Placing the ground of testing in observation terms 
outside of science also places it beyond philosophical, that 
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is, epistemological analysis. In a sense, this is not a 
surprising move since Nagel's predecessors in the empiricist 
tradition did the same thing. Prior to the airing of the 
issues surrounding the theory-ladenness pf observation, R. B. 
Braithwaite insisted that the philosophy of perception was 
irrelevant to the philosophy of science. Regardless of the 
answer one reached regarding the philosophical character of 
observation, he said, it would serve the purpose of identi-
fying the facts of observation which are the same for all 
normal observers ([1], p. 4). One might have expected this 
attitude to change with the introduction of the theory-
ladenness of observation into the discussion, but Nagel side 
steps this problem by locating the ground of testing in a 
sub-set of observation terms that, if theory-laden, are at 
least laden with theory that is common to normal observers. 
But what is more surprising than Nagel' s agreement 
with Braithaite is the similarity between his position 
concerning the location of the ground of test and the 
position of Kuhn on the same issue. For Kuhn the ultimate 
ground of test or justification for any observation is the 
paradigm. And the paradigm, like Nagel's "core" of 
observation terms, is outside of science in the sense that it 
is not open to any test. Like Nagel, Kuhn takes the testing 
relation to be primary in understanding science. The main 
Point of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions was to 
define the limit of the testing relation. That limit is 
defined by the concept of the "revolution." 
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Testing, for 
Kuhn, can proceed in the "normal way" so long as the paradigm 
is not questioned. But as soon as the paradigm becomes the 
issue the testing process breaks down. And so does philos-
ophy of science. Kuhn offers no philosophical insight into 
the process of revolutionary change other than the fact that 
it happens. His discussion of it is given in terms taken 
from sociology and pyschology. 
The point of bringing up Kuhn here is to emphasize 
the limitation on philosophy of science caused by placing the 
ground of test outside of science. Nagel differs from Kuhn 
in that he places his ground of test in common sense, and 
since common sense might never change, revolutions might 
never occur. But should a change of such depth occur, he 
would have no more than Kuhn to say about it. 
Other important questions are ruled out as well. For 
instance, the character of observation is more open to 
philosophical analysis with the recognition of its theory-
ladenness. Its character is not investigated by Nagel. 
Instead its character as evidence for testing is presupposed 
and treated as exhaustive. The determination of just what it 
means to say that observation is theory-laden is not 
addressed either. By placing the observational core outside 
of science Nagel hopes to neutralize the impact of theory-
ladenness on philosophy of science. A closer look at what 
theory-ladenness means would not be important on these 
conditions. 
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Neither is the more general issue of the 
relation between observation and theory given priority since 
observation is essentially an unanalyzable term in this 
approach to philosophy of science. 
THE "USE" CRITERION FOR THE THEORY/OBSERVATION DISTINCTION 
Some critics of the theory /observation distinction 
have suggested that the admission of the theory-ladenness of 
observation dissolves the "inherent differences" between 
theory and observation terms and statements. Nagel identi-
fies three types of inherent difference that have been 
attacked. First, some critics have argued, the proponents of 
the distinction have sometimes held that it was justified 
because theory terms are inherently problematic while 
observation terms are understandable in their own right. 
Nagel grants that either type of term may be clear in some of 
its applications while it is problematic in others. In other 
words, he says, all terms have a "penumbra of vagueness", 
including observation terms, but this does not vitiate the 
distinction itself ([2], p. 30). 
Secondly, it has been charged that the assumption 
that theory terms and observation terms represent two 
different "languages" in science, a self-contained and 
autonomous language of observation which deals only with 
directly observable matters and a theoretical language which 
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deals with unobservable matters ( [ 2], pp. 27-28), does not 
survive the admission that the observation language is 
theory-laden. Nagel agrees. Insofar as the "two languages" 
locution has any meaning, he says, it refers to different 
uses or functions to which certain groups of expressions are 
put in the process of articulating inquiry in science ([2], 
pp. 31-32). 
The third inherent difference between theory and 
observation terms is actually part of the second one above. 
The assumption that the sets of terms differ because obser-
vation terms, but not theory terms, can be predicated of 
things on the strength of direct observation alone, falls 
before the admission of the theory-ladenness of observation 
since the addition of theory to observation makes it indirect 
as well ([2], p. 32). Again Nagel agrees. And, again, he 
says that it does not matter. 
Why does it not matter? Because all that we need to 
be able to do is distinguish different ~ to which the sets 
of terms are put. What are the different uses? Nagel iden-
tifies five typical uses for observation terms and three 
typical uses of theoretical terms: Observation terms are 
used to, (a) "mark off in perceptual experience" objects and 
Processes, (b) to characterize an entity as of a certain 
type, (c) to describe instrumentation, (d) to report measure-
ments and other perceptual findings, and (e) to "codify 
experimentally ascertained data" ([2], p. 29). Theoretical 
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terms are used to (a) codify idealized or limiting notions 
(such as point-mass and instantaneous velocity), (b) pre-
scribe how the things identified in perceptual experience are 
to be analyzed and manipulated, and (c) provide inferential 
links between experimental data and "conclusions of inquiry" 
([2], p. 30). 
Nagel entertains an additional argument regarding use 
which appears to dissolve even that way of making the theory/ 
observation distinction. Critics have pointed out, he says, 
that predicates ordinarily classified as theoretical are 
often used to describe situations which are "directly appre-
hended" ([2], p. 35). Since he has already granted that 
observation terms cannot be predicated of things on the basis 
of direct observation he clearly must not mean that theoreti-
cal terms can be predicated of things in this way. What he 
must mean is that theoretical terms appear in some cases to 
be predicated of things in as direct a way as are observation 
terms. Examples of such theoretical predication are the 
description of a land format ion as a 11 glac lat ion 11 and the 
description of a track in a cloud chamber as having been 
produced by a positron-electron pair. It is beyond doubt, he 
says, that this sort of thing happens. Some theoretical 
predicates are used to describe observable matters while 
others apparently never are. We would not, for instance, 
describe what ls observed.in the electrolysis of water as the 
rearrangement of electrons in hydrogen and oxygen atoms ([2], 
pp. 35-36). 
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Just why some theoretical terms are used to describe 
observable situations and others are not is not clear, Nagel 
says, but he endeavors to shed some light on those situations 
where theoretical terms ~so used. In many instances of 
this sort the theoretical term in question appears to serve 
as a "shorthand formula" for describing observable but 
complex features of an experimental event. The shorthand 
replaces a long and involved account if that account were to 
be given in "terms of perceptual experience" ( [ 2], p. 37). 
"Accordingly," he concludes, "it is only in a Pickwickian 
sense that the theoretical predicates can be counted as 
observation terms" ([2], p. 37). 
It is interesting to note, he adds, that when 
theoretical terms that report observations are threatened 
they must be replaced by terms from "normal perceptual 
experience." This part of the argument was mentioned earlier 
in connection with the discussion of the relative stability 
of observation terms. Why must we pull back to the "more 
familiar observation predicates?" His answer is that they 
are "better warranted by the actual evidence" ([2], p. 38). 
But why are these more familiar terms better warranted? 
Because, he says, the theoretical terms assert more than the 
ordinary observation terms, "on pain of being totally 
superfluous" ([2], p. 38). 
It is interesting that the "use" basis of the 
theory/observation distinction has shifted here. Theoretical 
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terms ~ used differently from observation terms in that 
they assert more than observation terms, or expand on those 
terms. Both assert more than is immediately present to the 
senses, but theoretical terms go beyond observations that are 
"normally" recognized. To repeat, the new "use" of 
theoretical terms is to expand knowledge beyond what is 
"normal" and the "use" of observation terms is to provide a 
stable retreat when that expansion is in doubt. 
Why does Nagel shift his ground for the use basis of 
the theory/observation distinction? One reason may be that 
he has not found anything in particular to do with the uses 
he identified earlier. They are interesting in that they 
provide some possibility for expanding his treatment of 
science. The use of theories, for instance, in providing 
inferential links between experience and conclusions of 
inquiry suggests the possibility of examining the relation 
between observation and theory in a detailed way. 
But Nagel has no intention of following up such a 
suggestion. His concept of science will not allow it. In 
particular, his concept of theory blocks his invesitgation of 
science. His treatment of theories is given in terms of 
"free creations" of the scientist. If theories are free 
creations of the scientist it is troublesome to allow that 
they report observations. Such a concession would appear to 
make a mockery of the testing relation and empiricism in 
general. This is why he seeks to explain away the sense in 
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which theories are said to report observations. But his 
attempt to do this raises more questions about his approach 
to science than it answers. Why, for instance, does he say 
that theories are "free creations" of the scientist and then 
assign to them the role of shorthand for observation state-
ments? It would seem an unusual coincidence for a free 
creation to dovetail so well with observation. If it is not 
a coincidence, then why is it not a coincidence? An adequate 
understanding of science is at stake here. But if theories 
serve this function in science, why suggest that they also 
assert more than that for which they are shorthand? To avoid 
being superfluous, of course. Nagel clearly recognizes that 
theories must do more than serve as shorthand for observation 
statements, but just how they accomplish more than this is 
not an issue that Nagel is interested in addressing. And 
what of the theories that apparently never report observa-
tions? Perhaps they codify limiting or idealized notions or 
prescribe how things identified in experience are to be 
analyzed, as he outlined earlier. It appears that the uses 
of theories need to be better clarified if "use" is the 
criterion of the theory/observation distinction which, in 
turn, is essential to understanding the rationale of science. 
What concept of science must Nagel have in order to 
employ arguments of the sort that we have seen so far? It 
would appear that science for him is a collection of 
theories. Observation statements cannot be included since 
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theY are placed outside of science. And it appears to be a 
finished product rather than a process. Such a concept of 
science, it seems, would not require a scientist. 
THE PROBLEM OF CIRULARITY 
Nagel entertains one last attack on the theory/obser-
vation distinction which he considers a "radical'' challenge. 
Some critics of the distinction have claimed that every 
theory determines the meaning of the observation predicates 
that they used to test it. In other words the theories 
"manufacture" data in such a way that every test is "fatally 
circular." Only evidence which is generated by the theory, 
according to this c ri t lclsm, can serve as the bas is of 
testing. As a result, no theory could possily be refuted, 
but neither could they be said to have any factual content, 
according to Nagel. 
Further, if the meanings of observation terms were 
determined by the theory for which they serve as evidence, 
the same observation report could not confirm one theory and 
disconfirm another. In other words, it would be impossible 
in principle to ever decide between competing theories ([2], 
p. 41). 
Nagel has two arguments against this radical thesis. 
First, he says, the hist-0ry of science provides evidence 
against both its aspects. Many theories have been refuted on 
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the basis of observational findings. Therefore, it must not 
be the case that observational evidence invariably is molded 
bY the theory it is supposed to test ( [ 2], p. 39). It is 
also the case, he says, that even theories that have pro-
foundly different presuppositions often share "some hard core 
pedicates and laws" ([2], p. 41). Newtonian and Einsteinian 
dynamics, for instance, share important predicates such as 
"acceleration of bodies falling near the earth's surface," as 
well as a number of laws in which such shared predicates are 
found ([2]), p. 42). 
His second argument is that while an observation 
predicate may be determined in part by a theory, it need not 
be dependent on all the laws that make up the theory. Since 
some of the laws that make up a theoretical system may be 
logically independent of each other, it is possible for an 
observation term to serve in evidence statements for those 
laws which do not determine its meaning ( [ 2], p. 41). For 
example, it is possible to count the laws concerned with 
measuring instruments as well as the laws of Euclidean 
geometry as parts of Newtonian dynamics. This does not, 
however, make observation terms relating to measurements or 
geometrical assumptions circular as evidence supporting some 
other part of Newtonian dynamics ([2], p. 40). 
The theory-ladenness of observation appears to Nagel 
to present a serious problem for our understanding of the 
rationality of science since that rationality is given in 
terms of the testing relation. 
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He seeks to avoid the 
supposed implication that evidence ls determined by the 
theory it ls evidence for by distinguishing between the 
impact of the theory-ladenness of observation on evidence in 
general and its impact on evidence in particular situations. 
This argument is linked to his earlier argument for the 
relative stability of "core" observation terms. Competing 
theories, he says, often share such "hard core predicates." 
If this is so then meaning-dependence must not be immediate 
in the sense of dependence on the particular theory being 
tested. 
The issue here is not the meaning-dependence of 
observation terms on theories as a result of the theory-
ladeness of observation, but rather the scope or immediacy of 
the dependence. But why does he accept the meaning-
dependence of observation terms at all? Is this what it 
means to say that observation is theory-laden, that the 
meaning of observation terms is determined by theory? And if 
theories are the "free creations" of the scientist, does this 
mean that observations are generated by theories? It appears 
that this is the implication for Nagel since, at least in 
some cases, observation is no longer counted as genuine 
evidence. This is what circularity means. 
Under what conditions might the problem of 
circularity arise? Suppose that a biologist prior to the 
discovery of viruses hypothesized that there was a living 
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organism smaller than any bacterium which was responsible for 
certain diseases whose causes remained unexplained. He then 
executed the following steps in the hope of gaining evidence 
for or aainst his hypothesis: 1. Cultures were taken from 
individuals before, during and after the onset of a 
particular set of symptoms. The cultures were viewed under 
the electron microscope with the result that the culture 
which was taken while symptoms were active showed "shapes" 
that were not present in either of the other two cul tu res. 
2. Otherwise healthy individuals were infected with the 
active cultures with the result that they developed the same 
set of symptoms. 3. Cultures taken from these people showed 
similar "shapes," when viewed under the electron microscope. 
4. Other diseases that were unexplained as to cause but 
which appeared to be transferred by contact were examined 
using these techniques with the subsequent discovery of more 
such "shapes." He then presented his results as evidence for 
his hypothesis, saying that the "shapes" were in fact living 
organisms called "viruses." 
Is there anything circular about this sort of 
reasoning? All the observations are clearly theory-laden in 
the sense that they involve a theory of disease, that disease 
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recognize characteristic shapes under the microscope or 
observe symptoms without being committed to the theory of 
viruses. 
But what about step four? In this case we look in a 
place not previously examined for evidence to support our 
theory and we look because of our theory. This is theory-
guided observation, in a sense, but it does not seem at all 
circular. The reasons are the same as above, the theory of 
viruses is not essential to the observation of symptoms or of 
"shapes" under the microscope. 
What, then, would constitute circular evidence? 
Suppose our experimentor had stopped at step one of his 
investigation and described the "shapes'' viewed as "viruses," 
the cause of the disease. The question which sparked the 
research was, "What is the cause of this disease?" Is the 
answer, guided as it was by the hypothesized theory of 
viruses, circular? No, it is merely an insuf1c1ently 
supported assumption. Suppose, then, that prior to step one, 
without viewing before and after cul tu res, our researcher 
asserted that he had found "disease vectors" that he had 
named "viruses" in the cultures of sick people. But to offer 
an explanation of a disease without evidence is similar to 
attributing the sleep inducing quality of opium to its 
"soporific" effects. It presupposes that which needs to be 
explained. It represents_ a very primitive form of question 
begging. But again, is it circular in Nagel' s sense? No, 
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the recognition of shapes does not require the theory of 
viruses. It is, of course, quite unsupported. 
What is the difference between question begging and 
circularity? In question begging the problem is whether the 
explanandum is presupposed or entailed by the explanans. In 
circular! ty the problem is whether the explanans determine 
the meaning of the explanandum. With question begging we are 
concerned about the quality of an argument or explanation. 
Does it explain that which it set out to explain is the 
1ssue. With circularity the quality of observational 
evidence is the issue. Is it genuine or not? 
In cases as simple as my example question begging is 
highly unlikely, but it can become a problem as questions 
become more complex. Circularity, on the other hand, is 
highly unlikely in any case. The unlikeliness is not a 
function of complexity but of what it means to say that 
observation is theory-laden. If theory-ladenness means that 
theories are capable of generating observations, then 
circularity must be guarded against. But theory-ladenness 
should represent the substance of questions for philosophy of 
science rather than the source of presuppositions. It may be 
that it is more accurate to say that observations generate 
theories than that theories generate observations. There 
seems no reasonable sense in which observations could be said 
to be generated by theories. And, further, there seems no 
reasonable sense in which the theory-ladenness of observation 
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raises any doubt about the geniuneness of observation as a 
80urce of evidence. 
The difference between circularity and question 
begging is the difference between two approaches to the 
philosophy of science. If one understands the philosophy of 
science to be the analysis of the testing relation where 
observation is placed outside of science and beyond 
philosophy of science, and theory is treated as the "free 
creation" of the scientist, then the theory-ladenness of 
observation will raise the problem of circular! ty. But if 
the problem of philosophy of science is the investigation of 
the relation between theory and observation, then the 
theory-ladenness of observation represents grist for the 
mill. Should the issue of question begging arise it would 
arise in that context as part of the problem of what 
constitutes an adequate explanation. 
In summary, Nagel has presented three arguments he 
believes demonstrate that the theory-ladenness of observation 
has no significant implications for the "familiar 
methodological principle" that theories in science must be 
tested by confrontation with the findings of observation in 
the form of observation statements. 
First, he argued that even though oservation ~ 
theory-laden, and even though this means that observation 
statements assert more than is immediately present to the 
senses, there remains within observation terms a "core" which 
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15 relatively stable in comparison to theory terms or 
observation terms that are used within science. In doing 
this he has placed his foundation of evidence outside of 
science and beyond the realm of philosophical analysis, with 
the result that he is in a position similar to that of Kuhn. 
An important part of science has been excluded from 
philosophy of science. 
Second, Nagel argues that while no "inherent differ-
ences" between theory and observation terms survive the 
recognition -0f the theory-ladenness of observation, such 
differences are not essential to maintaining the 
theory/observation distinction. Differences in "use" can be 
distinguished in actual scientific practice and this is 
enough to make the theory /observation distinction warranted 
and useful. However, he declines to develop these different 
"uses" as instruments for shedding light on scientific 
knowledge. Instead, when he entertains a challenge to this 
sort of difference he appears to shift his ground of "use" to 
reflect the difference in stability argued for earlier. This 
second sense of different "uses" reveals in more detail his 
attitude toward theories. He wants to keep theories within 
parameters that would allow them to be supportable by 
observations. To this end he labels them as "shorthand'' when 
they appear to report observations. But he also wants them 
to have a genuine function.in expanding scientific knowledge, 
for, as he points out, they would otherwise be superfluous. 
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I applaud his attempt to expand the role of theories beyond 
"shorthand," but this concept of theories is not adequate to 
resolve the inherent conflict between these two 
characterizations. 
Third, Nagel argues that circularity is not a serious 
problem since a theory-laden observation can test any theory 
with which it is not laden. The history of science bears out 
this position, he says. I agree with him that circularity is 
not a serious problem. I have argued that it is even less 
serious than he takes it to be, that there is little reason 
to suppose that the theory-ladenness of observation puts 
observation in jeopardy as regards its status as evidence in 
any case. He sees circularity as a problem because of his 
inadequate concept of theory and because of his subsequent 
misinterpretation of what the theory-ladenness of observation 
means. 
The theory-ladenness of observation should be seen as 
a potentially significant insight into scientific knowledge 
and as the starting point for further investigation. Nagel 
sees it as a threat to the way science was understood prior 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE THEORY-NEUTRAL APPROACH 
The rift between observation and theory that was 
revealed in Nagel's work is in fact an implicit part of 
justificationism as an empiricist philosophy of science. 
This comes out most clearly in an article entitled "The 
Proper Object of Vision" by Gary Thrane. If the basis of 
objectivity in science is consensus on the content of 
observation reports as Thrane sees, theory 
accommodated but must be purged from observation. 
cannot be 
If basic 
observations were not theory-neutral, he says, there would be 
no way to test theories. 
I have included this article here because it shows 
that the problem of theory-ladenness is unsolvable in 
justificationist philosophy of science. The concept of 
objectivity implicit in justification is not compatible with 
theory-ladenness, but the return to fundamental or theory-
f ree observation will fail to solve the problems of that 
school. Thrane elaborates the conditions that must be met 
for theory-neutral observation as well as the conditions that 
must be met for theory-neutral observation to serve as the 
epistemological foundation of science. As we will see, 
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neither set of conditions can be satisfied. Having separated 
theory and observation at the start justification has created 
a gap that cannot be bridged. 
Thrane uses quotations from C. I. Lewis to make the 
significance of the issue of theory-neutral observation 
clearer. The problem for Lewis was whether both the data of 
experience and the interpretation put on them belonged to the 
mind, whether there was anything in experience that the mind 
could neither create nor alter. He believed that there was 
in experience a "given" which was characterized specifically 
by the fact that it was "unalterable" ([2], pp. 6-7). 
This seemingly plausible position has been attacked 
by, among others, Hanson and Kuhn, Thrane says. Both of 
them, he holds, argue that different people may see different 
things when apparently confronted with the same situation. 
That is, both of them argue that, "What we see is altered by 
what we think ([2], p. 7). 
In response Thrane proposes to argue that what we 
really see is "the pattern of light projected on the retina 
([2], p. 9). He is well aware of the many problems that 
attend this type of theory and much of his article is 
addressed to those problems. His motivation is clear; he 
hopes to establish a level of seeing that is sufficiently 
fundamental to escape the influence or impact of theory or 
knowledge. The pattern of light on the retina would appear 
to satisfy this condition as well as providing a reasonable 
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sense in which all perceivers with "normal" eyes could see 
the same thing when confronted with the same situation. 
Thrane's article is important to this thesis for 
several reasons. First, he does not merely presuppose that 
theory-neutral observation is possible, but he tries to show 
how it is possible. His article helps to establish minimal 
-
conditions for what it means to see, or more generally, to 
perceive. It brings out certain problems that appear to be 
inherent in "fundamentalist" approaches of this sort. It 
clarifies the epistemological implications of this type of 
theory of perception. And it helps to clarify that it means 
to say that observation is theory-laden. 
My discussion of Thrane's article will have four 
major sections roughly reflecting the reasons for its 
importance mentioned above. First, his "awareness argument" 
will be treated. Awareness is a problem for Thrane because 
we as perceivers seem to be unaware of that which his theory 
says that we really see. I will present his argument for the 
possibility of perception without being aware of what ls 
perceived. Further, I will offer a distinction within the 
concept of awareness to see whether his theory can be made to 
Work on other grounds. And, finally, I will argue that 
awareness of that which is perceived is a minimum condition 
for perception. 
Second, the "fundamentalist" approach to perception 
Will be examined. I will show that this approach is the 
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result of trying to avoid the input of knowledge in percep-
ti on. This approach, I will argue, leads to "compound" 
perception, or the seeing of one thing in order to see 
another. This will be shown to be an error that is inherent 
in the fundamentalist approach. 
The third section will deal with the epistemological 
implications of such a theory of vision. Thrane's assessment 
of those implications is largely accurate as far as it goes. 
But as I will show there are larger implications for his 
project as it relates to philosophy of science. 
The last section will deal with the meaning of the 
theory-ladenness of observation. Like Nage 1, Thrane mis -
understands what it means. Had he understood it differently, 
as I will show, he might have been a better able to integrate 
all his insights regarding perception into his theory. 
Before taking up these four points let us see how 
Thrane avoids certain obvious problems with a theory such as 
this. While he holds that what we really see are the 
patterns of light on the retina, he does not say that we see 
them as on the retina. The well-known criticism that seeing 
retinal "pictures" would require another eye and so on, is 
Side-stepped in this way. Similarly, seeing how the pattern 
is situated on the retina would require another eye. Thrane 
draws three basic conclusions about the patterns of light on 
the basis on this stipulation. First , since we do not see 
their setting, they are "free-floating." Second, they have 
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no determinate third dimension. And, third, they are 
entirely "metric-free" ([2], pp. 10-11). 
The patterns of light are not pictures for Thrane 
since the construction of a picture or seeing a pattern as a 
picture requires a great deal of knowledge. He leaves them 
indeterminate in an extreme sort of way. They cannot have a 
three-dimensional shape since the retina is essentially two 
dimensional and any representation in two dimensions can be 
generated by an infinite number of actual three-dimensional 
scenes. Being able to "disambiguate" a two-dimensional 
picture into a unique scene requires a great deal of 
knowledge ( [ 2], p. 22). The same is true for the 
determination of size. In fact, Thrane says, there is good 
reason to believe that what we know about the world "informs 
our determinations of how things look" ([2], p. 23). But 
this is not a matter of what we "really see" for what we 
really see is indeterminate in the way that it must be if it 
is prior to alteration by knowledge. 
AWARENESS OF WHAT IS SEEN 
Thrane grants that we might object to his theory of 
seeing on the grounds that we are not aware of seeing 
Patterns of light. The conclusion that this is what we see, 
he says, is the result of a highly theoretical argument, 
including among other things, projective geometry and optics 
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([2], p. 15). If this theory is to work there must be some 
sense of seeing in which we can say that the perceiver is not 
aware of that which is seen. 
His argument is as follows: Suppose that Jones has 
successfully climbed a flight of unfamiliar stairs. We ask 
him whether he saw the last step and he answers that he must 
have, al though he was not aware of it. Why does he answer 
that he must have seen it? Because he did not stumble ([2], 
p. 16). 
Similarly, he says, the reader of these pages must 
have been seeing his thumb all the while he was reading but 
he was not visually aware of it. Another example of this 
sort of thing is the apparent lateral motion of objects 
around us as we move. We are so unaware of this occurrence 
that we may be surprised when it is pointed out. Yet, we see 
it, and we can become aware of it when it is brought to our 
attention. 
He will later argue, correctly I think, that we are 
sometimes inclined to employ the model of the conscious 
noting of evidence and the conscious drawing of conclusions 
to analyze seeing. But if this were an accurate analysis of 
seeing, or perception in general, it would make seeing 
infinitely more complex than it actually is ([2], p. 36). It 
would also make it slower than it is, he might have added, 
since conscious inferences- of this sort take time. 
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If awareness of what is seen is not necessary to 
seeing it, what~ the necessary conditions? First, Thrane 
says, the object seen must be there. It must be visible from 
Jones' vantage point. He must be looking at it. And he must 
see the visible thing he looks at. In order to know the 
latter, we must know that he is conscious and that his 
eyesight is not defective. In order to know that the first 
three conditions obtain we need merely observe the object, 
the light source and Jones' eye. The judgment that he sees 
the object is admittedly inferential. If these conditions 
were realized it follows that he saw the last step, even 
though he was not aware of it. 
I find Thrane 's argument regarding Jones' ascent of 
the stairs not entirely satisfactory. It would seem that 
seeing something and ·responding appropriately to it would 
always involve some sense of awareness of that thing. Is 
Jones' testimony that he was not aware of the last stair 
adequate to establish his lack of awareness as factual? 
Perhaps he was aware of it but, since the.re was no reason to 
deli berate on the stair or his awareness of 1 t, he simply 
forgot about it. What is the success of his ascent, that is, 
not stumbling, evidence for? It would appear to support the 
conclusion that he was aware of the last stair as well as it 
supports the conclusion that he saw it but was not aware of 
it. 
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Suppose we make a distinction within the concept of 
awareness between a minimal sense in which we would be able 
to respond appropriately to objects that we see and a 
deliberative sense in which we could report that we have seen 
them. The behavioral sense of awareness would include much 
of our daily experience. This distinction would allow us to 
report that we drove to work successfully without the 
absurdity of adding that we were unaware of the traffic 
around us or the traffic signs and lights (when we do not 
remember them). 
Does this distinction help in Thrane's case? 
Learning to see could be merely learning to behave 
appropriately in response to particular retinal patterns. 
Behavioral awareness might be sufficiently fundamental to be 
the same for all "normal" observers. But can he allow that 
Jones was even behaviorily aware of the last stair without 
negative impact on his theory? The point of his theory is to 
show that perception is possible with no input from theory or 
knowledge. And even responding appropriately seems to imply 
some knowledge of that to which we respond. Not stumbling on 
the stairs, for instance, suggests that we know something 
about stairs, that they are solid for one thing. 
Further, if knowledge is implied in appropriate 
response, then awareness of that to which we respond seems 
that much more certain. 
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Instead of clarifying Thrane 's theory for him this 
distinction brings up an additional problem for it. In the 
case of Jones' negotiation of the stairs we can say that he 
was behaviorily aware of them, and that if we call his 
attention to them that he can becom deliberately aware of 
them. The same is true with regard to the examples Thrane 
provides. We may not be deliberately aware of our thumb 
holding these pages or of the apparent lateral motion of 
objects when we move, but we can become aware of these things 
in the deliberative sense. But this is apparently not true 
of the patterns of light on the retina. 
Could we, perhaps, train ourselves to be deliberately 
aware of the patterns of light? We ~ occasionally aware of 
our visual apparatus as a result of dis comfort from bright 
lights and from "after images", for instance. But after 
images are not retinal patterns in Thrane 's sense because 
they are not patterns of light at all. Discomfort and after 
images seem more like artifacts of the perceptual process or 
indications of its limitations than lessons in how to be 
aware of retinal patterns. 
Are there other things in our environment that we are 
behaviorily aware of but of which we are never deliberately 
aware? There surely are things in our environment that we 
are incapable of perceiving without special instruments. But 
this alone is not enough, since with. those instruments we are 
able to be deliberately aware of such things. 
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Perhaps instruments of this kind could reveal things 
in our environment which we had not been able to be 
deliberately aware of in the past, but which could be 
correlated with behavior. Suppose, for instance, that the 
presence of radio waves was found to correlate with an 
increase in violent behavior in a segment of the population. 
Would such a finding support Thrane's analysis of perception? 
It would represent an instance of behavioral awareness where 
no deliberate awareness was possible, at least prior to the 
development of the appropriate instrumentation. But in this 
case we would have the problem of identifying the sensory 
source for the behavioral awareness. In other words, instead 
of Thrane 's unaware perception, we would have unperceived 
awareness. 
There are other things in our environment such as 
background noises of which we are not usually aware in a 
deliberative sense. But even if such noises had always been 
there we could still imagine circumstances whereby we could 
become deliberately aware of them, by covering our ears, for 
instance. 
It would seem that if one can be behaviorily aware of 
something that becoming deliberately aware of it would 
require only a shift of attention. We are frequently aware 
of our environment in only the behavioral sense, but I can 
see no reason to believe that there are some things that we 
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can perceive only at this level or that there are some things 
that we can perceive with no awareness at all. 
A more reasonable conclusion is that a minimum 
condition for perceiving something is that we are aware of it 
at least on the behavioral level and that we can become aware 
of it at the deliberative level. 
THE THEORY-NEUTRAL APPROACH TO PERCEPTION 
The fundamentalist approach to perception is an 
attempt to identify an object of perception at a level which 
is not influenced by theory or knowledge. Sense data 
theories aim at this goal as does Thrane's theory that what 
we really see are "patterns of light" on the retina. This 
approach to perception has the problem of explaining how 
perception at this fundamental level facilitates perception 
at other levels, such as the perception of common objects 
like tables and chairs. 
To a theory like Thrane 1 s one might merely respond 
that it is obviously false. It is perfectly obvious that 
what we see are objects and objects are outside of our 
bodies, not inside on our retinas. But this is part of what 
a theory of vision should explain, Thrane feels. He 
considers it a "surprising fact" that we perceive an object 
as there when we are here. Every theory of vision should be 
able to explain how we perceive a distant object as distant 
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even though it is not touching our sensitive organs. It is a 
reasonable hypothesis, he says, that what we see is something 
that is touching our visually sensitive surfaces, patterns of 
light. In other words, seeing the surface of a distant 
object just.!.! seeing a pattern of light ([2], p. 19). 
The patterns of light "correspond" to the surfaces of 
objects, he says. By "correspond" he means to suggest an 
identity. That is, seeing the pattern of light is identical 
to seeing the surface of an object. He is not suggesting 
that the pattern of light is identical to the surface of the 
object for this would be contradictory on a number of levels, 
one being the invariance of the object's surface and the 
variability of the pattern of light, depending as it does on 
perspective. Instead, the identity is between seeing the 
pattern of light and seeing the surface of the object. What 
that means is that seeing an object's surface just is seeing 
a pattern of light ([2], pp. 20-21). 
In other words, Thrane is offering a theory of "how 
we see objects in space, not a theory that we do not" ([2], 
p. 19). He is not saying that we see patterns of light 
instead of objects. Seeing patterns of light is merely the 
way we go about seeing objects. 
He offers an analogy for this approach to perception, 
saying that one might hold that science has proven that 
objects have no color. When an object looks 
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red, on this view, what is really happening is that it is 
reflecting light of a particular electromagnetic frequency. 
When that frequency impinges on the retina it causes the 
sensation of redness. But this does not prove that an object 
such as this has no color. Instead, it is an account of what 
it is for an object to have color ([2], p. 19). 
Thrane obviously does not want to say that we do not 
see ordinary objects in space, but only that we see them by 
means of seeing something else, the patterns of light on the 
retina. But this "compound" approach to perception is 
troublesome. Do we really see one thing in order to see 
another? Is this understanding of perception commonplace, 
especially in regard to perception in scientific research? 
It is surely true that scientists often observe one thing by 
observing its effects on another. Tracks in a cloud chamber 
and Brownian motion are instances of this. In the cloud 
chamber a minute but visible quantity of condensation results 
from the passage of an otherwise invisible sub-atomic 
particle. In Brownian motion we witness molecular motion by 
seeing how tiny but microscopically visible particles react 
to it. 
But these examples do not illuminate the aspect of 
Thrane's theory that the term "compound" was intended to 
indicate. In the examples the things seen are all outside 
the perceiver. Further, ·there are two objects in the world 
that are involved. In the cloud chamber we have condensa 
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tion and sub-atomic paticles, and in Brownian motion we have 
pollen or some other tiny particles and molecules in motion. 
It is possible, at least in principle, to observe each of 
these objects apart from others. Sub-atomic particles can be 
observed through other effects as can molecular motion. But 
Thrane's theory is compound in the sense that there is only 
one object outside the perceiver, but two ''seeings" (Thrane's 
term) involved in our coming to know about it. To explain 
one "seeing" in terms of another seems questionable. It is 
similar to explaining cohesion in terms of atoms with tiny 
interlocking hooks. 
Would examples using other organs of sense be 
helpful? Do we hear a symphony by hearing the vibrations of 
our auditory apparatus? Do the hammer, anvil and stirrup of 
the inner ear reproduce the sound of the orchestra by 
striking each other? It might be possible to place a 
microphone inside the ear to see whether they reproduce the 
sounds that cause them to move. But is this really 
necessary? If they did reproduce the sound, what organ would 
hear that sound? We would need another ear, even if we did 
not hear the sound as in the ear, just as others have argued 
that we would need another eye in order to see the retinal 
picture. 
What is the point of the compound or fundamentalist 
approach? It is to establish a level of perception that is 
Prior to the intrusion of knowledge. Would it be enough to 
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say that there is at least one element of seeing, which is 
necessary but not sufficient to explain seeing, that occurs 
without the aid of knowledge? No, for what is sought is a 
source of the "data of experience" which is free of the 
influence of knowledge, and the data of experience can come 
only from actual, completed perception. Thus, the element 
that is identified must be treated as perception itself. 
The inherent conflict in the fundamentalist approach 
is that we are not aware of the fundamental "object" of 
perception. The approach is forced into its compound 
position in order to explain how it is that we perceive the 
things of which we are aware. 
THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE THEORY-NEUTRAL APPROACH 
Thrane began his article with a clear statement of 
the meaning of the theory-ladenness of observation for the 
philosophy of science. If Hanson and Kuhn are right, he 
said, then what we see is altered by what we think. For this 
reason he thought it important to develop a theory which 
preserved vision as a source of data from experience which is 
not altered by what we think. 
Having developed a theory which is sufficiently 
fundamental to be prior to the impact of what we think, he 
proceeds to define criteria which will determine the meaning 
that such a theory has for philosophy of science. These 
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criteria are stated as types of "priority" that a theory of 
this sort might be expected to have. These types of priority 
are as follows: 
1. The conceptually prior is that which we believe 
pre-theoretically that we see, tables and chairs and so on. 
2. The perceptually prior is "that by virtue of 
seeing that we see anything at all." 
3. The epistemologically prior is that whose nature 
we can know for certain merely by seeing it. 
The conceptually prior is that which we would 
identify when asked, "What in general do we see?" The 
ordinary objects around us largely exhaust this c.ategory, 
according to Thrane. The conceptually prior is "pre-
theoretical" and therefore pre-sciene. It is the level Nagel 
identifies as the "core" of observation terms. 
The perceptually prior is obviously the pattern of 
light on the retina, according to Thrane. The point of these 
distinctions is to determine whether the perceptually prior 
is also conceptually or epistemologically prior. Is the 
perceptually prior also conceptually prior? It is not, 
Thrane says. The reason is simple, the things that are 
identified as conceptually prior are far richer than the 
"impoverished array" of patterns of light could ever support. 
His appreciation of the richness of the conceptually prior is 
surprising. It is a fa~t, he says, that "the agony is there 
to be seen in Picasso's Guernica, the serenity there to be 
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seen in Claude Lorrain's The Herdsman" ([2], p. 36). The 
patterns of light, on the other hand, are so indeterminate 
that they defy description. 
Why have so many writers assumed that the 
perceptually prior would also be conceptually prior, Thrane 
asks. The likely reason is that they assumed that we as 
perceivers will be aware of the "cues" and "evidence" upon 
which our knowledge is based. If this were true, he says, it 
would make our daily life infinitely more complex than it 
really is. The model that is being employed is the conscious 
noting of evidence and the conscious drawing of conclusions. 
Aside from the_complexity issue, he has already argued that 
we are neither conscious nor aware of the patterns of light 
which are the "cues" and "evidence" level of perception. 
Since we cannot be aware of this level the model does not 
help to make the identification between the perceptually and 
the conceptually prior. In another sense, it does not matter 
that the model fails since the perceptually prior is far from 
adequate as the foundation, even by inference, for the 
conceptually prior. 
But a more important issue is the possible identity 
between perceptual priority and epistemological priority. 
But this identity cannot be asserted either. Why not? 
Because the epistemologically prior as "the foundation of 
empirical knowledge, must- be in those things the nature of 
Which is apparent and certain." And the patterns of light, 
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he allows, are "not there to be seen in their naked 
indeterminacy" ( [ 2], p. 37). Now, this is a bit odd since 
the patterns of light were supposed to answer the question, 
"What do we really see?" What he most likely means to say is 
1. That we are never aware of seeing them, and 2. That 
their extreme indeterminacy makes such awareness unlikely. 
If we are not aware of them their nature cannot even be 
apparent, not to mention certain. 
An additional reason for the failure of this 
identity, Thrane says, is the fact that "much that we see is 
'imposed' on" the patterns of light. That which is imposed 
could be mistaken. The level at which this imposition occurs 
must be the level of conceptual priority. And unlike Nagel, 
Thrane is unwilling to accept the "relative stability" that 
might be found at this level as adequate for epistemological 
priority. 
Thrane's insistance that the epistemologically prior 
must be apparent and certain forces him to concede that it is 
probably not to be found anywhere. It is certainly not to be 
found in vision, he says, and vision is the source of our 
most refined knowledge of the world ([2], p. 37). 
What does this mean for philosophy of science and the 
possibility of identifying a source of data from experience 
that is prior to the influence of the mind? If the 
perceptually prior is not the same as the epistemologically 
prior, then no such source is forthcoming. 
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Does this mean that Thrane's theory has failed? That 
depends on what you want from a theory of vis ion. If you 
want to justify our claims to know with the justification 
resting on a "sensorily self-evident base," then the theory 
has failed. But the theory had far more modest goals, he now 
says. Instead of aiming to justify knowledge on a 
self-evident base, its goal was to explain "what in part the 
evidential base of our visual judgments is" ([2], p. 35). 
Thrane refers to Quine in supporting this goal for a 
theory of vision. It is sufficient, according to Quine, to 
seek only "the casual mechanism" of our knowledge of the 
external world. 
Thrane 's theory of vision has helped to clarify the 
conditions that a fundamentalist approach must satisfy. One 
condition, that it be grounded at a level beyond the 
influence of knowledge, now appears to place it beyond 
anything that could be called the "data of experience." 
THE MEANING OF THE THEORY-LADENNESS OF OBSERVATION 
Why is it so important to Thrane to establish a 
fundamental level of perception that is beyond the influence 
of knowledge? The answer lies in his understanding of what 
the theory-ladenness of observation means to him. What it 
means can be seen first -in his response to Hanson and Kuhn. 
Both of them hold, he says, that what we see is altered by 
what we think. 
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He fears that in accepting the theory-
ladenness of observation one accepts the position that the 
data of experience somehow ''belong to the mind," as Lewis put 
it ([2]), pp. 6-7). 
He believes, as we have seen, that much of what we 
see is imposed on the patterns of light. He quotes Dewey, 
with apparent approval, saying that qualities other than 
those detectable by the eye are obviously controlling factors 
in perception. 
In other words, the theory-ladenness of observation 
means the theory-generation of observation just as it did for 
Nagel. Since this seems incompatible with the testing of 
theories in science, a level prior to theory must be sought. 
And, further, if that level fails to satisfy all the demands 
of the testing relation, it at least identifies the "causal 
factor" in perception which ~prior to knowledge. This ls 
enough, he says, and he takes Hanson to task for not 
realizing "the importance of the retinal pattern" ([2], p. 
31). If theory-laden observation means theory-generated 
observation then there seems little point to an investigation 
like that Hanson pursues. When Hanson tries to distinguish 
two senses of seeing, a sense in which Tycho and Kepler see 
the same thing in the east at dawn and a sense in which they 
do not, Thrane accuses him of equivocation ([2], p. 30). If 
the sense in which they do not see the same thing is due to 
theory-ladenness, then it is not significant for a theory of 
vision, in Thrane's terms. 
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It might contribute to an 
analysis of how the fundamental data of experience are 
altered or added to by knowledge, but a theory of vision must 
explain how we come to know what~ and what is surely 
cannot be altered by the caprice of the knower. His theory 
may not have accomplished all he had hoped, but at least it 
identifies something in perception which is not added by the 
mind. He and Hanson differ on the import of the retinal 
pattern because he sees it as the end point of an analysis of 
vision and Hanson does not. 
But Thrane is not entirely oblivious to problems 
relating to perception that are of the sort that Hanson takes 
seriously. As indicated earlier, he grants that, "The agony 
is there to be seen in Picasso's Guernica, the serenity there 
to be seen in Claude Lorrain's The Herdsman". How is it that 
"agony" or "serenity" are there to be seen in the painting? 
"Although it is clearly something about the painted surface 
that makes The Herdsman serene, it is not easy to say what." 
About this issue he says, "I have nothing to say" ( [ 2], p. 
36). It is not to the point in any case, he says, since a 
theory of vision need only establish that which is 
perceptually prior for vision. 
But like Nagel, Thrane is wrong about what the 
theory-ladenness of observation means. If it did mean that 
observation was theory-generated or even partially 
theory-generated then it would follow, as he says, that 
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ordinary objects would have a rich range of "visible but not 
necessarily optical qualities" ([2], p. 37). This represents 
a conflict in Thrane's position. To suggest that we can see 
something that has no optical aspect would appear to be the 
assertion of extra-sensory perception. But this is not what 
the theory-ladenness of observation means. Theory-ladenness 
is entirely compatible with the belief that all of what we 
see is there in the object to be seen. 
A theory of vision, or perception in general, must be 
able to explain how we can see such things as serenity. It 
must give a detailed account of what the theory-ladenness of 
observation means. As I will argue in Part II 
theory-ladenness does not mean that observation is 
theory-generated, even in part. Instead of treating the 
theory-ladenness of observation as an obstacle to be 
overcome, it should be treated as the beginning point in 
understanding the logic of observation. 
In summary, I have argued that Thrane's theory of 
vision is flawed in that he is forced to argue for the 
possibility of seeing without being aware of what is seen. 
His argument fails to support that position. The mere fact 
that we do not deliberate on a particular perception does not 
mean that we are not aware of the object perceived. In fact, 
I have argued, awareness of the object is a minimum condition 
for perceiving it. 
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Further, I have argued that his fundamentalist 
approach carries the inherent flaw of requiring "compound" 
perception or two "seeings" for every visual perception. 
This flaw is the result of the position on awareness, which 
in turn is due to his misunderstanding of the 
theory-ladenness of observation. 
I have argued, with Thrane's help, that the 
implications of this position point to serious limitations. 
It is too impoversihed to account for what we ordinarily 
think that we see, and it is too indeterminate to provide the 
foundation for science that empiricism has traditionally 
assumed was essential. 
Finally, I have argued that Thrane's understanding of 
the theory-ladenness of observation is mistaken. He treats 
it as the theory-generation of observation. This explains 
why he feels compelled to avoid theory in his treatment of 
vision. It also explains the paucity of his theory. Much of 
what needs to be explained about observation must be left out 
if theory-ladenness is interpreted in this way. 
The challenge offered by the theory-ladenness of 
observation is not to find a way to accept the claim that 
perceptions and that which is perceived are somehow 
fabricated by what we think. Instead, it should be taken as 
an insight into the problem of how we come to know the world. 
It will also help us to· better understand theory and the 
relation between theory and observation. 
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CHAPTER V 
THE LOGIC OF DISCOVERY - HANSON 
Hanson has often been grouped with philosophers such 
as Feyerabend, Kuhn and Toulmin as a proponent of a position 
which leads to epistemological relativism and an irrational 
characterization of science. Relativism and irrationality 
are thought to follow from the claim that observation ls 
theory-laden, a claim which appears to destroy the empirical 
base of science, to make the comparison of -0ompeting theories 
impossible and to make the rational acceptance or rejection 
of a given theory impossible. Even among those such as Peter 
Machamer ([5]) who doubt that such consequences necessarily 
follow from the theory-ladenness of observation, the 
placement of Hanson in this group fails to raise an issue. 
But Hanson should be viewed differently. What he 
offered in Patterns of Discovery is the outline of a new 
concept of the rationality of science based on the discovery 
of scientific knowledge rather than its justification. In 
his introduction he insists that micro-physics be used as the 
model for philosophy of science for the reason that it 
continues to be a research science. To use finished systems 
such as planetary mechanics or optics is a mistake he says. 
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The point of research is not the rearrangement of known facts 
into more elegant formal patterns but is instead the 
discovery of new patterns of explanation. The program for 
philosophy of science that he proposes shifts the emphasis 
from theory-using to theory-finding, from the testing of 
hypotheses to their discovery. Instead of looking at how 
observation, facts and data are built up into systems of 
explanation, he proposes to examine the influence of those 
systems on observation, facts and data ([2], pp. 1-3). 
I will argue that Patterns of Discovery constitutes 
an outline for the rationality of science based on the 
espistemological relations into which observation enters. I 
will also show how this analysis represents a philosophy or 
logic of discovery. 
I will divide Hanson's work into three parts. First, 
I will examine his analysis of observation. The point of 
this analysis is to develop a sufficiently complex model of 
observation to be able to account for the things that we 
ordinarily report that we observe, e.g., that the animal 
before us is a mammal. Second, I will examine his treatment 
of facts. His primary concern here is the relationship 
between facts and the fact-stating language. This 
relationship has important implications for the objectivity 
of science. I will show that Hanson's account of this 
relationship disputes the traditional empiricist under-
standing of objectivity, but that it does not preclude the 
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understanding of science as a rational process. And, third, 
I will deal with Hanson's treatment of theory. Two major 
points will be made here, first that the understanding of 
theory is inseparable from the understanding of observation. 
Secondly, the sense will emerge in which the examination of 
the epistemological relations between observation and theory 
constitutes a logic of discovery. 
OBSERVATION 
I have described Hanson's purpose with regard to 
observation as an attempt to develop a sufficiently complex 
model of observation to be able to account for the things we 
ordinarily report that we see. The need for a more complex 
model arises from paradoxical situations like the one 
conf renting Tycho and Kepler in Hanson 1 s example. Do they 
see the same thing in the east at dawn or do they not? Many 
would answer that they do, that any difference is due to 
alternative interpretations they put on the visual data. 
What they report that they see would not be the same, 
however. One might respond that regardless of their first 
person account what is actually going on is first the 
observing of an event by two men who then interpret it 
differently. In other words, they report their interpreta-
t 1 on and not merely what they see. But this is at least 
paradoxical since both men, if asked, would likely say that 
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what they have reported is exactly what they ~, even though 
their reports were different. 
Do they see the same thing or not? This is not a de 
facto question, Hanson says, but it is rather the beginning 
of an examination of the concept of observation. To take 
this as a de facto question should be viewed as the refusal 
to participate in that examination. The reason for the 
refusal is most likely the feeling that one must insist that 
Tycho and Kepler see the same thing or else scientific 
knowledge based on observational evidence will lose any claim 
to objectivity. 
There are other reasons why a more complex model of 
observation is needed besides the paradoxical character of 
first person reports such as those from Tycho and Kepler. 
One of them is the apparent failure to the "interpretation" 
explanation for the different reports. Hanson uses the 
gestalt example of the perspex cube to bring out the problem 
with this explanation. Most observers of this drawing are 
able to see it as a box viewed from above or as a box viewed 
from below. The shift, when it occurs, Hanson says, does not 
seem at all like a change in interpretation. For one thing 
interpretation is something with which we are all familiar. 
It is an intellectual process, e.g., we interpret a literary 
work, and it takes time. We might, for instance, say at one 
point that we are half th~ough with our interpretation of a 
Particular work, but we could say no such thing of our 
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11 interpretation" of the box from above or of the sun as a 
satellite of the earth. One might respond that 
interpretation in this case is instantaneous> but there is no 
ordinary or philosophical sense of the word "interpret" that 
fits this usage ([2], p. 10). 
At this point Hanson offers his alternative model of 
observation. The "interpretation," he says, is part of the 
seeing its elf. He calls this sense of interpretation the 
"organizational element" of seeing. The differences in the 
ways we see the perspex cube and the dawn are due to 
differences in organization. 
Just what is this organizational element? It is not 
another line in the drawing or another detail in the 
landscape. It is similar to the tune of a piece of music or 
the plot of a story. It is that which makes the details, 
notes or lines "hang together" in the way they do. 
Is the organizational element something that is added 
by the perceiver or is it there to be seen as Thrane conceded 
that the agony is there to be seen in Picasso's Guernica 
([8]> p. 36). An essential issue about the character of 
empirical science is at stake here. If the organizational 
element is seen, it is not seen in the same way that the 
lines of a drawing are seen or the notes in a piece of music 
are heard. It seems to belong to the perceived object, and 
yet the perceiver seems to contribute something too. The ad 
~ interpretation formula does not appear adequate to 
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explain this complexity in perception since such 
interpretation would surely be the exclusive property of the 
perceiver. 
Hanson goes on with another example, the x-ray tube: 
Does the layman or the child see the same thing as the 
physicist when they look at the x-ray tube? He has already 
conceded that there is something common about what they see, 
but the physicist sees more than either the child or the 
layman. Is this because he has learned more and can provide 
an interpretation based on his knowledge? No, he does no 
more than they when he looks at the x-ray tube. Observation 
is what is happening for all threee, Hanson says ([2], p. 
16). 
Is the knowledge of the physicist relevant to this 
problem? Yes, it provides the context appropriate to such 
pieces of apparatus; it gives the physicist a pattern of 
concepts which reiate x-rays to other forms of electro-
magnetic radiation as well as numerous other theories, 
problems and techniques. The layman and the child see the 
same lines, colors and shapes but they do not organize them 
in the same way because they lack the appropriate conceptual 
background. 
Knowledge is also relevant to the sense in which the 
layman and the physicist do see the same thing. They both 
know enough about glass to know that if the x-ray tube were 
dropped it would probably break. Tycho and Kepler share even 
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more knowledge about the sun and consequently organize what 
they see at dawn in much the same way. The sense in which 
they see the same thing is not at odds with the sense in 
which they do not see the same thing. What is seen is in 
part the "organizational element" and while that element is 
there to be seen in the object or situation, the perceiver 
must have particular knowledge in order to see it. When 
individuals see the same thing it is because they share 
knowledge that allows them to organize the situation in the 
same way. When they do not see the same thing it is because 
they do not share the same knowledge. 
Hanson further clarifies the character of the 
organizational element through his discussion of "seeing-
that." He describes "seeing-that" as a "logical element" 
which connects observation with knowledge and language. 
Seeing involves, at least, the having of knowledge of certain 
types. It is to see that if certain things were done to the 
objects we see, other things would result. Every perception, 
he says, involves an aetiology and a prognosis. To see an 
object x is to see that it will behave in ways characteristic 
of x 's. If it does not behave in that way, we tend not to 
see it as a genuine x any longer ([2], pp. 20-22). 
Observation could not have been any other way, Hanson 
argues. The formula presented earlier which makes the 
knowledge contribution an ·ad hoc feature which explains any 
differences in what we say about what we see. Knowledge on 
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this view is not part of observation, but is used to 
manipulate observations. This model is too simple, Hanson 
believes. It would have us treat visual observing as the 
simple absorption of retinal pictures. But pictures are not 
adequate to account for the fact that we make significant and 
relevant observations. Why is this so? It is because of the 
way pictures accomplish their end. Hanson explains this by 
contrasting it with language. 
How do pictures and language differ? First, Hanson 
says, they represent originals by copying certain of their 
aspects. The lines, shapes and colors of pictures stand in 
much the same relations to each other as the lines, shapes 
and colors of the originals. Language, on the other hand, 
does not represent or copy originals at all. Instead, 
language characterizes the original as of a particular type, 
and it states the relations that obtain. 
Further, statements can be true or false but pictures 
can be neither. 
Statements are also more versatile than pictures. It 
is said that a picture is worth a thousand words, but this is 
true only if what the words attempt to describe is pictur-
able. A picture of a bear will tell us nothing about its 
growl, but language can tell us that and more about its 
texture, smell and habits ([2], p. 27). 
Hanson describes the differences between language and 
pictures as "logical" in type. He wants to emphasize the gap 
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between the simple model of seeing (as the absorption of 
retinal pictures) and significant or relevant observation. 
Seeing according to the simple model would be like a view 
through a kaleidoscope, for pictures like objects and events 
have no intrinsic significance ([2], p. 26). 
The point of "seeing-that" is to bring observation 
and language together, or rather, to show that they are not 
separate. If we can see the significance of an object or 
event it is because our linguistic knowledge is part of our 
seeing. 
Does it matter that the knowledge contribution to 
observation is not ad hoc in the way the interpretation 
formula would have it? From Thrane's perspective it matters 
a great deal since allowing theories to intrude in the realm 
of observation means that the data from the world is diluted 
by what we think and no longer genuinely empirical. But 
Hanson's model intends to do more than shift the temporality 
of the knowledge contribution to perception. Just as a 
student can learn nothing if he does not help, the perceiver 
can see nothing if he does not contribute to the process. 
The knowledge element is his contribution but it is not 
contributed in absentia from the observational situation. 
The knowledge contribution is more like gaining a better 
perspective from which to see the world than it is.like 
laminating something onto· observations of the world. The 
knowledge contribution of the perceiver is essential but it 
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does not constitute dilution of the data any more than the 
effort of the student alters the lesson. 
Microphysics, Hanson says, is the search for new 
organizational elements for observable data. If new modes of 
conceptual organization are found, the discovery of new 
entities will follow. Gold, he says, is rarely found by 
those who have not got the lay of the land. Microphysics is 
only secondarily the search for new objects and facts, 
although he adds, these two endeavors are "as hand in glove" 
([2], pp. 18-19). 
This is an interesting point in part because it is 
similar to Kuhn's suggestion that theoretical discoveries are 
often "open-ended" ,in the sense that they lead to further 
discoveries and new appltcations of those discoveries in 
previously unexpected areas. Why should this be true? For 
Kuhn it is largely a psychological matter. Past success 
provides the scientist with the assurance he needs to devote 
time and energy to further "articulation" of. the paradigm. 
What this really means for Kuhn, as he says frequently, is 
that the scientist is willing to devote sufficient energy to 
"forcing nature to fit the contours of the paradigm." 
Hanson's point is very different. His way of stating 
the connection suggests some kirid of guarantee--that if a new 
conceptual organization is found then the discovery of new 
entities will automatically follow. But the more accurate 
statement of the case is suggested by the phrase "hand in 
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glove." New conceptual organization always works intimately 
with the actual experimental or perceptual context. It could 
do nothing else. The discovery of new aspects of nature is 
part of what it means for new organizational elements to be 
considered successful. If they reveal nothing about the 
world that was not already known, they would be simply 
dropped. 
The discovery of new aspects of nature is not guaran-
teed in any mysterious way by new conceptual organization. 
Instead discovery is part of what "new conceptual organiza-
tion" means. To label one of these aspects of research as 
"primary" and the other as "secondary" is misleading. It 
leads to the suggestion of a guarantee where none is needed. 
Kuhn thinks that a guarantee is needed because he does not 
see theory as essentially related to observation. Theory is 
not part of observation for Kuhn but is an addition to it. 
It ~part of observation for Hanson. So why does he 
separate the search for intelligibility from the search for 
entities? It is because he wants to emphasize the former. 
It is the pattern that the scientist is looking for, not new 
things. He is not a scout in the sense of one who is sent 
randomly looking for problems. Instead, he is more like a 
detective searching for relationships between his problem and 
other elements of the observable situation. 
Recognizing that there is an organizational element 
in observation is the same as recognizing an aspect of the 
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epistemological significance of observation to science. The 
more complex model of observation is the cornerstone of his 
philosophy of science. It is on the basis of this concept of 
observtion that his concept of the rationality of science is 
explicated. What he has accomplished here is a concept of 
observation that allows for the contribution of the perceiver 
without subs ti tu ting that contribution for the input into 
perception of the world itself. It is for this reason that 
his philosophy of science does not preclude the understanding 
of science as an objective process. 
FACTS 
Hanson assumes all along that science is objective. 
His philosophy of science is not aimed at defending that 
point but rather it is concerned with understanding the 
rationality of science as a process. In order to appreciate 
the character of that process it appeared important to Hanson 
to determine what, if any, parts of the process were static. 
Particularly the concept of "fact" has been treated as if it 
were as irreducible and unequivocal as the world itself. 
This attitude is misleading, Hanson said, since facts are not 
observable, not even picturable entities. White was later to 
agree, pointing out that we can state the facts but that we 
cannot see them ([9], p. 83). 
The status 
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of facts appeared significant for 
understanding science. How do they relate to observation, 
given that they are not observable? They are clearly related 
since what we observe determines the facts that we are 
willing to state about a given situation. Hanson's reason 
for dealing with facts is to show that, like observation, 
this concept is complex. Understanding it properly is 
important to a similarly complex account of the rationality 
of science. 
The limitations or peculiarities of our language may 
tell us something about facts. The English adjectival idiom, 
for instance, tends to give a passive account of the 
properties of objects. "Grass is green," we say and "Bears 
have fur." But some languages express these properties in a 
verbal idiom: "Grass greens, 11 and "Bears fur, 11 suggesting 
activity. The facts that are expressed in the latter idiom 
are not exactly the same as in the former. Certain 
conclusions will follow from one statement of the situation 
that will not follow from the other. To say, "The sun 
rounds," instead of, "The sun is round," is to suggest that 
the sun is constantly arranging itself in a sphere, Hanson 
argues ([2], p. 34). This is very much what fluid mechanics 
suggest that liquids do in even gravitational fields. To say 
that the sun is round misses this active aspect of its shape. 
There may be, Hanson goes on, many things about 
ordinary situations that elude our current language. If our 
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language had been different we might have come to think about 
the world differently, to see different aspects of it and to 
know different facts about it ([2], p. 35). 
This is not to say that the world might have been 
different, he says. "Given the same world, it might have 
been construed differently" ( [ 2], p. 36). Theory, language 
and knowledge have importance in the way we see our world, 
but this admission is fully compatible with an empirical 
characterization of science. 
simple model of observation. 
Empiricism does not require a 
THEORY 
The more complex account of the rationality of 
science offered by Hanson stems from two sources. First, it 
begins with a more complex account of observation, and 
second, it analyzes a process instead of a product. These 
two points are related since the process is explicated in 
terms of the dynamism within observation. This comes out in 
Hanson's discussion of theory. 
The notion of "dynamism within observation" makes 
sense because of the complexity of observation, that is, 
because it involves an "organizational element" as well as a 
cont ri but ion from the world. The ways in which those work 
together and evolve together represent the evolution and 
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growth of science, i.e., the development of scientific 
knowledge. 
The failure to appreciate the complexity and dynamism 
of observation has resulted in misconstrual of the nature of 
scientific theory, Hanson argues. The isolation of causes by 
science represents such a case of misconstrual. Science 
sometimes explains a problematic phenomenon by showing that 
it is caused by a better understood phenomenon. Russell, 
among others Hanson says, assumed as a result that causes 
represent something very like chains of sense experience that 
can be traced from any point backward to the beginning of 
time ([2], p. 50). 
Again, the issue is complexity. To name a cause is 
to give an explanation. And the giving and understanding of 
an explanation may presuppose a great deal of knowledge. 
This is not to say that causes are not observable. Since 
observation always involves an "organizational element" the 
requisite knowledge for understanding a causal explanation 
also makes it possible to see the cause. We do commonly see 
the causes of events in our environment, but there are also 
events whose cause escapes us. 
The point is that the determination of a cause is or 
may be as complicated as the development of any explanation 
in science. In fact, there may be many causes for any event, 
as many as there are reasonable explanations of it. When we 
attempt to determine the cause of even the most ordinary 
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events, the knocking over of a chair, for instance, we often 
find ourselves in the process of listing numerous factors 
which contributed to it. The chair had been moved out of its 
usual place, the lights were dim and the package I was 
carrying could all be offered as "causes" of the accident. 
Further, Hanson says, cause words are as theory-
loaded as words like "finesse" and "offside." Without some 
knowledge of bridge and football these terms mean nothing. 
Neither can we observe the events they refer to without 
knowledge ([2], p. 57). That one billiard ball is the cause 
of the motion of another is obvious, but only because all of 
us know enough about the elastic properties of such bodies to 
know that, e.g., they will not stick together or merge like 
water droplets on contact. 
The chain analogy misses the significance of 
causality in science in another way. The chain relation 
suggests a sort of equality between cause and effect which 
fails to illuminate the explanatory power of causality in 
science. To say, for instance, that I knocked the chair over 
because it was out of its usual place is to provide an 
explanation in only a very modest sense. This may be all 
that is required to explain a causal accident, but it would 
not be adequate for science. It does not afford a pattern 
from which I can predict future events or link this 
phenomenon with other phenomena not previously known to be 
connected (except in the same modest sense that other chairs 
or other objects inappropriately placed • . ) . 
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Causal 
connection in science is diagnostic and prognostic, Hanson 
says. The description of the cause must be at a different 
logical level from the description of the effect to perform 
these functions ([2], p. 60). Otherwise the explanandum 
could not be deduced from the explanans in a scientific 
explanation. 
This insight concerning logical 





clarify another concept relevant to scientific knowledge, the 
notion of "necessary connection." Causes are certainly 
connected to effects, Hanson says, "but this is because our 
theories connect them, not because the world is held together 
by cosmic glue. The world ~ be glued together by 
imponderables but this is irrelevant for understanding causal 
explanation" ([2], p. 64). 
This comment is interesting for three reasons. 
First, it tells us the source of the necessity in scientific 
explanation. It is the necessity of the syllogism. Given 
certain premises the conclusion must follow. This allows a 
view of scientific theory which is compatible with the 
history of change in science. When one theory replaces 
another it is not because the older theory has been exposed 
as having falsely isolated necessary connections in nature. 
Necessity does not reside in nature at all, Hanson is saying. 
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Second, it tells us something about what we should 
expect of causal explanations in science, what is missing in 
the ''modest" causal explanation above. Causal laws are not 
built up by merely noticing that A's are followed by B's 
repeatedly and then summarizing this observation under the 
umbrella formula, "All A's are followed by B's." Exceptions 
to such laws would raise no conceptual issue. There are 
exceptions to causal laws in science, Hanson admits, but they 
also raise conceptual issues. They cause the pattern of our 
concepts to "warp and crumble" ( [ 2], pp. 64-65). There are 
ways to save favored patterns from warpage, as Hanson surely 
knows, but these too raise conceptual issues. 
And, third, Hanson seems in a certain way to have 
overstated this point. The connection identified by a theory 
or law between two events is not there merely because our 
theory or law connects the statements that describe them. If 
theories are to be cast as empirical, they must tell us about 
the world. It is important to identify the source of any 
supposed necessity in causal laws, but it is also impotant to 
understand the sense in which laws and theories tell us about 
the world as it is. Much of Hanson's discussion of theories 
is aimed at making just this point. 
Whether causal connection is left solely in the realm 
of statements is important. An essential feature of Hanson's 
Philosophy of science is his attempt to bridge the gap 
between statements and experience. That is why he hegan his 
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philosophy of science with an analysis of observation, 
culminating in his discussion of the relationship between 
language and seeing. If the two are ever separated, it is 
indeed difficult to get them back together. His method of 
"bridging" the gap was in fact the demonstration that they 
were never separate. 
The chain analogy is deficient in the additional 
sense that it fails to appreciate the genius that is required 
of a Galileo or Newton in accomplishing their explanations of 
nature. When experiments appear chain-like it is because 
they were designed to appear that way. It is the chain-like 
character of logic and not of objects or events in the world. 
Experiments are designed to direct attention to a 
particular sequence of events, Hanson says, and philosophers 
who dwell on those events miss what is involved in directing 
attention in this way. Nature, he says, must have been 
tampered with to achieve this end. One way in which nature 
is tampered with is by holding all but one variable constant 
([2], pp. 66-68). 
Philosophers who focus on the spectacular event, 
usually the impressive conclusion to a lengthy experiment, 
fail to appreciate what the scientist had to do in order to 
expose its spectacular character. It is not that they 
generated the event for this is not the sort of tampering 
tbat scientists engage in. But the scientist did have to 
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aesign its exposure using a theoretical background against 
which its spectacular character'could be seen. 
Focusing on the spectacular is equally likely to lead 
to the conclusion that the event was merely there to be seen 
by any passer-by. 
This discussion of causality sets the stage for 
understanding the process whereby theoretical explanation is 
achieved. Again, Hanson's point is to characterize the 
rationality of science through the examination of discovery. 
He proposed to do that by looking at theory-finding, at the 
influence of theory on observation, facts and data. 
Everything that he has done to this point is in the service 
of explicating discovery. In order to understand discovery, 
the complex character of observation must be appreciated for 
discovery will involve new observations in old and familiar 
landscapes. We must appreciate the relation between facts 
and the fact-stating language, because discovery will also 
result in the statement of new facts, or, at least, the 
statement of facts that had not been stated. It is also 
essential to understand that we are looking for an 
explanation when we look for a cause, and to appreciate the 
applicable sense of "necessity" if "necessary connection'' is 
used to describe scientific theory. 
It is against this background that Hanson gives the 
details of the dynamics of theories and the rational! ty of 
discovery. Philosophy of science, he says, has typically 
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provided two accounts of theories, the induction by 
enumeration account and the hypothetico-deductive account 
(H-D). They are different but compatible. The H-D account 
tells us what laws and theories do--serving as higher order 
propositions in a deductive system. The inductive account 
tells us how they are arrived at--by enumerating particulars. 
There is something wrong with each account, according 
to Hanson, and something right as well. Scientists do not 
come up with theories by enumerating and summarizing data. 
And as a description of research H-D fails as well since 
scientists do not start with hypotheses, but instead start 
from data ([2], p 70). The inductive view is correct in its 
starting point, but it misses the critical point that a 
theory must explain why something occurs, instead of being a 
summary account of what occurs. The H-D account included the 
explanatory character of theories, but it left out any 
reference to the connection between data and those theories. 
The reasoning H-D takes as fundamental, from higher order 
propositions to lower order propositions, will englighten our 
reasons for accepting an hypothesis after it is got, but it 
tells us nothing about the reasons for proposing the 
hypothesis in the first place ([2]), p. 71). 
While such proposals may require genius, their 
genesis is of more than psychological interest. 
This is Hanson's· introduction to the problem of 
theories in science. 
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If theories are freely created with their only 
empirical connection provided after the fact in the form of 
deducing observational propositions, then their creation will 
be difficult to understand or trace. But if they are 
responses to an observable environment with empirical 
connection at every step, then their creation may be subject 
to logical analysis. 
The logical form of this process is retroduction or 
abduction, according to Hanson. He employs Peirce and 
Aristotle in support of this "form of inference." It differs 
from both induction and deduction, neither of which can 
originate any new idea whatever. While induction tells us 
what is the case and deduction shows what must be the case, 
abduction tells us what may be the case ([2], p. 85). What 
may be the case is given in the form of hypotheses which 
provide a new pattern or background against which the data 
could make sense. 
That an hypothesis of this sort is not achieved by 
induction is suggested in the way statements are falsified. 
If a bird-antelope drawing has four lines added to it we 
might say that it is a drawing of a bird with four feathers. 
About the number of feathers we could be wrong; the way of 
deciding whether we are wrong would involve a simple count. 
But about whether the drawing is of a bird, we could not 
decide in the same way. Pattern statements such as, "It is a 
bird," are different from detail statements such as, "It has 
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four feathers," in ways that inductive summaries such as, 
"All birds have four feathers," are not different from detail 
statements such as, "This bird has four feathers." The 
inductive summary and the detail statement could be falsified 
in the same way--a simple count would suffice. 
Both pattern and detail statements are empirical, 
Hanson says, but not in the same way. What he has offered is 
an interpretation of what it means to say that a statement in 
science is empirical. His interpretation is richer than that 
common to empiricists such as Nagel and Thrane. The theory-
ladenness of observation, as I understand it, represents 
evidence for the claim that theories in science are empiri-
cal. It is not evidence against the claim that observation 
statements in science are empirical. How do I reach this 
conclusion? Let us examine the assumptions that are involved 
in each approach. Why does theory-ladenness appear to 
threaten the empirical character of observation statements: 
The answer lies in the sense in which theories are assumed to 
be created. For Nagel, Thrane and Kuhn theories are "freely'' 
created by the scientist. How they are related to experience 
or reports about experience is never specified. Hanson, on 
the other hand, assumes no such freedom in the creation of 
theories. For him theory creation is always intimately in 
contact with observation. As a result his account of theory 
creation represents no threat to the rational! ty of science 
because it is not a non-rational process. 
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How are theories created, according to Hanson? 
First, they are generated in context. This is hardly a new 
1nsight since people unfamiliar with scientific contexts 
rarely make scientific discoveries. In order to see how 
theories are generated we must appreciate the ways in which 
they are related to that context. 
Theories are intended to provide a pattern or 
conceptual framework within which observable phenomena make 
sense, Hanson says. They also make possible the observation 
of phenomena as of a certain type and as related to other 
phenomena in understandable ways ([2], p. 88). Any pattern 
which appears to have the potential of making a problematic 
phenomenon explicable as a matter of course is a potential 
theory. Inductive accounts of theory generation, like the 
"modest" causal explanation presented earlier, cannot 
illuminate the capacity of scientific theories to explain why 
something occurs. The process of theory generation will be 
developed in greater detail in connection with Hanson's 
discussion of classical and modern physics. 
The significance of Hanson's approach to theories can 
be seen in at least three ways. First, it develops an aspect 
of science that has been ignored. Research is the major 
activity of science, but previous characterizations of 
science by philosophy of science have failed to provide any 
acceptable account of how discovery comes about. This 
omission was justified by the claim that discovery was of 
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psychological interest only. Hanson has tried to show that 
discovery is a rational process, proceeding in a step-wise or 
walking fashion. The scientist always has one foot firmly 
grounded in observation before the second foot attempts, 
through hypothesis to make further contact with the world. 
He need never "jump" from data to theory. 
This account of theories is significant for the 
second reason that it makes theories empirical both in their 
genesis and in their function. They tell us about the world 
in a way that is at least the equal of observation 
statements. 
And, third, Hanson's treatment of theories leaves no 
"gap" between theories and experience. "Correspondence 
rules" and "bridge laws" are not needed in his approach, 
giving his philosophy of science an economy and relevance 
that is missing in the other accounts of science that have 
been examined here. 
But Hanson's point in discussing theories in relation 
to the H-D and inductivist accounts is not merely to criti-
cize them but also to identify where they were correct. 
Induction was correct in trying to give a rational account of 
theory generation and ~-D was correct in assuming that 
theories and observation statements were deductively related. 
The recognition of the deductive relation is important 
because it establishes the logical sense in which theories 
Provide a context within which problematic phenomena become 
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the expected. This is the point of Hanson's attempt to 
formalize abduction ([2], p. 86). But as Harold Brown points 
out, any such attempt is destined to be paltry since formal 
logic is concerned only with formal relations, with no 
concern for content ([l], p. 134). A dialectical logic, 
which Brown wants to pursue, is concerned precisely with the 
context of science in its historical setting. He argues that 
philosophy of science should abandon "absolutist" 
epistemology (logical analyis based on an irreducible 
empirical foundation) in favor of historicism and relativism 
([l], p. 152). The consequence of this shift, he admits, is 
that philosophy of science must give up any sense of 
correspondence in its theory of truth and re-define 
objectivity to mean "non-arbitrary" ([l], pp. 153-154). 
CLASSICAL PARTICLE PHYSICS 
Part of the value of Hanson's work lies in his 
attempt to define a sense of rationality between these 
absolutist and relativist/historicist extremes. The 
structure of that rationality is given flesh in his 
discussion of classical particle physics and elementary 
particle physics. 
There is more to be said about the relation between 
theory and observation than is contained in the reference to 
deduction or in the historical context approach of Brown. It 
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has long been recognized, for instance, that some of the laws 
of classical physics are used in such a way that disconfirm-
ing evidence is conceivable and some are not. This presents 
a problem for some philosophers who argue that physics must 
keep in touch with experience in the sense of always being 
falsifiable. Hanson responds that "the orderings of 
experience are limitless; we force upon the subject matter of 
physics the ordering we choose" ([2], p. 98). What he 
appears to mean is that, having chosen a particular ordering 
of experience, we see the world according to the pattern it 
provides. The fact that we may not be able to conceive of 
another pattern at a particular time does not count against 
the empirical character of a theory. In order to be 
empirical it must provide the background against which 
observational details make sense. On the contrary, the fact 
that some laws of physics appear to be functionally a priori 
represents testimony for the power of the patterning function 
of theory. They do their job so well that, having accepted 
them, we find it difficult to conceive of any other way of 
making sense of this aspect of nature. 
But no scientific theory has ever been a priori in 
the sense of having been generated prior to or apart from 
experience. 
Falsification and falsifiability are concepts which 
have the potential for shedding light on the rationality of 
science but they are not touchstones of empiricism in the 
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naive sense suggested in the concern over the functional a 
priori-ness of some theories. Non-falsifiability may not 
count against the empirical character of a theory, but 
contrary evidence may not result in a theory being rejected 
either. The entire system of science is empirical, Hanson 
believes, and as a result contrary evidence counts against 
the system as a whole. Naive falsificationists would have 
such evidence count against the fundamental tenets of the 
science, but to reject them when confronted with such 
evidence would amount to refusing to think about this part of 
nature at all ([2], p. 103). A more reasonable attitude is 
to take the contrary evidence as counting against the system 
as a whole--it did not apply where it might have. The "hard 
line" of the naive falsificationist may be due in part to a 
misunderstanding of the location of "necessary connection" in 
science. If a theory has failed to isolate necessary 
connection in nature then it is untrustworthy and should be 
rejected. But, as we have seen, the function of theory is 
not to isolate necessary connection in nature. 
Further, as Hanson has alreay pointed out, the 
falsification of theory is not accomplished in the same way 
that it would be for an observation statement. Theories 
provide patterns for observable data and they may succeed in 
doing that even when particular bits of observable data that 
were expected to fit into·that pattern fail to do so. 
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The point is that the patterning relation between 
theory and observation explains how one goes about seeking a 
theoretical explanation. It is understandable on the basis 
of the complex character of observation and facts discussed 
thus far, and it provides the basis for assessing the 
relevance of falsification to the rationality of science. 
Whether one subscribes to this as the best or only 
way of understanding the rationality of science is not the 
point. Rather, the point is that Hanson has presented an 
integrated system whose purpose is to present in outline form 
the rational structure of science as research. 
Hanson 1 s discussion of elementary particle physics 
helps to further articulate the character of the patterning 
relation between theory and observation. 
ELEMENTAL PARTICLE PHYSICS 
Elementary particle physics has been thought by some 
philosophers to present special problems for philosophy of 
science. For instance, 
characterized in such a 
ultimate matter seems to be 
way that it is in principle 
unvisualizable or unpicturable. This is an insight, 
according to Hanson, which lays bare the essence of 
explanation in science. Instead of presenting a special 
problem for philosophy of ~cience, it helps us to understand 
the character of science in general. 
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What is it about unpicturability that is essential to 
scientific explanation? It is that an explanation must not 
rely on that which requires explanation. Various attempts at 
explanation have been rejected for this reason. The 
suggestion that crystals might be explained by a reference to 
a brick-like structure, for instance, was rejected because 
the bricks would then have to be invested with those 
properties of crystals that require explanation. Similarly, 
explaining cohesion with "hooked atoms" fails to explain, 
Hanson says. This is part of the promised account of how it 
is that theories are generated. Scientists, in order to be 
successful, must understand this and more about the structure 
of explanation. 
Atomic theory attempts to explain visible or 
picturable properties. It must do that by reference to 
something which does not possess those properties ( [2]), p. 
12 0) • E.g., if atomic theory is to explain the color and 
odor of chlorine it must do so without endowing atoms with 
either color or odor. 
The classical concept of the atom with its postulated 
properties such as impenetrability, homogeneity and 
sphericity is no longer adequate to pattern the data of 
physics with its array of sub-atomic particles, Hanson says. 
The properties of these particles are "discovered and (in a 
way) determined by the physicist." He ascribes properties to 
sub-atomic particles which he hopes will support inference to 
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the phenomena he has observed. An intelligible conceptual 
pattern is the goal ([2], p. 123). 
In what way does the physicist determine the 
properties of sub--atomic particles? By choosing only those 
that are explanatory, must be Hanson's point. The whole 
story of micro-physics, he says, is that the sub-atomic 
particles show themselves to have just those properties which 
they must have in order to explain the phenomena which 
require explanation ([2], p. 124). 
Only when the quest for picturability was dropped was 
the essence of explanation in science laid bare. As Hanson 
recognizes, however, this is not the only essential feature 
of scientific explanation. Explanation in science must unite 
phenomena that might otherwise have been anomalous or wholly 
unnoticed ([2], p. 121). A theory must be concerned with 
more than a particular phenomenon or a particular property of 
a particle in order to constitute a pattern. It must connect 
with other phenomena in order to avoid being merely ad hoc in 
the way that epicycles were in Ptolemy's astronomical theory. 
Unpicturabili ty does not present a problem for the 
real existence of such particles. Intelligibility, Hanson 
says, demands that they exist ([2], p. 123). In other wods, 
unpicturability does not count against the empirical 
character of micro-particle theories. These particles have 
just those properties they must have in order to explain 
problematic phenomena. Such properties are not postulated at 
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random but are responses to actual laboratory situations. 
They are attempts to explain problems that, as a type, are 
picturable and have therefore to be, as a type, unpicturable. 
The same is true for other supposed special problems 
in modern physics such as the absolute identity of atoms _and 
sub-atomic particles as well as the uncertainty principle. 
Observations forced physicists to construe the world with the 
help of these principles in order to make sense of the data 
([2], p. 131). Had the world been different such ideas might 
never have been formulated. They are justified in every 
experiment in quantum physics since those experiments would 
not make sense without them. They are parts of "interlocked 
and systematic accounts" of the behavior of complex bodies, 
Hanson tell us ([2], pp. 134-136). 
Why is picturabi 11 ty such a pivotal issue? Hanson 
emphasizes one reason, that it reveals the essential feature 
of scientific explanation that such explanations must not 
rely on that which requires explanation. It also brings out 
the other essential feature that scientific explanation must 
put the problematic phenomenon in the context of other 
phenomena. This helps to distinguish scientific explanation 
from the "modest" sort of explanation of why the chair was 
upset. The latter was modest because it did little to 
connect this phenomenon with any others. The latter was 
modest because it did little to connect this phenomenon with 
any others. The law of gravity, on the other hand, connects 
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the falling of the chair with planetary orbits and other 
phenomena whose relation to the chair would have been 
unthinkable without it. 
Similarly, inductivist approaches are by nature 
concerned with particular types of phenomena and are even 
less likely to make the sort of connections that Hanson's 
notion of "pattern" aims to illuminate. 
The picturability issue has the added significance of 
shedding light on the problem of circularity that plagued 
Nagel. I contended in discussing this problem that 
circularity was not a serious problem in science. It appears 
to be a problem if theories are seen as "free creations" of 
the mind and the theory-ladenness of observation, in turn, is 
interpreted as (at least) partial theory generation of 
observation. But if theories are not free creations, I 
argued, but are responses to the environment of the scientist 
such circularity is unlikely. Now we can see why. An 
explanation must constitute a pattern within which the 
problematic phenomenon makes sense along with other 
phenomena. The two essential features of explanation help to 
clarify the problem of circularity. The first, the 
requirement that the explanation not depend on that which 
requires explanation, makes Nagel's concern unnecessary. 
That an observation is theory-laden does not mean that the 
theory constitutes its meaning. Atomic theory can explain 
the color of chlorine but it does so by reference to 
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principles that do not include color. In this case the color 
of chlorine would count as genuine evidence for the theory 
that intends to explain it. Such evidence would not be 
adequate to win acceptance of the theory, but it would not be 
circular either. 
The only genuine sense of circularity arises because 
of the other essential feature. The explanation must put the 
problem in a context along with other phenomena. Ptolemy's 
epicycles were circular in this explanatory sense because 
they explained only the apparent retrograde motion of some 
planets. In other words, if circularity occurs it occurs 
because the explanatory relation is too narrow. 
For Nagel circular! ty is a problem of the empirical 
character of observation. Instead, it should be seen as a 
problem of the empirical character of theories. A theory 
like Ptolemy's which can explain only the problem at hand has 
questionable empirical status. It does poorly what theories 
actually do in science. Theories provide the conceptual 
backgound against which observable phenomena make sense. For 
background to be background it must be wider than a 
particular problem. 
Does the theory-ladenness of observation mean that 
the meaning of observation terms and statements is determined 
by theory? Yes, but only in the sense that the meaning of a 
term or statement is determined by its context and the other 
terms and statements to which it is related. Does this 
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create a problem of circularity? No, the problem of 
circularity arises when theories fail to provide such a 
context, as was the case with the theory of epicycles. 
HANSON'S CRITICS 
Finally, it should be pointed out that criticism of 
Hanson has often missed the point. Carl Kordig, for one, 
misinterprets the point of Hanson's work, treating it as if 
it were framed by traditional concerns and assumptions about 
objectivity. Kordig believes that he has accompished a 
reductio ad absurdum when he argues that if seeing x 
requires knowing certain of x's properties, then one could 
not change one's knowledge state with regard to those 
properties and still be said to see the same x ([3]), pp. 
457-459). This argument has force only if one's concept of 
objectivity is based on the content of observation reports, 
as Kordig's is, but it has no impact if an alternative basis 
of objectivity is presupposed. 
It is surely true, as Kordig says, that we can see a 
lamp without knowing that it is our maiden aunt's favorite 
possession, but it is also true that we cannot see the lamp 
without the aid of theory or knowledge. This does not 
create a problem for our concept of observation if we take 
it as an insight suggesting a direction for research as 
Hanson did. 
112 
If we assume that the answer to that research 
has already been given it creates serious problems. 
Another award-winning paper taking Hanson to task 
was written by Paul Tibbetts. He argues that Hanson fails 
to give adequate emphasis to the distinction between reports 
of seeing as discrimination and reports of seeing as 
interpreting. Seeing as discriminating, he says, is nothing 
more than "describing or discriminating a figure x relative 
to a background y, rather than describing some property or 
feature of x per se • " ([7], p. 151). Such reports, 
having to do only with such things as change in direction 
and size, are theory-neutral. The problem with Hanson, on 
his account, is that he failed to give sufficient empahsis 
to this level of observation reports and consequently 
reached the inaccurate conclusion that there are no theory-
neutral observation statements. 
Tibbetts is wrong on two counts. First, the level 
of seeing as discriminating involves knowledge even if it is 
at a level that is unlikely to be contested. But, second, 
he fails to see that Hanson is offering an alternative basis 
for understanding the rationality of science. The problem 
of theory-neutrality is important to Hanson only because it 
suggests the need for a better understanding of observation 
in relation to science. 
What Hanson has done is substitute an analysis of 
observation for certain assumptions about observation. He 
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does not assume that observation is objective because of the 
possibility of consensus on the content of observation 
reports, and therefore he need not seek a level at which 
that content is theory-free. Both Kordig and Tibbetts 
continue to assume that the objectivity of observation is 
based on observation reports and they structure their 
arguments to show the error of failing to incorporate this 
assumption into one's philosophy of science. 
What is needed at this point is to make explicit the 
concept of the objectivity of observation that an analysis 
of observation such as that given by Hanson can support. 
That concept will be based on the character of observation 
rather than on the content of observation reports. That is 
the task of Chapter VI. 
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CHAPTER VI 
THE DISCOVERY APPROACH 
I share with the philosophers I criticize the belief 
that science is empirical. What I find lacking in their 
work is an adequate account of how it is possible for 
science to be empirical. The works of Kuhn, Nagel, and 
Thrane represent a dilemma. If observation is taken as a 
theory-laden endeavor, the empirical character of scientific 
knowledge becomes a problem; both Kuhn and Nagel attempt to 
accommodate theory-ladenness to philosophy of science, but 
they fail to show how observation that is impregnated with 
theory can offer evidence for or against theory. On the 
other side of the dilemma is Thrane who defends a theory-
neu t ra l account of observation only to find that on his 
account observation is irrelevant to epistemology. 
The alternative I offer is the discovery approach. 
This approach assumes that the scientist begins with the 
observation of a problematic phenomenon, an anomaly or 
malady of some kind, and seeks an explanation whereby this 
phenomenon becomes non-problematic. 
The alternative discovery approach will be developed 
and defended in five steps. First, I will argue that the 
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goal of discovery is explanation or theory. 
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I do not deny 
that entities are discovered in science, but I will argue 
that one can make better sense of science by pursuing dis-
covery as the discovery of explanation. I will show, for 
instance that the discovery of entities can be accounted 
for, given this assumption, while the reverse is not the 
case, and also that the sense in which "accidental" dis-
coveries are genuinely accidental can be explained with this 
assumption. I do not assume that all explanations are 
scientific theories, but I will assume that all scientific 
theories are explanations. As Karl Popper puts it, 
"Theories are nets cast to catch what we call 'the world': 
to rationalize, to explain, and to master it" ([6], p. 59). 
Second, I will argue that observation is theory-
laden. As will become clear in my arguments, I do not mean 
by "theory"-laden that all observation is informed, directed 
or somehow loaded with scientific theory. "Knowledge"-laden 
might be a better term for I would count fundamental 
knowledge such as colors and shapes to be sufficient to 
result in theory-laden observation. I am aware that some 
consider this sense of theory-laden observation "trifling" 
([3], p. 176), but my argument will show that, with regard 
to the empirical nature of science, it is not. 
Third, I will give a detailed analysis of what it 
means to say that observation is theory-laden. The purpose 
of this analysis will be to define precisely the contribu-
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tion that is made to observation by the environment as well 
as that made by the observer. This is critical to under-
standing the sense in which science is empirical. The 
theory-ladenness of observation created a problem in philos-
ophy of science because it appeared to erode the evidence 
character of observation. Does observation remain a source 
of independent information about the world or must it be 
understood as "mind dependent" in light of theory-ladenness? 
Observation is clearly mind dependent in the sense that it 
could not occur without a mind, but a more serious sense of 
mind dependence such as "contamination," "dilution," or 
"alteration" is the more usual concern when this issue is 
raised. My concern in this section will be to show that 
observation can be treated as theory-laden without pre-
cluding the possibility that observational evidence is 
objective. That is, I will show that mind dependence in the 
second sense is not a consequence of the theory-ladenness of 
observation. 
In section four, I will argue that this interpreta-
tion of the theory-ladenness of observation has powerful 
implications for philosophy of science. First, it will 
provide the basis for a clear description of the 
theory/observation distinction. The distinction will not be 
collapsed but neither will it be treated as representing a 
difference in levels of empirical or theoretical content. 
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This re-interpretation of the theory/observation 
distinction will provide the basis for treating the problem 
of "unobservable entities" in science, for the meaning-
dependence of observation terms on theory and for the 
problem of circularity in the evidence-theory relation. 
The positive characterization of theory developed in 
section three and the beginning of this section will be used 
to support a re-interpretation of the justification/discov-
ery distinction as the discovery-justification continuum. 
It will also be shown to aid in solving the problem of the 
non-rejection of theories in the face of counter-evidence 
from falsification theory. 
In section five, I will argue that a theory of 
scientific truth must include elements of correspondence, 
coherence and pragmatics. 
Finally, in section six, I will take one more look 
at the posit ions taken by Kuhn, Nage 1 and Thrane. I wi 11 
argue that the error common to all of them, as well as to 
Popper and Scheffler, is the failure to analyze observation. 
DISCOVERY AS THE DISCOVERY OF THEORIES 
That discovery in science is the discovery of 
theories is by no means a unique view. Popper describes 
discovery in science as "the act of conceiving or inventing a 
theory" ([6], p. 31). Hanson, of course, has the same view, 
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suggesting that science is "primarily a search for 
intelligibility," or the seeking of "new modes of conceptual 
organization," which, when it is successful, will be followed 
by the discovery of entities ([4], pp. 18-19). It would be 
better to say that the discovery of entities often signals 
success in the search for intelligibility, but the point here 
is to distinguish the options. The scientist either sets out 
to discover new entities or he sets out to discover theories. 
I will argue that the latter makes better sense. 
The starting point of the discovery process is 
important in deciding this question. The scientist always 
begins with the recognition of a problem, that is, with a 
problematic observation. The sense in which an observation 
is problematic may vary. An observed measurement may not 
conform to prediction (e.g., the total energy released from a 
sub-nuclear reaction may be less than predicted); an 
unfortunate event may be observed, the cause of which is 
unknown (e.g., a recurring set of disease symptoms); or a 
phenomenon may accompany an experiment which the operative 
theory does not explain (e.g., Roentgen's glowing screen for 
which then current electro-magnetic theory could not 
account). 
Having begun with an observed problematic phenomenon, 
the scientist seeks a context within which the phenomenon no 
longer appears problematic. This does not necessarily mean 
that we will look for or find a new entity. In the case of a 
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physical illness, he may find that its cause is an already 
known agent. He has solved his problem by locating it within 
the aegis of the theory of a particular disease agent. New 
sets of relations are discovered in such a case instead of a 
new entity. 
In an instance such as unexplained energy loss an 
entity may well be sought, but even then the course of 
research can best be understood in terms of the operative 
theory. It is that theory that will tell the researcher the 
sort of entity that is likely to be responsible for this 
quantity of energy under these conditions. Without such 
guidance he would know neither where nor how to look for the 
entity. 
The alternative, to assume that the goal of reseach 
is entities, would seem to leave research without a context. 
It would make of science a sort of "prospecting" where the 
most successful scientist would be the one with the best 
luck, who happened to look into the corner of the universe 
that was richest in unknown entities. Even if such behavior 
accurately characterized scientific research, it would not 
explain the development of intelligibility that science 
achieves. Each new entity would have to be placed, ad hoc, 
into the explanatory structure of science. We might expect 
that process to be rather far behind the work of the "entity 
Prospectors," with a constant backlog of things waiting for a 
Place in the system of science. But this does not coincide 
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with the order of events in science where entities and 
explanations seem to come along hand in hand, but with the 
explanation commonly leading the way, if only in the form of 
an hypothesis that is on its way to becoming an accepted 
explanation. "Acceptance" often corresponds with the 
discovery of the entity predicted by the hypothesis. 
This is not to say that new phenomena are never 
encountered for which an explanation is lacking. Roentgen's 
discovery of x-rays is perhaps the best known case of such an 
event. But from an epistemological perspective the discovery 
of x-rays is not different from the discovery of a virus. A 
problematic phenomenon (a glowing screen or a disease 
symptom) is observed and an explanation for it is sought. 
When the explanation is found, (in each of these cases the 
explanation involved the existence of a new entity) an entity 
is discovered. 
The discovery of x-rays was no more accidental than 
any other in science. The visual sighting of a glowing 
screen in the presence of the cathode-ray tube could not be 
called the discovery of x-rays since at least one other 
researcher had seen the screen without making anything of it. 
X-rays were not discovered until they were placed within the 
context of electromagnetic theory. 
The term "problematic phenomenon," as indicated, 
covers both the unexpected or new phenomenon as well as a 
well-known problem such as a particular illness. To describe 
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the discovery that follows from the first (e.g., x-rays) as 
"accidental" and the discovery that follows from the second 
(e.g., a virus) as "non-accidental" is to disguise what they 
have in common. In each case the discovery involves the 
theoretical context that makes them intelligible. 
ARGUMENTS FOR THE THEORY-LADENNESS OF OBSERVATION 
The problem of this thesis is not so much whether 
observation is theory-laden as it is the best philosophical 
approach to science. I believe that the best approach is 
from the perspective of discovery, and one of the reasons is 
that this approach involves the analysis of observation. 
Since the movement of discovery is from the observation of a 
problematic phenomenon to a theoretical explanation, it 
requires that we understand how observation and theory 
relate. In the process of investigating that relation Hanson 
saw that theory was part of the observation process itself 
and he labeled that discovery "the theory-ladenness of 
observation." 
The importance of analysis of observation lies in the 
fact that it provides the opportunity to specify the sense in 
Which theory contributes to the observation process, thereby 
making clearer the sense in which observation can provide 
evidence for or against theory. I.e., the analysis of 
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observation represents, as one might expect that it would, 
the determination of the sense in which science is empirical. 
What led Hanson to the conclusion that observation 
was theory-laden? At least two arguments can be distin-
guished in his chapter on observation in Patterns of 
Discovery: 
A. "Gestalt" shifts 
The issue as Hanson sees it is whether interpretation 
is part of the perceptual process its elf or whether it is 
something that occurs after perception is completed. He 
offers the "Gestalt" drawings such as the perspex cube and 
the bird-antelope as evidence for the former option ([4], pp. 
9 ff.). The argument is simple. The shift from seeing the 
cube as from above to seeing it as from below or from seeing 
the bird to seeing the antelope occurs in an instant. It 
takes neither time nor conscious deliberation. 
Interpretation as an intellectual process requires both. 
The ability to see the drawing as a cube or as either 
a bird or antelope will require training which is clearly of 
an intellectual nature, but once the training is mastered it 
becomes part of the observation process and no longer 
represents intellectual functioning in the same sense. 
Clearly the change cannot be attributed to the 
drawing itself. If it cannot be attributed to a change in 
intellectual interpretation either, then there must be 
124 
something else about observation that can change, and Hanson 
calls that the "organizational element" or the theory aspect. 
a. Argument from the Complexity of Perception 
Hanson also argues that perception is too complex to 
be accounted for solely by the contribution from the world, 
or, in the case of vision, by the retinal "picture." He uses 
the contrast between language and pictures to clarify this 
sense of complexity. Pictures copy aspects of originals, 
typically shapes, spatial relations and colors. Pictures 
represent the original in ways that language does not. The 
limitation of picturing brings this contrast into focus. 
Pictures can represent only those things that are picturable, 
e.g., physical elements such as shape, spatial relations and 
color. Language is not so limited. It refers to originals 
instead of representing them, it characterizes the original 
instead of arranging its parts according to that found in the 
original. But language can refer to and characterize any 
aspect of the original whether it is visual, auditory or 
tactile. 
The most important aspect of the complexity of 
perception lies in what Hanson calls "seeing-that." We can 
see, for instance, that birds have hollow bones, that the 
universe is heliocentric, or that the car is parked in an 
inopportune spot '( [ 4], p. 25). In each case what is seen 
involves relations that are not obvious without relevant 
knowledge. A picture of the situation or a description of 
'· 
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each part would not necessarily convey the information that 
18 observable to a suitable aware observer. 
This argument can be used with simpler instances of 
observation as well. To observe a red pen involves knowledge 
of shape, color and use. The point is admitted by many 
philosophers who are in general disagreement with Hanson. 
Israel Scheffler, for one, concedes that observation apart 
from concept is impossible ([8], p. 36). He attributes the 
same concession to C. I. Lewis. Nagel, as we have seen, 
agrees that every observation is determined by theory ( [5], 
p. 18). 
It is clear that even if the theory-ladenness of 
observation is indubitably established its implications are 
far from certain. I will nonetheless add two arguments for 
the theory-ladenness of observation which will be developed 
in more detail in the next section. 
C. Argument from the Complexity of the World 
Hanson's second argument above suggests that the 
product of perception is too complex to be accounted for 
solely in terms of the contribution from the world. One 
might also argue that the world itself is too complex to be 
perceived without the help of theory. We are immersed, in 
the terms of J. J. Gibson, in a "flowing array of ambient 
energy" ([2], p. 5). Perception is the process of extracting 
information from that flowing array. If we are to be 
successful we must have some method of selection or attention 
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since there is simply too much energy to attend to all at the 
same time. We would be overwhelmed by the sea of energy if 
we were without theory, that is, if perception were nothing 
but the process of conveying energy through sensory channels. 
D. Argument from Non-Seeing 
We often do not perceive things that are available in 
the sense of being directly before us. There are at least 
two types of situations where this occurs. In the first, our 
failure to see what is before us may be due to lack of 
knowledge. I do not, for instance, see what the radiologist 
sees when looking at an x-ray film. This will not sway those 
who are not convinced of the theory-ladenness of observation, 
since they will, in opposition to other arguments presented 
here, hold that what is seen is the same but the 
interpretation put on it is different as the result of 
different states of knowledge. 
On the other hand, we often fail to see things that 
are directly before us when our state of knowledge with 
regard to them is adequate to "interpret" what we have seen 
appropriately. It might be answered that in such cases, 
although we have the necessary knowledge, we fail to apply it 
to this experience. But it is not unheard of to actively 
seek a particular item and still not see it when it is 
directly before us. This is explainable on the assumption 
that observation is theory-laden, because on this account 
Whatever is seen (and in cases like this there are always 
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other things to be seen in the environment) requires the 
employment of some bit of knowledge. Not-seeing can be 
explained by the fact that perception as an activity 
involving theory is involved with some other object when that 
which is sought is available. The theory-neutral view of 
observation that is followed by interpretation is less open 
to an explanation of this sort. With the separation of 
processes the likelihood of such common perceptual mistakes 
or malfunctions is apparently eliminated. All the data is, 
on this view, presented with equal value, and we need only 
sort for that which fits the item sought. 
If observation is theory-laden it is also a skill and 
is thus open to both error and excellence. If observation is 
theory-neutral it is not a skill but is the mere absorption 
of energy which is then processed by the intellect. Our 
common experience of both error and excellence in observation 
is evidence for the theory-ladenness of observation. 
Finally, I will only mention the argument developed 
in Chapter III. There Thrane's attempt to develop a 
theory-neutral acount of seeing resulted in the conclusion 
that observation is irrelevant to epistemology. This is due 
largely to the totally undifferentiated character of 
perception without theory (the insight that was responsible 
for both Nagel and Scheffler accepting the theory-ladenness 
of observation). The assumption of theory-neutrality is 
therefore self-defeating. 
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THE ANALYSIS OF OBSERVATION 
AND THE EMPIRICAL CHARACTER OF SCIENCE 
The assumption that observation is theory-laden has 
been seen as casting doubt on the evidence-theory relation. 
I believe that the solution to this problem must lie in an 
analysis of observation, the purpose of which is to specify 
the contribution made by theory to the oservation process as 
well as the contribution from the world. I will begin that 
analysis with a discussion of the "data" of perception. 
A. The "Data" of Perception 
J. J. Gibson argues that as perceivers we are 
immersed in a sea of environmental energy, all of which is 
potential information about that environment. The energy of 
the environment is in that sense the "data" of perception. 
But this sense of "data" should be carefully distinguished 
from any "accomplishment" sense of data. That is, ambient 
energy is not information but only potential information. 
Without a perceiver it is not information, and in the 
presence of a perceiver it may or may not be information; it 
will depend on the nature of the perceiver (including the 
constitution of his sense-organs), as well as his interests 
or needs. 
Therefore, ambient energy represents the data of 
perception but not in the sense that, say, a measurement 
would be a datum in a blueprint. The measurement is 
129 
information apart from the blueprint but energy is not 
information apart from an actual perceptual process. This 
explains why I may not hear the traffic outside my office 
even though sound waves from it are striking my eardrums at 
an audible intensity virtually all the time. The sound waves 
are not the data of perception unless I perceive the traffic 
and I cannot do that unless I attend to it in the sense of 
employing some theory or other. 
B. Analysis of Theory-Function 
1. Selection 
As I indicated in my third argument for the theory-
ladenness of observation, the energy of our environment is a 
constant and complex source of potential information. It 
comes in the form of electromagnetic radiation, heat, sound 
waves, pressure and chemical action. 
The massiveness of the source provides theory with 
its first function. In order for perception to occur the 
perceiver must limit his attention to particular sources of 
energy. He must select from the vast array of energy just 
those types and sources which are most likely to yield the 
basis for information at a particular time. When walking or 
driving, for instance, we select for visual data in the 
region directly ahead of us most of the time. When listening 
to a lecture we select for audible data of the sort 
characteristic of the speaker. 
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To argue for theory-ladenness is not the point here. 
That argument has already been pursued to the degree that it 
will be. Instead, selection should here be seen in terms of 
the specification or description of theory-function in the 
observation process. I begin with the assumption that all 
perception involves the absorption of energy from the 
environment. This provides needed breadth to perception, but 
it also requires a tool for limiting the data source to 
manageable proportions. Theory in a selective role 
accomplishes this end adequately. 
It should be noted that since the energy of the 
environment is potential data and only becomes data when it 
is selected, the issue of the factual separateness between 
theory in its selective role and energy cannot arise. These 
are logical distinctions in the sense that theory and 
energy-data are separable in thought but not in fact, but in 
the case of its selective role this problem cannot arise 
since the energy does not become data until it is selected. 
2. Connection 
The data selected by theory must also be connected 
with other data in order to make sense of a complex 
environment. In our ordinary situations we regularly connect 
such things as a whistling sound with visible steam in order 
to gain the information that the water in the kettle is 
boiling. In science one may make connections between 
pendular and planetary motion in order to explain one or the 
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other. Or the scientist may employ mathematics to manipulate 
data into a recognizable phenomenon. 
The connective function of theory is the process of 
establishing relationships among selected energy-data. It 
has the additional function of directing the selection 
process, of course. Selection is never random, but is always 
for a purpose. The perceiver may be unskilled in finding 
relevant data, resulting in the appearance of randomness, but 
the perceiver who remained unskilled would not succeed and 
might not survive. He would surely not succeed in science. 
Suppose, for instance, that a researcher into a rare form 
of early senility recognizes what appear to be symptoms simi-
lar to those he has read about accompanying a particular form 
of paracitosis. He reads the available reports on the para-
cite and, perhaps, contacts the people involved in that 
research. He knows that his patients are not suffering from 
the same paracite since it is not found in his environment, 
but through his library research he finds that this particu-
lar organism injures its host by selectively absorbing an 
important nutrient from its. host's diet. The result is a 
form of malnutrition with symptoms like senility. He then 
tests his patients for the presence of the crucial nutrient, 
and finds that while their diets are adequate, their diges-
tive tracts are incapable of processing the nutrient 
properly. He then administers the chemical in the form of an 
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injection and observes his patients for changes in their 
symptoms. 
In this example the researcher is guided by the 
recognition of a similarity between very different dieseases. 
His hypothesis was that early senility was the result of a 
nutritional deficiency of the sort found in the paraci tic 
disease. He then knew what sort of experiment to perform. 
The hypothesis was nothing but a suggested connection between 
his problem and other data, but the possible data to which it 
might have been connected were virtually endless. It is the 
guide-capacity of theory that makes research non-random. 
c. Theory as Non-generative 
The point of this analysis of observation is to leave 
open the possibility of an empirical characterization of 
science. For science to be empirical it must be possible for 
observation and observation-reports to give information about 
the world that corresponds to the world in some meaningful 
sense. It is important to emphasize that possibility is all 
that is sought. I will not try to show that any particular 
report or set of reports has accomplished this end or that it 
ever will. The point is to base the empirical characteriza-
tion of science on the analysis of observation and not on the 
content of any set of observation reports. 
There are two critical points about this analysis of 
observation. First, every observation involves an energy 
contribution from the environment. Any process of gaining 
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information about the world without such energy contribution 
would not be called observation. And second, the contribu-
tion by the perceiver in the form of theory is a non-
generative contribution. That is, the energy is not 
amplified or altered by theory function. Great effort may go 
into the determination of the appropriate relations among 
data that constitutes theory, but that effort is the process 
of theory discovery and not the product. In any case, it 
does not represent the same sense of energy as that in the 
environment and could not, therefore, amplify or alter 
environmental energy. Theories, after all, are conceptual 
and concepts are too different from environmental energy to 
dilute, amplify or alter it. 
1. Theory as empirical in function 
The non-generative function of theory is important 
but there is more to the analysis of the empirical basis of 
science than merely pointing out that the perciever 's con-
tribution to observation is too different from the contribu-
tion from the world to replace it. We must give a positive 
account of the function of theory if we are to understand 
what it means to say that observation is theory-laden. 
Hanson argues that theories represent "pattern" 
statements which provide the context within which detail 
statements make sense. Two points need to be made about this 
claim. First, the pattern statement is responsible for 
revealing the world since it constitutes information in 
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exactly the same way that the detail statement reveals the 
world, by making appropriate connections. The only 
difference is the level of generality and the level of 
complexity of the theory. 
In other words, the selective function of theory in 
science is the same as in observation itself. There is a 
good reason for this similarity and it is that theory in 
science always serves observation. That is, there is no 
theory in science that does not function as the theory 
component of some theory-laden observation. A theory that 
did not would have no place in empirical science. 
2. Theory as empirical in production 
Theories are discovered only by those who are 
immersed in the context of the problematic phenomenon. It 
grows out of careful observation; it is not an "armchair" 
activity in the sense of idle speculation. According to 
justificationist approaches to philosophy of science, theory 
is simply there with nothing said about how it came to be. 
The support that is given for this omission is that the 
creative act is the realm of psychology. Discovery doubtless 
has a psychological component, but the dependence of 
discovery on the observable problem situation, and its 
emergence from experience is not a matter of psychology. 
Neither is the relationship between the theory and the energy 
components of perception. 
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The assumption that theories simply "leap" into existence 
from the mind of the scientist ignores obvious facts about 
the relation between the scientist and his subject matter. 
But it also ignores significant information about the charac-
ter of theories. Theories are as much the product of the 
world as they are the product of the mind of the scientist. 
It is only because the scientist is in such intimate contact 
with the world that he is able to solve a problem with regard 
to it. 
This again raises the issue of the beginning and end 
points of discovery. The scientist begins with the observa-
tion of a problematic phenomenon and his research ends, or is 
successful, when he is able to explain that phenomenon in 
such a way that it is no longer problematic. This descrip-
tion of the end point of research is another way of saying 
that research ends when the scientist has achieved a new 
observation, when he has developed a new way of seeing the 
original phenomenon. This understanding of the movement of 
the discovery process is part of the support for the claim 
made above that the development of theory is always in the 
service of observation. This is because the stimulus for 
every research project is an observed problem and the solu-
tion always involves a new, non-problematic observation. The 
credit for this change can go only to theory. Whatever else 
a theory does, it must facilitate this observational advance. 
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Otherwise the problem which stimulated its development would 
persist. 
IMPLICATIONS FOR PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 
A. The Theory/Observation Distinction 
The most important implication of this analysis of 
observation is the meaning it has for the theory/observation 
distinction. In the discovery approach "theory" and 
"observation" are logical distinctions within the process of 
meaning-determination in science. The distinction between 
them is not based on empirical content or theory content. In 
order to make the remaining basis of the distinction entirely 
clear, it should be separated into two applications--its 
meaning within observation its elf and as a way of 
distinguishing statements in science: 
1. The theory/observation distinction and observation 
itself 
As a distinction that is relevant to observation, 
"theory" and "observation" indicate aspects of the 
observation process itself. The redundancy of the term 
"observation" is misleading, and it comes from the tendency 
of past empiricists to associate observation exclusively with 
the contribution to the observation process of the world. In 
terms used here the T/O distinction is .E.£!_ applicable to the 
observation process at all since the appropriate logical 
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distinctions for analyzing observation are "theory" and 
"energy-data." 
The tendency to assume that observation is exhausted 
by the energy contribution from the world is also respon~ible 
for the sense in which the term "theory-laden observation" is 
misleading. In fact observation is not laden with theory or 
anything else. Part of what is meant by "observation" is 
theory. Theory is logically distinguishable or separable in 
thought from observation but not separable in fact. Without 
theory there is no observation. 
2. The T/0 distinctton in science 
Within science T/O distinguishes statements or sets 
of statements from each other. From the perspective of 
discovery statements are not here distinguished on the basis 
of empirical or theoretical content. Instead "theory" and 
"observation" ·indicate explanans and explanandum. They 
differ in terms of generality. Each is empirical, i.e., each 
describes or is intended to describe the world. Hanson 
suggests that the way they do that, the way in which they are 
empirical, is different but I believe that he overstates this 
difference. If any scientific explanatory structure is to 
have many levels, then there would have to be many senses of 
"empirical" in an heirarchic relationship. To distinguish 
many senses is more of a task than I believe is necessary. 
It is enough if the one sense sought here, the sense in which 
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theory can be accommodated without precluding the possibility 
of undiluted contact with the world, can be made clear. 
This sense of "empirical" allows any statement in 
empirical science to be labeled either theoretical or 
observational, depending on the context. A statement from 
the explanandum of one scientific argument may be found in 
the explanans of another. 
a. Unobservable entities 
This interpretation of the T/0 distinction avoids the 
"two-tier" characterization of scientific statements adopted 
by empiricists like Scheffler where the top or theoretical 
tier is thought to refer to observable entities ([8], pp. 46 
ff.). Given the theory-ladenness of observation there is no 
reason to describe any of the entities referred to in science 
as unobservable. To do that is to make a mockery of the 
empirical characterization of science. The reasons for it 
seem to be, (a) the fact that these entities cannot be 
observed with the unaided senses, and (b) that the production 
of the necessary instrumentation will require theory. 
Neither of these reasons represents a philosophical problem 
for the analysis of observation developed here. If the 
intervention of an instrument were sufficient, then anything 
observed with the aid of eyeglasses or the light microscope 
would have to be labeled "unobservable." The fact that 
optical theory is necessary for the production of eyeglasses 
or the light microscope does not change the situation either. 
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We need not know optical theory in order to use either 
instrument, but even if that knowledge were necessary it 
would not have a pejorative impact on observation since it is 
admittedly theory-laden. 
There remains at least one additional reason for the 
"unobservable" label, that some entities that require 
instruments for their observation are in principle beyond our 
sense organs. Eyeglasses and light microscopes work with 
light of wavelengths in what is called the "visible" range, 
but the electron microscope uses a stream of electrons to 
which the eye is not sensitive. Similarly, x-rays, radio 
waves and sub-atomic particle motion represent forms of 
energy which none of our sense organs can detect at any level 
of intensity without the appropriate instrument. But the 
fact that a theory is necessary in order to connect the 
"energy-data" of observation to the entity in the world does 
not complicate our theory of observation. A theory is 
necessary in the case of the light microscope also. In 
neither case need we necessarily know the theory in order to 
use the instrument. There may be cases where knowing the 
theory is important in assessing the relevance of particular 
observations, but this could be true whether we have sense 
organs tuned to this type of energy or not. 
This problem needs a great deal more work but I will 
make only one more remark about it: The fact that my 
analysis of observation does not depend on any necessary 
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connection between the actual structure of our organs of 
sense and the entities found in the world is an advantage. 
It requires only that the theory component of observation 
function in such a way that it does not alter or replace the 
energy-date contribution from the world, and that its 
function be empirical in character. The intervention of 
instrumentation has no effect on that analysis. 
b. Meaning-dependence of observation terms on theory 
I will offer two arguments against the 
meaning-dependence of observation terms on theory. The first 
is a negative argument that the problem itself has 
contradictory presuppositions. The second is a positive 
argument based on the analysis of observation given above. 
It is odd that the problem of the meaning-dependence 
of observation terms on theory should be encountered in an 
empiricist tradition since the most fundamental assumption of 
empiricism is that knowledge (and, therefore, meaning,) 
arises from experience or observation. The reason why it 
occurred, I belie-ye, is the failure to examine observation. 
R. B. Braithwaite 's introduction to Scientific Explanation 
gives an argument which expresses the prejudice against 
observation as a philosophical problem in the treatment of 
science. The problem of philosophy of science, he says, is 
scientific law and theory and how they relate to the facts of 
observation. It is not the problem of how we come to know 
those facts through perception. The reason why this second 
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problem need not be examined is that the disputants in the 
philosophy of perception debate (the phenomenalists and the 
realists) can agree about what the facts of observation are 
even though they will disagree about whether there is a more 
fundamental sense of experience, to be analyzed in terms of 
sense-data ([l], pp. 4ff.). 
It is important to note that this work by Braithwaite 
predated the debate about the theory-ladenness of 
observation. The assumption that all observers will be able 
to agree about the facts of observation cannot be made so 
casually if the claim that observation is theory-laden is 
accepted. At least some who accept that claim will argue 
that the facts of observation vary with the theory employed 
in observation. 
It is also important to note that Braithwaite's 
attitude toward the philosophy of perception places the 
question of how observation terms and statements achieve 
meaning outside the parameters of the philosophy of science. 
If universal agreement is achievable on the meanings of these 
terms and statements, he is saying, we can pursue other 
questions without worrying about how observation terms and 
statements attained their meaning. This is not to say that 
Braithwaite is not an empiricist. It is to say that that 
part of his position which represents empiricism has the 
character of an assumption· rather than a problem or argument. 
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Further, there is an obvious contradiction in this 
claim, although a different one from that which is involved 
in inferring the meaning-dependence of observation terms from 
the theory-ladenness of observation. Braithwaite's 
contradiction lies in the fact that the uniformity in 
observation reports depends on the assumption that 
observation is theory-neutral. This assumption is a 
philosophy of perception, one that is essential to his 
construal of philosophy of science. It is contradictpry to 
define the parameters of philosophy of science (as excluding 
the philosophy of perception) on the basis of a philosophy of 
perception. 
But the response to the theory-ladenness of 
observation is my real concern here. For the meaning of 
observation terms to be treated as dependent on the theory 
for their meaning, one must first make an assumption which 
leaves the question of how the meaning of observation terms 
is achieved unanswered. The meaning of observation terms 
must be a sort of philosophical void in order for theory-
ladenness to imply that theory supplies the meaning of those 
terms. Otherwise the most we could infer from theory-
ladenness would be that the meaning of observation terms 
would have to be re-assessed in light of theory-ladenness. 
In other words, if the problem of the meaning of observation 
terms has already been examined, then the theory-ladenness of 
observation would force a re-examination. It is only under 
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the condition that it has not been examined at all, (i.e., 
that philosophy of perception is irrelevant because 
observation is theory-neutral) that from the theory-ladenness 
of observation we can infer the meaning-dependence of 
observation terms on theory. 
Braithwaite's assumption that philosophy of 
perception is irrelevant to philosophy of science provided 
the needed assumption: we need not examine perception. 
Theory-ladenness then appears to imply that the meaning of 
observation terms comes from theory. Since the irrelevance 
of philosophy of perception to philosophy of science is based 
on the theory-neutrality of observation, we must first assume 
theory-neutrality in order to infer meaning-dependence of 
observation terms from the theory-ladenness of observation. 
The positive acount of theory gives it the roles of 
selection and connection in observation and in science it has 
the correlative function of providing the context within 
which observation reports are related to each other. There 
is no factual separation between theory and observation 
statements of the sort that would support a dependency 
relationship. The assumption of a factual separation is 
supported by the prejudice against the philosophy of 
perception. In this atmosphere theory invention or discovery 
appears to be speculative in an "armchair" sense. When 
observation is given only an evidence or testing role it can 
have no effect on theory production. The result is the 
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isolation of theory from observation and the assumption of 
dependency. 
c. The Problem of Circularity in the Evidence-Theory 
Relation 
I will argue here that there is no conflict between 
observation being theory-laden and the belief that 
observation is the source of evidence for or against theory. 
This argument will be based on a clarification of what it 
means to say that observation is theory-laden. 
In the above argument I hold that the theory-
ladenness of observation does not mean that observation terms 
are meaning dependent on theory. In that argument the point 
was to emphasize the ways in which theory and observation are 
related in order to distinguish their relationship from that 
which would be appropriate for dependency of meaning. In 
this argument I will show that the theory-ladenness of 
observation indicates or refers to the connective or 
patterning function of theory, and that as a consequence of 
this interpretation the theory being tested is never required 
for the observations that constitute the test. In other 
words, I have argued against meaning-dependency, and, and 
here I will argue against existence-dependency of observation 
terms and reports as a consequence of theory-ladenness. 
Let me begin with an example. Suppose that a medical 
researcher hypothesizes that disease symptoms A, B and C are 
caused by the degeneration of a particular part of the brain. 
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If that part of the brain were in fact degenerated it would 
be revealed by test X. He then performs test X on patients 
with A, Band C. If test Xis positive for a significant 
number of patients with this syndrome, the hypothesis is 
supported. 
All the symptoms in such a case would have been 
observable and observed prior to the new theory of their 
cause. Test X might well have been available too. None of 
these observations depend on the theory, except in the sense 
that they would not have been associated or connected with 
each other without the theory. This is the function of 
theory that Hanson describes as "organizational," as the 
"pattern" for observational details. 
This is not to say that the experiment, which in this 
case involved the performance of test X on patients with 
symptoms A, B and C is theory-neutral. The ability to 
recognize particular physical conditions as a symptom of 
disease requires theory. It might be argued, then, that even 
though the experiment used to test the new disease theory is 
not determined by that new disease theory, it remains 
dependent on other theories, particularly theories which 
describe physical conditions such as blood pressure as 
indices of health. This might appear to lead to the 
conclusion that theory retains the definitive role in testing 
for empirical adequacy. I will show that this conclusion is 
unwarranted. 
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The fact that other theories are involved in the 
observations which are essential to the experiment in 
question does not represent a problem for the empirical 
character of science if it can be shown that in these cases 
theory has the same guide-function that was described in 
connection with the new disease theory. That is, if theory 
does not determine those observations in the sense of making 
them possible, but only guides the researcher to make the 
appropriate observations, then the influence of theory at 
this level is also not anti-empirical with respect to the 
experiment designed to test the new disease theory. 
The observation of elevated blood pressure was 
grouped with other symptoms into ~.single syndrome by the new 
disease theory. Theory or knowledge is required for the 
recognition that elevated blood pressure is an index of 
heal th. That theory is not required however, in order to 
observe and measure blood pressure. The theory of blood 
pressure as a disease symptom guides the researcher to 
measure blood pressure, but it does not make that measurement 
possible. The ability to observe and measure blood pressure 
(apart from any understanding of 1 ts relationship to human 
health) is theory-laden too, but by still different knowledge 
or theory. In order to observe and measure pressure one must 
know at least that it involves a mathematical relationship 
between force and area. 
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We can continue to trace this example downward toward 
simpler instances. While theory or knowledge is required in 
order to relate force and area in the mathematical way 
required in order to express pressure, this knowledge is not 
required in order to observe either area or force. 
At this simpler level, the recognition of area as a 
measurable entity requires the application of mathematics to 
the energy contribution from the world, but it does not 
fabricate that energy contribution. Neither is mathematics 
necessary for that energy contribution to play a role in 
perception. Non-mathematical adults and children are not 
prevented from observing the surfaces of tables or other 
objects around them. Some theory or knowledge is required, 
of course, but it need not be mathematics. 
As science evolves, higher and higher theoretical 
levels are reached, but th~ guide-function of theory is the 
same at each level. Theory guides research toward ever more 
complex integrations, but never does it supply the data that 
are to be integrated. The fact that the data being 
integrated by a theory have separately been integrated by 
lower-level theories does not change the empirical character 
of the experiment that is designed to test that theory. 
This same point can be used to show how a single 
experiment can decide between the conflicting theories. 
Suppose that our current theory of light characterizes it as 
composed entirely of energy in wave form having no mass. 
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Suppose also that an alternative theory is offered which 
allows that light travels in a wave pattern but suggests that 
it has a small but detectable mass. A proponent of the 
latter theory might offer a "crucial experiment"--at a 
particular time during a near total eclipse of the sun the 
light from a distant star will pass close to the sun before 
reaching earth. Since a large part of the earth's surface is 
darkened it is possible to detect the light from the star 
over a wide area. If the light passing near the sun traveled 
in a straight line its detection point on the earth would be 
predictable relative to its detection point along other paths 
passing farther from the sun. 
In order to make the observations necessary for this 
experiment one need not have any knowledge of the make-up of 
light. The scientist who suggested the experiment might ask 
an astronomer to perform it for him, saying nothing of the 
theory it was intended to support. 
,Proponents of the older view might be expected to 
support such research, expecting that it would corroborate 
their theory of light. 
Neither theory of light is necessary in order to 
conduct this experiment. Therefore, if it shows that in fact 
light does bend when passing massive objects one might expect 
that all parties would agree that the experiment offered 
support for the new theory. This may not happen. Proponents 
of the old view, as Kuhn argues, will doubtless question the 
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experimental design or suggest intervening variables that 
have not been taken into account. These arguments will 
prompt an examination of technique and possibly a search for 
specific, possible variables. Such responses are not 
unreasonable. Fraud and error are not unheard of in science 
and the search for unaccounted for variables sometimes 
results in significant discoveries. But if no fraud, error 
or variable is found, the experiment can legitimately be 
treated, if only in retrospect, as "crucial." 
It is certainly possible that the theory necessary 
for making the observations might itself be replaced. 
Euclidean geometry, for instance, is not the only way to 
conceptualize spacial relations; alternatives have been 
offered. These alternatives, however, would have no 
relevance unless they demonstrated the falsity of the 
Euclidean principles that were used in making the critical 
observations. Even then the philosophical point being made 
here would be untouched. If the relevant Euclidean 
principles were proven false then both theories of light 
would have to reassess the value of an experiment that had 
appeared relevant. The geometric principles that replaced 
Euclid's might support a similar experiment and they might 
not. But there is no reason to suppose that another 
experiment could not have been designed that both parties 
could agree was decisive (given flawless technique and no 
intervening variables). 
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The point is that this interpretation of theory-ladenness 
gives theory a connective or guide-function. When an 
hypothesis is first suggested, it directs the researcher to 
the appropriate observation. This observation may have been 
made any number of times by others or it may have been 
possible with available instruments. But its relevance would 
not have been known prior to the hypothesis which suggested 
the previously unknown connection between this and other 
observations. An observation is T1LO because we are guided 
to it by T1 , not because T 1 is necessary in order to see 
whatever is there. 
Observations that act as evidence for a theory need 
not have been made nor need they be possible with existing 
instruments in order for this interpretation of theory-
ladenness to be viable. Dudley Shapere, in "The Concept of 
Observation in Science and Philosophy," gives a detailed 
description of the development of a neutrino detector which 
was expected to confirm or disconfirm theories about this 
sub-atomic particle. It required the building of a large 
tank far below the surface of the earth in order to shield it 
from other particles that might have similar effects. 
Chemicals that would react to a particle of this sort were 
used in the chamber. Specifically an isotope of chlorine was 
used because it could be expected to decay on contact with 
such a high energy particle yielding radioactive argon. The 
latter could be removed by bubbling helium through the tank 
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which could then be separated from the helium with a charcoal 
filter and conducted to a detection chamber ([9], p. 487). 
The theory of the behavior of the chlorine isotope 
and its reaction to helium and charcoal filters as well as 
the theory relevant to radioactivity detection were all 
available prior to the construction of the elaborate neutrino 
detector. The theory of the neutrino was not involved in any 
of these individual components of the device. The theory of 
the neutrino was involved in the choice of those components. 
Only chemicals that could be expected to react in a 
predictable way would be useful and neutrino theory told the 
researchers which chemicals would most likely do so. Other 
considerations such as cost had to be taken into account 
since the character of the particle indicated that vast 
amounts of the primary detection material would be needed 
([9], p. 501). Neutrino theory "guided" researchers to 
inexpensive material in the same way that it "guided" them to 
an isotope of chlorine. To suppose that we can only 
understand this experiment from the perspective of neutrino 
theory makes no more sense than supposing that neutrino 
theory is necessary for understanding the cost of the primary 
detection material. 
The theory being tested has enormous impact on the 
choice of evidence, but the impact is not of the sort that 
could cast doubt on the espistemological warrant of the 
evidence so chosen. 
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At least one further problem should be considered 
that might have relevance to the issue of epistemological 
warrant. Shapere tells us that results other than those that 
were expected prompted the researchers to reassess the 
theories of the reactions within the tank. It was suggested 
that the low counts initially achieved might be caused by 
argon remaining an ion and being captured by another molecule 
in the mixture. In other words, the theory of the instrument 
was adjusted because it failed to yield results predicted by 
neutrino theory. But as indicated with reference to the 
light bending experiment, criticism of experimental technique 
is a reasonable part of any research. If results are other 
than those expected there may be something wrong with the 
design of the apparatus. However, no scientist would simply 
conclude that this was so because of the failure of 
prediction. He would test the implicated aspect of his 
experiment against the background from which it came. In 
this case ionization theory could be consulted to see whether 
such aberrant behavior might be expected under these 
conditions. Other experiments might be set up to determine 
whether alterations were called for. 
No epistemological problem is created by this sort of 
interplay between prediction and experimental design. The 
critical point remains. Theory-ladenness does not imply that 
the experiment used to test the theory is determined by that 
theory. Instead, theory-ladenness tells us that the theory 
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being tested guides us to relevant data; it tells us what 
sort of experiment to perform. 
This is a general theory of the meaning of the 
theory-ladenness of observation. I have argued that 
theory-ladenness does not imply that the experiment used to 
test a theory is determined by that theory, but the intent of 
the analysis is to make the general point that theory-
ladenness does not imply that science is non-empirical. 
In order to make the case for the general argument 
more clearly, I will entertain one further possible 
objection. It might be argued that the notion of scientific 
theory should be taken more broadly as including all the 
theories that are involved in the experiment. In the light 
experiment this would include Euclidean geometry and in the 
medical research experiment it would include the theory of 
blood pressure as a disease symptom. There are at least two 
senses in which this objection can be taken and I believe 
that both can be satisfactorily accommodated within my 
analysis of the theory-ladenness of observation. 
First, it must be determined under what conditions 
the expansion of the notion of theory will be helpful in 
solving the problem of the meaning of the theory-ladenness of 
observation for philosophy of science. Insofar as the issue 
concerns the less general point about whether the theory 
being tested determines the observations involved in its own 
test, it is not helpful to expand the notion of theory. The 
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theory being tested in the light example is a theory about 
the nature of light, not Euclidean geometry. It is only 
because Euclidean principles are not in doubt that the 
experiment could be designed in the way that it was. 
This is not to say that Euclidean geometry could not 
be tested, but if an experiment were designed with that in 
mind, it would surely not be based on the assumption that the 
connections proposed by those principles were valid. To do 
so would be to beg the question in an obvious way. 
No experiment should be expected to test all the 
knowledge that is presupposed by its design and relevant 
observations. The point or controlling variables in 
scientific experimentation is to limit to one the number of 
things being tested. If all relevant knowledge were included 
in the notion of theory, then every experiment would 
presuppose most of what it was supposed to test. 
However, a second interpretation of this objection 
suggests a less obvious sense of circular! ty. It might be 
granted that "theory-ladenness does not imply that the 
experiment used to test a theory is determined by that 
theory," while insisting that the experiment is determined by 
some theory (e.g., Euclidean geometry), and that this is 
enough to give theory a definitive role in testing. This is 
a weaker objection since it does not imply the vicious 
circularity that would characterize testing when the tested 
theory determined the condition of its own test, thereby 
guaranteeing its own success. 
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But it suggests circularity 
nonetheless even though the circularity has been spread out 
over a range of scientific theories. The point of describing 
my argument as "general" is to indicate that this sense of 
circularity can be countered as well. This was the point of 
the analysis of the blood pressure datum used in the earlier 
medical experiment example. There I showed that the theory 
involved in recognizing the datum functions in the same 
guide-capacity described in connection with the theory being 
tested. Consequently its function in the experiment in 
question is not to determine a datum if by determine we mean 
to make it possible. Instead, the theory of blood pressure 
as a symptom of disease or Euclidean geometry will be 
responsible for directing the researcher to make a particular 
observation (which could have been made without it, but which 
might not have been made), and, naturally, for ignoring 
others, in fact everything else seen or felt. 
To generalize the argument that theory-ladenness does 
not imply that the experiment used to test a theory is 
determined by that theory is to show that it applies at every 
level. 
implies 
The argument itself showed that theory-ladenness 
a guide-function in the sense of guiding the 
researcher to make appropriate observations, but that it does 
not mean that theory makes the observation possible. If that 
is true of all the observations that led up to the experiment 
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in question, then there is no level of theory-ladenness which 
threatens the empirical character of science. 
When we say that an observation is T1-laden we are saying 
that we are directed to make that observation by T1, not that 
T1 is necessary in order to see whatever is there. 
B. The Positive Account of Theory 
The discovery approach provides the context within 
which theory can be given a positive characterization. That 
positive characterization has four different aspects. It is 
non-negative in two ways. First, theories need never be 
interpreted as referring to unobservable entities. The use 
of instrumentation does not make the entity unobservable and 
it need not raise any doubt regarding its existence status. 
Second, theory function in science does not have the negative 
impact of making the testing process circular. 
The third positive aspect of this account of theor>ies 
comes directly from Hanson. Theories, he said, provide a 
"pattern" within which observation details make sense. This 
account is impressive in that it is simple and understand-
able. Other accounts of theory function, such as that 
offered by Nagel, are less clear. Theories, Nagel says, 
"codify highly idealized (or 'limiting') notions • • • , " and 
"serve as links in the inferential chains that connect the 
instantial experimental data with the generalized as well as 
the instantial conclusions of inquiry" ([5], pp. 29-30). 
This descr>iption conflicts with his later admission that 
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theories also, occasionally, report observations ([5], p. 
36). 
Scheffler is similarly vague and negative in his 
characterization of theories; they represent the upper tier 
of the two-tier structure of scientific language. Theories 
are described by contrasting them with observation state-
ments. The latter, he says, formulate observable facts that 
are directly testable and that can be expressed independently 
of theory. Theories, by contrast, neither formulate 
observable facts nor directly testable generalizations ([8], 
p. 4 7). The meaning of theory-terms is determined by the 
theoretical context in which they are found. The function of 
theories on Scheffler's account is more vague than that 
offered by Nagel. It appears that they are important in his 
system because they provide an area in which scientists 
disagree without casting doubt on the empirical foundation of 
science. 
The fourth positive aspect of theories developed here 
involves their actual discovery. Given a positive account of 
the function of theory as providing the pattern or 
organizational structure within which observational details 
fit, it is easier to see how theories evolve. Until the T/O 
distinction is divorced from the assumption that it 
represents a difference of empirical or theoretical content, 
theories merely "appear." But function and discovery cannot 
be separated without confusion. Once we see how theories 
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serve as part of the empirical structure of science, the role 
their discovery plays in understanding the rationality of 
science becomes more apparent. Among the points clarified by 
discovery are certain aspects of falsification theory and the 
importance of the justification/discovery distinction for 
philosophy of science. 
1. The justification/discovery distinction 
The traditional use of this distinction has been to 
distinguish philosophical issues from psychological or 
sociological issues. Discovery, it was thought, was of no 
interest to philosophy of science. The distinction was 
mistaken in two ways. First, as I have argued, the 
examination of the discovery process has important 
epistemological consequences. And, second, justification can 
be better accommodated as part of the discovery process than 
in isolation. 
Traditional empiricism has equated justification with 
the testing process. According to this school, theory 
statements and statements describing antecedent experimental 
conditions are combined as premises. From these premises 
singular statements are deduced which are then compared with 
statements describing the relevant observable situation to 
see whether they match. If they do the theory is justified 
and if not it is not. 
There are many problems with this account, but I find 
two particularly troubling. First, since no account of 
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theory discovery is given, it seems from a philosophical 
point of view pure chance when a theory succeeds in support-
ing the deduction of observation statements. 
The second problem is that as an account of science, 
the just ifica ti on approach is particularly pal try. All it 
gives us is the "bottom line" of science. Philosophers, of 
course, have found a great deal to do within this framework, 
but much of it has the flavor of patching a leaky boat. 
The alternative that I offer is the discovery-
justification continuum. As soon and as often as an 
hypothesis is developed which has promise it is tested. The 
testing process need not be particularly formal since its 
essence is to determine whether the old problem can be seen 
in a new way. In the example given earlier of hypothesizing 
brain tissue decay to explain a particular syndrome, the 
researcher might, as a first step, call a colleague and ask 
if he knew of patients with symtoms A, B, C and X. At this 
point the process of justification has begun. The answer, of 
course, may be equivocal and the initial hypothesis may 
require refinement or replacement. But the point is that 
justification or testing is important because it serves 
discovery and not because it proves that scientific 
assertions are true. In my view the use of the term "true" 
as well as the specification of its meaning should be given 
following the analysis of discovery. Otherwise it may 
represent a source of problematic presuppositions. The 
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concept of "truth" should serve epistemology and not the 
other way around. 
Similarly the concept of "empirical" should refer to 
science as a whole and not merely to the evidence used in 
science. Treating discovery-justification as a continuum is 
part of the process of expanding "empirical" to cover all of 
science. 
2. The non-rejection of theories in the face.of 
counter-evidence 
Why are theories in science not rejected when the 
scientists employing them are fully aware of the existence of 
counter-instances or anomalies? Kuhn answers that to do 
science is to work under the aegis of a guiding theory or 
paradigm. To reject a theory without another to turn to for 
guidance would be to reject science itself. But this is not 
a satisfying answer; science might still be irrational for 
maintaining a position which is in conflict with the evidence 
of observation. 
Others, notably Popper and Lakatos, have offered 
programs which aim to outline the conditions under which it 
would be rational to consider a theory falsified. This is 
not a straightforward project, according to Kakatos, for two 
basic sorts of reasons. First, almost any theory can be 
saved by ad hoc additions to it which make exceptions for 
recognized anomalies. And second, the evidence of observa-
tion cannot prove anything in the realm of statements since 
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"proof" is a concept applicable to the logical relations 
among sentences ([10], pp. 97-98). As a result all the 
statements of science are fallible including those called 
"observational" or singular statements of fact. They are all 
adopted as a matter of agreement or convention ([10], p. 
106). It is on the basis of these fallible statements that 
theories are rejected. The choice, according to Lakatos, is 
between this "risky conventionalist policy" or irrationalsim. 
Lakatos explains the failure to reject or consider 
falsified a theory on the basis of anomalies or 
counter-evidence by adding what he calls a "sophisticated" 
proviso to the falsificationist criteria for rational 
behavior in science. This proviso stipulates that no theory 
be rejected unless a new and better theory is available to 
take its place. By "better" he simply means that the new 
theory must have "corroborated excess empirical content over 
its predecessor" ([10], p. 116). History suggests, he says, 
that scientific tests are not the two-cornered fights between 
theory and experiment of naive falsificationism, but instead 
are three-cornered fights between rival theories and 
experiment ([10], p. 115). 
Taking historical factors into account may give an 
historicist ring to a philosophical account of science and it 
may not. In this case I believe that it does. Lakatos gives 
no reason for the added sophistication other than history. 
In that sense, his account is no better than Kuhn's. 
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Scientists, Kuhn has said, do not reject a theory until they 
have a better one because they could not continue to do 
science in the absence of a theory. Lakatos has altered 
falsificationism to take that historical fact into account. 
He would doubtless point out that falsification could not be 
"progressive" otherwise, but this is also Kuhn's point. To 
dogmatically reject the only available theory would surely 
halt progress. 
The point remains that the rationality of science is 
not adequately clarified by falsificationism. Part of the 
reason for this is the conventional character of falsifying 
observational statements. What is not made clear either by 
Kuhn, Lakatos or Popper is the sense in which the observa-
tional report or statement is conventional. That the 
observation statements are fallible tells us little except 
that they are not as good evidence as we had thought. The 
reason why they are fallible, according to Lakatos, is 
because the truth-value of statements cannot be decided by 
the facts. His admiration for Popper is due to the latter's 
willingness to proceed on the basis of fallible, 
conventionally chosen evidence statements, fully aware of the 
risks, in an attempt to salvage some sense of rationality in 
science. 
In my view such willingness is imprudent. The 
problem lies in the supposed conventional character of 
observation reports. Any structure built on admittedly 
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conventional statements is of dubious value for explicating 
the rationality of empirical science. It is for this reason 
that the problem of discovery is important. Discovery begins 
wih observation and it examines the ways in which observation 
and theory interrelate. It shows us a sense in which the 
perceiver contributes to observation statements and a sense 
in which he does not. It does not preclude the view that 
observation provides information about the world that is 
objective. 
But more than that, the process of testing is inte-
grated into the process of discovery. Testing is perhaps a 
less formal procedure than either Lakatos or Popper recognize 
but this is part of the problem. For Popper, the analysis of 
discovery is impossible ([6], p. 31), and for Lakatos it is 
the same as the "rational appraisal of scientific theories" 
([10], p. 115). The point is that such rational appraisal is 
a constant feature of scientific research. A theory or 
hypothesis is successful only if it facilitates observation, 
and as often as it promises success it is tested. The test-
ing usually takes the form of an experiment, which may or may 
not be highly complex and time consuming. But by integrating 
testing into the philosophy of discovery it is possible to 
see more clearly how theory actually functions within sci-
ence. Testing, in this sense, is a tool used in the discov-
ery of theories. Viewed in this way we are less likely to 
treat theories as imaginative leaps or sheer speculation. 
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The problem lies in finding something to which to 
link the actual historically supported tendencies of 
scientists with regard to falsification. To say that 
falsification proceeds as it does because we could not have 
progress otherwise is lame and historicist. 
What does discovery do for falsification theory, and 
specifically for the problem of the non-rejection of theories 
in the face of anomalies? First, the sense in which 
observation statements are conventional and the sense in 
which they are not becomes clearer. Also important, however, 
is the fact that falsification is given a rational context as 
part of the discovery process. That same context tells us 
that observation statements are conventional in the sense 
that the history of science, including its language, will 
dictate the direction of reearch. But those statements are 
not entirely conventional since the theory-ladenness of 
observation does not preclude the possibility of observation 
reports giving an empirical account of the world which, 
although guided by theory, is not fabricated by theory. 
And second, by focusing exclusively on falsification 
one misses a surviving sense of justification. The claim 
that no theory is ever proven (since a falsifying instance 
can always turn up) misses the point of why theories are 
sought in the first place. They are valued because they 
facilitate observation and an hypothesis is called successful 
(and raised to the status of theory) when it is found to do 
that. This is a genuine sense of justification. 
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It also 
tells us why theories are not rejected in the face of 
apparent counter-instances: They succeed in helping us to 
observe in important ways. That a theory could do more is 
stimulus for further research but it does not detract from 
what the theory is able to accompish. Neither does it bring 
into question the rationality of science. The positive 
account of theory offered above makes it unnecessary to 
apologize for non-rejection. 
The numerous retreats that Lakatos defines are 
necessary because he has chosen to characterize the 
rationality of science using only a narrow band of the 
spectrum of scientific activity, justification or falsifi-
cation. Without the broader context provided by discovery he 
is forced to busy himself with adjustments to a system that 
had been crippled by the framework within which the problem 
of scientific knowledge is placed. If falsification is the 
principle that defines scientific rationality, then 
non-rejection becomes a problem. But if falsification is put 
in the context of discovery, non-rejection is reasonable, 
i.e., it does not complicate a rational account of science. 
to it. 
A THEORY OF SCIENTIFIC TRUTH 
My theory of truth-has an undeniable realistic flavor 
I believe that the terms of science refer to real 
entities in the world. 
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No other assumption is compatible 
with an empiricist interpretation of science, and I believe 
that the evidence for an empirical interpretation of science 
is overwhelming. 
Defining the exact sense in which I am a realist may 
be aided by reference to an article by Richard Rorty, 11 The 
World Well Lost" ([7]). Rorty concludes in this article that 
the coherence and correspondence theories of truth are 
"non-competing trivialities" ([7], p. 665). He identifies 
the source of the philosophical presuppositions which are 
responsible 
distinction 
for such fruitless 





distinction between necessary and contingent truth ([7], p. 
649). I will concentrate here on the errors he finds 
implicit in realism in order to show how my theory avoids 
such a fate. 
The dispute between the realist and anti-realist 
(correspondence and coherence) has been waged in terms of 
whether it is reasonable to assert the possibility of an 
alternative conceptual framework replacing entirely the one 
we currently have, according to Rorty. Without getting into 
the details of his argument, Rorty rejects the notion of 
different conceptual frameworks carving up the world 
differently. An equivocation is involved here on the meaning 
of "the world," which is· particularly relevant to realism. 
The realist, Rorty says, wants the world to be independent of 
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our knowledge in such a way that it might turn out that the 
world contains none of the things we attribute to it. The 
world, in other words, must not be conditioned in any way by 
the receptive faculty of our concepts, whether those concepts 
are innate or optional. 
The equivocation appears when we realize that what 
the realist means when he refers to "the world" is what the 
vast majority of our beliefs that are not currently in 
question are thought to be about ([7], p. 662). For realism 
to be interesting, it must at once treat the world as having 
those entities we refer to and also treat it as unspecified 
and unspecifiable. It does not help, he says, to talk of the 
world in terms of "sense-data" or "stimuli" of a certain sort 
which effect our sense organs, for this is to involve oneself 
in a theory specifying how the world is ([7], p. 663). 
My theory escapes this equivocation by virtue of the 
fact that it contains no distinction between receptivity and 
spontaneity. If the realist is to include a receptive 
faculty, he needs an independent test from the world in order 
to balance the order imposed by that faculty. He must take 
some position, however general, on the nature of the world in 
order to show that it can count as the source of independent 
test. In other words, he has not fully escaped from 
ontology. The equivocation that Rorty points to could be 
equally well described as the result of doing ontology and 
epistemology without distinguishing which is which. In the 
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process of analyzing the relationship between concepts and 
knowledge, the realist is pursuing epistemology, but in 
positing a receptive faculty, he has retained an implicit 
ontology. Whether the character of that faculty is innate or 
optional makes no difference. 
I believe that observation is spontaneous, that there 
is no reception apart from activity on the part of a knower. 
What I have done here is analyze that activity in order to 
see whether there are reasons to believe that science is 
empirical in the sense of referring to real entities in the 
world. The reasons that I have offered have nothing to do 
with the privileged claims about the way the world really is. 
The problem of how the world really is I leave to science, 
art and common sense. 
My reference to "energy," for instance, has nothing 
to do with privileged information on my part. The concept of 
"energy" is itself theory-laden, but this is an advantage and 
not a defect. My point, after all, is to provide a theory of 
the empirical character of scientific knowledge. If the 
theory provides good reaons for believing that science is 
empirical, it succeeds. 
privileged claims. 
It cannot succeed if it re lies on 
Rorty's realist wants the world to be independent of 
our knowledge in order to have it serve as a source of 
independent test. I too believe that the world is 
independent of the knower. I also believe that it is a 
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source of test for science. I further believe that our 
knowledge and observations are of real entities in the world. 
But in order to maintain these beliefs I need not take any 
position on what the world is like independent of our 
knowledge of it. The question is nonsense for it is 
knowledge that tells us what the world is like. 
I have good empirical evidence for the first belief, 
that the world is independent of the knower, for as Scheffler 
says, it frequently surprises me and resists my attempts to 
deal with it. By analyzing observation I have attempted to 
give a philosophical interpretation to that sense of the 
independence of the world. That interpretation has 
implications for our understanding of science and I have 
investigated some of those implications. But nowhere do I 
hold that the knowledge that we gain of the world through 
oservation "represents" the world in the sense of being a 
sort of carbon copy or impression on a wax block, for that is 
the receptivity assumption criticized by Rorty. 
Consequently, when knowledge changes my theory does not 
fracture, for on my view knowledge does not correspond to the 
world by virtue of copying or picturing. This is not what it 
means to have empirical knowledge of the world. 
The belief that the world is the source of test in 
science is supported by both empirical evidence and 
philosophical arguments. Physical science supplies the 
empirical evidence that the contribution to the perceptual 
process by the world is energy. 
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Physical science also 
supports the argument that thought or theory could not 
possibly alter or generate energy of the sort supplied by the 
world. The philosophical argument provided in connection 
with the analysis of observation and the medical and light 
research examples gives a reasonable analysis of theory-
function in theory-laden observation without supposing that 
theory alters or fabricates the energy contribution from the 
world. The combination of these arguments gives us a concept 
of observational evidence in science which is based on 
theory-laden observation, and yet which has no non-empirical 
aspect. 
It is my position that this is an adequate argument 
to support a realist interpretation of science. I also 
believe that this argument supports the inclusion of a 
correspondence component in a theory of scientific truth. 
The claim that scientific knowledge corresponds to the world 
is based in part on the fact that we have good empirical 
reasons for believisng that there are entities apart from 
human observers. It might be objected, however, that the 
issue in supporting correspondence is not that there are 
entities apart from us but rather what those entities are 
like. In a sense I agree with this objection; correspondence 
cannot be established between determinate knowledge and an 
indeterminate world ("unspecified and unspecifiable" in 
Rorty 1 s discussion). But the issue is complex and 
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distinctions are needed in order to clarify it. First, it is 
clear that the correspondence relation is between our 
knowledge and the world. The problem is how we could 
possibly know whether correspondence is possible. 
There are two possible solutions to the problem of 
how to know whether correspondence is possible. The first is 
a philosophical analysis of the processes of coming to know 
the world which may or may not support the belief in corres-
pondence between knowledge and the world. The second is a 
comparison between scientific knowledge and some other source 
of knowledge of the world such as ontology or metaphysics. 
The latter is unlikely to succeed since it shifts the problem 
from correspondence between knowledge and the world to 
correspondence between two types of knowledge. The problem 
of how we know whether correspondence between the more basic 
type of knowledge and the world is possible would remain. 
If appeal to special (non-scientific) knowledge of 
the world does not succeed, the philosophical analysis of the 
processes of coming to know the world seems to be the most 
reasonable route. But how are we to respond to the charge 
that the issue is not that there are entities but what those 
entities are like? We cannot know what the entities are like 
apart from our knowledge (in this case, scientific knowledge) 
of them. Even if we held open the possibility of appeal to 
special or privileged knowledge of a metaphysical or 
ontological sort, it would not answer the question of 
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correspondence. At least this much is clear: if we are to 
show that correspondence is possible we must do more than 
argue that there are entities apart from human observers. We 
must show that the impact of those entities is neither 
altered nor fabricated by the observer. 
Does this leave open the problem of how 
correspondence can hold between determinate knowledge and 
indeterminate entities in the world? The fact that those 
entities are unknown apart from our knowledge of them should 
not be confused with the assumption that they are indeter-
minate apart from our knowledge of them. There is no reason 
to suppose that the entities of the world are indeterminate 
or unspecifiable apart from our knowledge of them. 
Further, a qualified sense of correspondence is 
supportable based on the theory-ladenness of observation if 
it can be shown that theory-ladenness means only that 
observation is guided by theory and not determined by theory. 
If this is so, then observational evidence is objective in 
the same qualified sense. 
Coherence has a role as well since the scientist is 
most likely to seek answers in directions or areas mapped out 
by his predecessors. But coherence should not be interpreted 
in the strong sense that the truth of a proposition is 
decided by whether is is "logically deducible from some of 
the other propositons ••• of the system" ([11], p. 111). 
Instead, it should be taken to mean something weaker such as 
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"not compatible with some of the other propositions of the 
system." Discoveries in science are often incompatible with 
some of the propositions previously accepted. And further, 
the new theory will probably not be strictly deducible from 
anything contained in past assertions. 
But coherence has additional value in that it tells 
us why particular bits of data were picked out (and why 
others were ignored), and why they were connected in the ways 
that they were. Historical background has a powerful impact 
on virtually all research since there is, perhaps, an 
infinite number of possible connections that could be made 
among the data of our environment. The connection that is 
chosen will have to demonstrate that it corresponds to the 
world, but it is unlikely that it is the only connection that 
could do that. Correspondence cannot tell us why this 
particular connection was chosen, but coherence may. This is 
part of the sense in which a theory of truth should apply to 
the process of science and not merely to the product. 
Pragmatism contributes to this theory of scientific 
truth both in terms of process and product. A theory 
fulfills its function when it makes a new connection among 
the available data, and we know when that has happened when 
new observaions occur as a result. This functional quality 
represents a pragmatic aspect of science, but not in the 
"large and loose" sense that an assertion is called true if 
it satisfies the purpose of the inquiry that brought it 
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about. This sense of pragmatism confuses reasons for 
accepting something with the reasons for accepting it as true 
( [ 11], pp. 124-127). The sense in which I wish to employ 
pragmatism is as a tool of correspondence. To say that an 
assertion is true when it corresponds to a fact is important 
and there is no reason not to maintain that sense of truth in 
connection with science. But it remains an open question how 
we know when an assertion corresponds to a fact and it is 
this aspect of truth that pragmatism fleshes out. We know 
that a theory corresponds to a fact when it makes possible a 
new observation. This is a more specifically empirical 
interpretation of pragmatism than the more vague criterion of 
"satisfying the purposes of the inquiry that brought it 
about." The point is the same, however, since the purpose of 
scientific inquiry is to establsih a context within which a 
problematic phenomenon no longer appears problematic. 
TRADITIONAL EMPIRICIST PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 
The problem that is common to Kuhn, Nagel and Thrane 
is the failure to examine observation. 
Kuhn and Nagel both retain the philosophical under-
pinning of an earlier age when it was assumed that 
observation was theory-neutral. If theory-neutrality were 
the case then it would ·be reasonable to expect that the 
content of observation reports would be uniform for all 
normal observers. With the introduction 
theory-ladenness of observation into the debate, 





observation reports to "epochal stability" and ''relative 
stability" in those reports. They thought that these 
interpretations of observational evidence were enough to 
support rational characterizations of science. The error of 
these approaches is due to the fact that the philosophical 
underpinning of uniformity in observation reports--the 
theory-neutrality of 
without losing it. 
observation--cannot be watered down 
That is, the assumption of uniformity 
reports is based on a philosophy of among observation 
perception, that perception can be accomplished without 
theory. Once that philosophy of perception is given up, as 
it must be with the acceptance of the theory-ladenness of 
observation, there is no longer any philosophical support for 
the belief in the uniformity of observation reports. That 
belief provided the implicit foundation for the empirical 
characterization of science. What is needed to re-establish 
an empirical characterization of science is an examination of 
observation, or a new philosophy of perception. 
The structure of the rationality of science can then 
be built on that analysis, but its shape cannot be predicted 
prior to the analysis of observation. Kuhn and Nagel tried 
to retain the stucture of rationality of science that was 
based on the justification of scientific knowledge, but they 
176 
did so without the foundation on which the justificationist 
approach was built. 
Braithwaite takes a straightforward approach to this 
problem, arguing that philosophy of perception is irrelevant 
to philosophy of science, so long as all observers report the 
same things. As we have seen, that argument has 
contradictory assumptions. 
Popper argues for much the same point with similar 
conflicts. The problem of epistemology, he says, lies in the 
logical relations between statements, "which alone interest 
the epistemologist" ([6],, pp. 43, 99). He admits that all 
knowledge of the world comes from observation, but he insists 
that this knowledge can justify other statements. 
The conflict in Popper's position is obvious in the 
sense that testability is his primary criterion for the 
acceptability of scientific statements, as it must be for any 
falsificationist. In fact, he retains Braithwaite' s 
contradictory assumptions. He believes, like Braithwaite, 
that observation reports should be the same for all normal 
observers. Any scientific statement, he says, "can be 
presented (by describing experimental arrangements, etc.) in 
such a way that anyone who has learned that relevant 
technique can test it" ([6], p. 99). This instrumentalist 
approach avoids none of the problems introduced by the 
theory-ladenness of observation. The data achieved with the 
aid of the instrument must be fitted into a context. That 
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context is theory and if the theory is in dispute the 
relevance of the data may be in dispute as well. 
Popper's position in this regard can be easily 
misconstrued, I believe. He takes great pains to argue that 
which statements we employ as "basic" in science is a matter 
of choice, giving the appearance of a conventionalist stance. 
If he had a genuinely conventional interpretation of 
observation, he could not be accused of Braithwaite's 
contradiction. But the matter of choice for Popper is purely 
the problem of where to stop in the deductive chain of 
reasoning. He happily admits that any basic statement at 
which we choose to stop has the character of a "dogma," but 
the admission of dogmatism is innocuous because we can at any 
time test it further by deducing further consequences from it 
([6], p. 105). 
Popper must include observation in some form and he 
does so with the criterion of "observability" (any basic 
statement in science must be about an observable event). We 
need not define observability, however. Instead, we should 
treat it as a primitive concept, he says ([6], pp. 102-103). 
Like Braithwaite, Popper restricts philosophy of 
science to the logical relations among sentences. And like 
Braithwaite he rules out any examination of observation. 
This appears to be a reasonable ploy because "basic 
statements" are unproblematic as to their content. I.e., 
philosophy of perception is treated as irrelevant because of 
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the assumption of uniform content in observation reports, 
which is based on the assumption of the theory-neutrality of 
observation, a philosophy of perception. 
The importance of examining observation is demon-
strated in another way in Israel Scheffler's Science and 
Subjectivity. Scheffler wants to include the notion of 
theory-ladenness in his interpretation of observation, while 
maintaining that science is objective. That observation is 
the source of that objectivity can be seen from the fact of 
disharmony between what we expect and what we observe ([8], 
p. 44). This leads him to attempt an interpretation of 
observation that, although theory-laden, nonetheless provides 
the basis of agreement among scientists who may not agree 
about theory. One of the ways in which he does this is to 
off er an extensional interpretation of the meaning of 
observation terms in order to establsih the possibility of 
uniformity of content for observation reports, even among 
theoretical disputants. How this interpretation of the 
meaning of observation terms is compatible with 
theory-ladenness is never entirely clear, especially since 
theories cannot be given an extensional definition, referring 
as he says they do to unobservables. 
There are two things to be emphasized about 
Sheffler's argument. First, it ends almost where it began, 
with the dependence on the notion of disharmony between what 
we observe and what we expect ([8], pp. 118 ff.). He 
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provides no philosophical interpretation of this disharmony 
and that brings up the second point of emphasis. What he has 
given does not constitute an analysis of observation because 
he begins with the assumption that observation must provide 
"independent control" over be lief ( [ 8], p. 45). To begin 
with such an assumption is to give the answer to the question 
of philosophy of perception in advance. The proper question 
about observation is, how is it possible for observation to 
achieve knowledge of the world? To begin with the assumption 
that it must be independent of belief is to beg the question. 
This is exactly what is wrong with Thrane's approach. 
His analysis of seeing begs the question. He substitutes a 
defense of the possibility of theory-neutrality for an 
analysis of observation. He believes that the objectivity of 
science depends on theory-neutrality. Such an approach 
appears with hindsight to be fainthearted. The outcome is 
interesting, however, since it leads to the conclusion that 
observation as theory-neutral is irrelevant to epistemology. 
The analysis of observation is the key to any 
empirical characterization of science. It is because the 
discovery approach leads us through an analysis of 
observation as a first step that it is superior to the 
justificationist approach. The question of how it is 
possible to obtain knowledge of the world through observation 
must be answered before the question of rational structure of 
science is raised. The former has been avoided by Kuhn, 
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Nagel and Thrane as well as by Scheffler and Popper, but only 
by begging the question or making contradictory assumptions. 
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CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSION 
My point has been to argue that an adequate under-
standing of science must examine the problem of the discovery 
of scientific knowledge. The failure to do so, I have shown, 
results in limited knowledge. In general, my thesis can be 
taken as an argument against justification-discovery 
distinction which is treated by Reichenbach ([3], p. 382) and 
others as the outline for the program of philosophy of 
science. That is, philosophy of science concerns itself with 
reasons for accepting an hypothesis after it is offered or 
justification, and not with the reasons for offering that 
hypothesis or its discovery. 
The reason why the failure to examine discovery has 
caused problems is because of inadequate and self-defeating 
concepts of observation. The inadequacy of the understanding 
of observation was first revealed by the recognition that 
observation was theory-laden. I have examined works from 
recent writers in philosophy of science in order to see how 
they responded to the challenge brought by the theory 
ladenness of observation. 
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The first of these writers was Kuhn. 
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Kuhn brought 
the problem of the theory-ladenness of observation to the 
surface of philosophy of science. His handling of it had a 
great deal of impact on philosophers who followed him. 
Kuhn's concern with observation grew out of his 
study of the history of science. The evidence was over-
whelming, he believed, that the model of scientific growth by 
steady accumulation was inaccurate. It seemed to him that a 
regular feature of science was the periodic rejection of much 
that had been considered "scientific," including observation 
reports. The conclusion appeared unavoidable that the 
foundation of objective observation reports so long pre-
supposed by empiricist philosophers was faulty. The 
foundation of observation reports appeared to him to have 
more to do with consensus among the community of scientists 
than with objectivity in the sense of giving a true account 
of the world. 
Kuhn did not explicitly conclude that science itself 
was irrational. Instead, he continued to describe the 
rationality of science in terms of the relation of 
justification between theories and observation statements. 
The problem of philosophy of science, according to Kuhn, was 
to determine the sense in which that relation still held, 
given the loss of objectivity brought by the theory-ladenness 
of observation. 
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Science, he said, could continue justifying its 
theories on the basis of observation reports so long as the 
theories with which the observations were laden were not in 
dispute. When those theories were in dispute, however, 
observation reports could no longer function as evidence. 
During such periods science was left with "persuasion" and 
"conversion" as means of making decisions. Revolutions, or 
periods of major change, were treated as irrational by Kuhn. 
Kuhn's work can be seen as an attempt to define the 
limits of philosophy of science, given the theory-ladenness 
of observation and the loss of objectivity it entails. 
Philosophy of science, he concluded, retained the capacity to 
illuminate the rationality of science when theory remained 
stable, but it became mute when theory changed. 
Kuhn accepted the theory-ladenness of observation and 
concluded accurately that there was something wrong with the 
traditional empiricist notion of the objectivity of observa-
tion. Consensus on the content of observation reports did 
not seem to be supportable, given the history of science. 
But instead of trying to find another interpretation of the 
objectivity of observation, he concerned himself with 
describing the implications of the loss of the traditional 
sense of objectivity. He rejected the problem of discovery 
and thereby blocked at least one avenue that would have been 
more fruitful. 
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Nagel attempted to solve Kuhn's problem. He accepted 
the claim that observation was theory-laden, but he argued 
that theory-ladenness did not relativize knowledge or lead to 
circularity in testing in the ways that Kuhn thought. He 
held that even if there were no inherent differences between 
observation and theory terms and statements, observation 
terms and statements were nonetheless more stable. This 
relative stability provided all the foundation that was 
required for the testing or justification relation to remain 
a viable way of characterizing the rationality of science, he 
said, with the single proviso that the observational evidence 
chosen to justify theory not be laden with that particular 
theory. 
In a sense I believe that Nagel is right in his 
assertion that observation terms and statements are 
relatively stable in comparison to theory terms and 
statements, although in particular cases this may not be 
true. Unlike Nagel, however, I can place that assertion in 
the context of the theory-observation distinction. That is, 
theory and observation are distinct because of levels of 
generality and generality is sometimes related to stability 
although not always. 
Nagel's difficulties came from the same source as 
Kuhn's. He assumes that the objectivity of observation must 
be based on consensus on the content of observation reports. 
When forced to admit the theory-ladenness of observation he 
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resorts to "common-sense" as a source of theory or prior 
knowledge that satisfies the consensus requirement and 
provides "relative" stability. This gives him a sense of 
objectivity but only insofar as common sense is objective. 
Should common sense change he would have no more insight into 
that period of change than Kuhn did into revolutions in 
science. Nagel's solution to Kuhn's problem amounts to 
shifting the basis of consensus from the scientific community 
to the community at large. 
This is not an attractive solution for two reasons. 
First, it does not tell is how specifically scientific 
observation reports (that have no common sense corollaries) 
achieve any reasonable sense of objectivity. With 
theory-ladenness admitted, there would appear to be no basis 
for consensus on the content of observation reports. The 
second reason for rejecting this solution is that Nagel 
himself implicitly rejects it. He grants that circularity in 
the testing relation is still possible, although avoidable. 
Within science relative stability does not solve the problem 
of the objectivity of observation. As long as the basis of 
objectivity is the content of observation reports, the 
admission of theory-ladenness will raise the issue of 
meaning-dependence and circularity. And as long as the 
evidence of observation is even occasionally circular, it can 
not be genuine evidence because the obj ecti vi ty of 
observation is in doubt. 
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Nagel's treatment of science is interesting for one 
more reason. He raises the issue of the function of theory 
in science but he can find no way to account for it within 
the parameters of the problem of justification. His "use" 
criterion fails because, as he sees, theories sometimes 
report observations. The problem of objectivity as well as 
the problem of theories results from the isolation of 
objectivity in observation. If he had examined the problem 
of discovery the interrelations between theory and 
observation would have become the working context of his 
philosophy of science. Instead, the separation of theory and 
observation become a presupposition. Consequently, the 
function of theory in reporting observations was as much a 
problem as the objectivity of observation. 
In short, Nagel tried to solve Kuhn's problems but he 
retained the source of those problems in his assumptions 
about observation. And like Kuhn, he avoided the one route 
that offered relief from the difficulties raised by theory-
ladenness. 
This attempt to solve the problems raised by 
theory-ladenness failed, but others have concluded implicitly 
that those problems are unsolvable. The article by Thrane 
supported this conclusion. Like Kuhn, Thrane say that 
theory-ladenness was incompatible with a consensus-on-content 
interpretation of the basis of objectivity in observation. 
But unlike Kuhn, he chose to develop a concept of vision that 
was theory-free. 
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Without theory, he thought, consensus on 
the content of observation would be achievable. His article 
is interesting because it establishes conditions that must be 
met for theory-free observation. The most important 
condition is that the object of observation must be something 
of which we are not aware. This is so because to be aware of 
something is to-be aware of it as something determinate. 
Since determinateness is the province of theory or knowledge, 
indeterminateness is critical to theory-free vision. 
Thrane's argument for the possibility of perceiving something 
without being aware of it fails, but he detects failure in an 
even more important sense. Even if it were reasonable to 
talk of an object of vision of which we are not aware, it 
would be useless for philosophy of science, he says. Why? 
Because an object of vision that is so radically indeter-
minate cannot be specified as content in an observation 
report. In other words, his theory aims at a ground for 
consensus on observation reports but the conditions required 
for consensus are incompatible with content. 
Thrane's article helps to point out that the problems 
of philosophy of science discussed here were not created by 
the theory-ladenness of observation, but were implicit in the 
separation of theory from observation. The principle that 
consensus on the content of observation reports was the basis 
of objectivity required incompatible presuppositions. It 
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required indeterminateness for consensus and determinateness 
for content. 
I have described the independence of the evidence of 
observation as a pseudo-problem. It arises, as we have seen 
for two reasons. First, the concept of the objectivity of 
observation reports and the theory-ladenness of observation 
seemed to threaten that concept. And second, the concept of 
theory in its relation to observation was left unexamined. 
Theory was examined in philosophy of science to be sure, but 
the sense in which it might be said to contribute to 
observation was left unspecified. I have offered discovery 
as the approach to correct this situation because discovery 
in science~ the discovery of theories. If we examine that 
process we find both what theories contribute to observation 
and how they make that contribution. What they contribute is 
the selection and connection of the data-energy from the 
environment and not the data itself. How the contribution is 
made is through constant contact with the environment. This 
tells us both ~hat theory is not a dilution-factor and that 
it does not spring ex nihilo from the mind of the scientist. 
It is empirical both in process and product and fully 
compatible with an objective account of observation. 
The independence of observational evidence is a 
pseudo-problem based on faulty presuppositions about the 
objectivity of observation and the failure to analyze the 
discovery of theory. Nagel's work showed us how the latter 
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results in the treatment of theory as the "free creation" of 
the mind of the scientist and the concomitant inability to 
integrate the function of theory into philosophy of science. 
The meaning-dependence of observation terms on theory 
was shown to be a pseudo-problem on similar grounds. In a 
common sense sort of way it is surprising that such a problem 
should plague self-avowed empiricists. If a relation of 
meaning dependence should arise for empiricists it should 
have been the other way around, with the assumption that 
theory terms were meaning-dependent on observation terms. 
But it was to illuminate the reasons behind this construal of 
the problem that the demarcation criterion was introduced. 
The empiricists made presuppositions that were shielded from 
examination. They assumed that science was different from 
metaphysics because of its dependence on observational 
evidence. Observation became their criterion of the real and 
was doubly protected from inclusion in the program of 
philosophy of science. To examine it would appear to be an 
exercise in metaphysics or an incursion into science. 
Consequently, the only recognized source of meaning in 
science was theory and the arrow of meaning-dependence was 
clearly established. 
But, again, to correct this problem we need only 
examine the discovery of theories to find that meaning 
determination is the process of science itself. "Theory" and 
"observation" are logical distinctions which illuminate that 
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process but they do not refer to separate or separable sets 
of terms. It is only when theory and observation are 
artificially separated that dependence appears as a problem. 
Falsification theory offered little that was new, as 
the problem of the non-rejection of theories showed. 
Non-rejection was a problem only because of related 
assumptions about the basis of objectivity and the program of 
philosophy of science. Observation provided the bas is of 
objectivity because of its content and this in turn was the 
foundation of the rationality of science. The admission of 
the theory-ladenness of observation forced the falsifica-
tionists toward a conventionalist position, but this appeared 
(at least to Lakatos) the only alternative to irrationalism. 
That is, falsificationism did not represent a 
significant philosophical advance because it retained the 
unsupportable content interpretation of the basis of 
objectivity in observation, and because it continued to 
restrict the program of philosophy of science to the testing 
relation and its implications. The sophisticated provisos 
added by Lakatos, e.g., that a theory not be rejected until 
another is found with "corroborated excess empirical content 
over its predecessor," is significant for understanding 
science, but 1 t has the flavor of an ad hoc addendum. The 
program of philosophy of science as justification provided no 
context within which this insight fits. Justification in 
general has become too fragmented, resembling a patchwork 
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more than a program, as a result of the damage to the concept 
of objectivity brought by theory-ladenness. 
Discovery, on the other hand, provides a context 
within which the peaceful co-existence between theories and 
anomalies constitutes no problem for the rationality of 
science. The objectivity of observation, discovery revealed, 
is not based on content. 
This is why Hanson's philosophy of science represents 
an alternative to the traditional empiricist program. 
Instead of making assumptions about observation, he proposed 
to examifle observation as the starting point of philosophy of 
science. The issue is discovery, he said, and the way to 
enlighten discovery is by determining how theories are built 
into our appreciation of observation, facts and data. He 
began with the assumption that theories and observation are 
intimately related, and with the further assumption that the 
way to understand the rationality of science was through the 
investigation of that relation. 
The fruit of Hanson's approach can be seen in his 
contribution to the understanding of theories as the context 
or background against which observational details make sense 
alongside other data. He also characterized theory as an 
empirical part of science. But, equally important in his 
analysis of observation which attempted to accommodate its 
complexity and depth. He was able to bring these insights to 
bear on particular issues in philosophy of science. He was 
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able to show, for instance, that the so-called "functionally 
a priori" character of some of the laws of classical physics 
is a psychological issue with little relevance to the 
epistemology of science, giving new meaning to the charge of 
"psychologism." He also showed that many problems thought to 
be peculiar to quantum mechanics fit the relations between 
theory and observation that he developed in Patterns of 
Discovery. 
Hanson's philosophy of science mapped the discovery 
direction that I have followed here. He began by examining 
the interrelations between theory and observation with the 
result that he was able to specify the function of theory in 
scientific observation as well as its empirical character. 
The theory-ladenness of observation appeared to be threaten-
ing from the justificationist's perspective in part because 
that perspective offered no analysis of the relations between 
theory and observation. Theory input into observation was 
admitted in some cases (such as in the works of Nagel and 
Kuhn treated here) without any specification of its actual 
meaning or sense. Whatever its meaning it appeared to 
conflict with objectivity based on the content of observation 
reports. By following Hanson's lead I have been able to show 
that it is possible to develop a concept of observation that 
is both objective and compatible with theory input. The 
function of theory, I have argued, can be characterized as 
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selective and connective which makes it both empirical and a 
non-diluting factor in perception. 
I have further attempted to develop a theory of truth 
that is appropriate for this approach to scientific 
knowledge. That theory has elements of correspondence as 
well as coherence and pragmatism. One of the most attractive 
parts of the theory is that it avoids too great a dependence 
on coherence or conventionalism. Lakatos described Popper as 
courageous for his willingness to proceed on an essentially 
conventional foundation, having found no reasonable sense of 
correspondence. The lack of a correspondence element was due 
to the faulty and unsupportable assumption that obj ecti vi ty 
was to be founded on observation reports. To proceed as he 
did seemed the only path open, given the dictates of the 
justification program of philosophy of science, but a more 
prudent course would have been to seek another ground for or 
interpretation of objectivity. 
The coherence or conventional aspect of the theory of 
truth developed here is not a retreat position but instead 
has a functional role in the philosophy of discovery. All 
discoveries are contextual and understanding how a discovery 
was made requires an appreciation of the history of the 
problem that stimulated research in the first place. Harold 
Brown recommends the analysis of discovery in science based 
on its historical context but he has explicitly given up any 
sense of correspondence between scientific knowledge and the 
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world. Instead he calls any proposition "true" that is part 
of a body or scientific knowledge ( [l], pp. 152-155). He 
overtly embraces historicism and relativism as that which is 
possible for philosophy of science. 
This is not a necessary course. In a recent article 
Theodore Kisiel attempts to formulate a logic of discovery 
which illuminates the rationality of science without 
abandoning the belief that scientific knowledge somehow makes 
objective contact with the world. The logic of discovery, he 
points out, begins with the problem to be solved, and 
problems are not man-made. They force themselves upon us and 
this suggests a sense of objectivity that he calls "peculiar" 
and more complex than the objectivity of atomically isolated 
data ( [2], p. 405). This is compatible with the sense of 
objectivity to which I have attempted to give structure here. 
I.e., observation is treated as objective because the input 
from the world is both genuine and undiluted. 
Kisiel further argues that the logic of discovery is 
more basic than traditional forms of reasoning such as 
deduction since these depend on discovery for their premises. 
This more basic form or rational! ty would be measured, he 
says, by the ability of the researcher to adapt to new and 
challenging problems ([2], pp. 403-404). This stands in 
marked contrast to measuring a student's ability to learn and 
apply rigid rules of inference. 
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Kisiel, like Brown, takes what might be called a 
contextual approach and for that reason could be on the same 
path to conventionalism. He avoids that course, however, by 
placing his analysis of discovery in a wider, human context 
with discovery characterized as a "form of life" that 
presupposes objectivity and precedes verification ( [2], p. 
409). His direction for philosophical investigation is 
aimed, in my terms, at fleshing out the coherence of 
discovery. I believe that this is potentially a very 
fruitful direction to take. 
An implied problem that deserves consideration is the 
appropriateness of available metaphors for knowledge. If 
correspondence is the primary criterion of truth and 
consensus on observation reports the basis of obj ecti vi ty, 
then the most likely metaphor for the relation between 
knowledge and the world will be picturing or mirroring. 
Hanson has pointed out some of the problems with this 
metaphor, but in a broader sense it fails by being too rigid 
and specific. It is possible for observation to yield 
genuine contact with the world without generating a 
foundation for consensus. In fact, it can be characterized 
as objective without any specification of content and this 
leaves open the possibility of a functional metaphor such as 
"tool-using." 
The shift from a content metaphor to a functional 
metaphor may have other interesting implications as well. 
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Knowledge can be viewed as far more fluid and subject to 
change (of any depth) on the tool interpretation without the 
sense of threat that accompanied the content interpretation. 
We are not foreed to make uncomfortable concessions, 
admitting for instance, that "knowledge" that once served us 
effectively and was called "true" is now considered false. 
Archaic knowledge was true because it manifested the three 
elements of correspondence, coherence and pragmatics. The 
fact that this was superseded represents no conflict for this 
theory of knowledge simply because the basis of our concept 
of objectivity is not content. 
The emphasis on fluidity may also have implications 
for fields such as learning theory and psychology. Neurosis 
might, for instance, be characterized and treated as, in 
part, an epistemological illness--the inability to relinquish 
certain non-functional approaches to the world. 
A similar psychological problem may be responsible to 
some small degree for obscuring the importance of theory-
laden observation to epistemology. While it is clear at a 
common-sense level that our knowledge and attitudes influence 
what we are able to observe, it is also common-sense that 
many of those controlling factors are not empirically based 
in any obvious way. Attitudes and beliefs that are inherited 
from our culture, sub-culture and family may remain unchal-
lenged for a lifetime and yet constitute a dysfunctional 
element in our lives. This would appear to call for a 
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distinction between theory-laden observation (which I have 
described as empirical in all its aspects) and ego-laden 
observation. 
The tool-functional metaphor may also facilitate a 
more practical approach to the assessment of knowledge 
claims. The process of determining the value of knowledge 
claims need no longer be restricted to an up or down truth 
determination. The discovery approach places knowledge 
itself, as Kisiel suggests, in the broader context of human 
life. The broader context allows for knowledge assessment 
based on notions such as "appropriateness." The picturing 
metaphor, on the other hand, restricts knowledge assessment 
to the corresponding relation between knowledge and its 
purported objects. 
The discovery approach, however, places no restric-
tions on the level of scrutiny in knowledge assessment. The 
only philosophical difference between theory and observation, 
after all, is the level of generality. Any level, including 
the most basic observation is fair game. 
It is my belief that the discovery approach to 
scientific knowledge can give new life to philosophy of 
science without sacrificing a basic commitment to empiricism. 
It provides a context that is broader than justification, and 
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